| PHIL 109 --
History of Analytic Philosophy Fall 2013 |
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| Professor:
Clinton Tolley office: HSS 8018 hours: Mon, 12:30-2pm email: ctolley [at] ucsd.edu |
Teaching Assistant:
Matt Braich office: --- hours: --- email: --- |
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| Time:
Mon / Weds / Fri 11:00am--11:50am Location: Warren Lecture Hall (WLH) 2115 [map] |
| {first three available at
UCSD Bookstore (in the Price Center)} Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1912) Hackett reprint Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) Pears/McGuinness, tr., Routledge, 2001 A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (1936/46) 2nd ed., Dover, 1956 *Elizabeth Anscombe, Intention (1957/63) [selections will be made available electronically] |
| The main questions we will
address include: * What would it mean for 'analysis' to be the proper method of philosophy? What are the prospects for such a proposal? What are the tools (logical? conceptual? linguistic? psychological?) to be used in distinctively philosophical analysis? * Can a philosophy grounded in, and limited to, analysis claim to provide the foundations for knowledge in general, if it has to presuppose that there is something 'there' to be analyzed? Can analysis demonstrate the validity of its own method to provide knowledge? * Among all that is 'there' already prior to analysis, what is to be the primary focus of analysis? (the world? our minds? language? science?) * How can analysis ever lead to new knowledge (tell us something we don't already implicitly know)? Is it ultimately and essentially conservative? * Should analysis be the only valid method for all forms of philosophical inquiry (even, say, in ethics and aesthetics)? * If we cannot conceive of certain traditional philosophical questions and projects (in, say, metaphysics) as ones that can be resolved through analysis, what should we say about them? Would this mean that the questions themselves are invalid or meaningless? But then why would we have been tempted to ask them in the first place, and so frequently throughout the history of philosophy? We will try to answer these questions (and more!) by working through proposals made by the central figures in the historical development of the tradition which has come to be known as 'analytic' philosophy: Bertrand RUSSELL (1872–1970), Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN (1889-1951), A.J. AYER (1910–89), and Elizabeth ANSCOMBE (1919-2001). Prerequisite: upper-division standing or consent of instructor. Despite what the catalog and the registrar may think, Phil 120 is *not* a prerequisite for this course (though having taken 120 might help you get more out of the course). If you are having problems registering for the class because of this, please send me an email so that I can give you permission to enroll. |
| * writing assignments {tbd} * attendance * participation |
| {tentative} Weeks 1-3: Russell Weeks 3-5: Wittgenstein Weeks 6-8: Ayer Weeks 8-10: Anscombe |
| Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy entries (requires campus sign-in) Overview of 'analytical
philosophy'
Gottlob Frege G.E. Moore Bertrand Russell Ludwig Wittgenstein Rudolf Carnap A.J. Ayer The Vienna Circle W.V. Quine Elizabeth Anscombe Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries
Analysis in the history of philosophy Analysis in analytic philosophy John Stuart Mill Gottlob Frege G.E. Moore Bertrand Russell Ludwig Wittgenstein A.J. Ayer The Vienna Circle Logical Empiricism W.V. Quine Elizabeth Anscombe |