| PHIL
109
--
History
of
Analytic Philosophy Winter 2012 |
||||
| Instructor:
Clinton
Tolley office: HSS 8018 hours: Tues, 2-4pm email: ctolley [at] ucsd.edu |
Teaching Assistant:
Alex M. office: HSS 7039 hours: Fri, 11a-12p email: derrida [at] hush.ai |
|||
| Time:
11:00am--12:20pm Location: Pepper Canyon Hall (PCYNH) 121 [map] [**note change in room!**] |
| {available at UCSD
Bookstore (in the Price Center)} Gottlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884) J.L. Austin, tr., 3rd ed., Northwestern (1980) Gottlob Frege, The Frege Reader M. Beaney, ed., Blackwell 1997 Bertrand Russell, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918) Open Court, 1985 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) Pears/McGuinness, tr., Routledge, 2001 A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (1936/46) 2nd ed., Dover, 1956 |
| {tbd} |
| The main questions we
will address include: * What would it mean for 'analysis' to be the proper method of philosophy? What are the prospects for such a proposal? What are the tools (logical? conceptual? linguistic? psychological?) to be used in distinctively philosophical analysis? * Can a philosophy grounded in, and limited to, analysis claim to provide the foundations for knowledge in general, if it has to presuppose that there is something 'there' to be analyzed? Can analysis demonstrate the validity of its own method to provide knowledge? * Among all that is 'there' already prior to analysis, what is to be the primary focus of analysis? (the world? our minds? language? science?) * How can analysis ever lead to new knowledge (tell us something we don't already implicitly know)? Is it ultimately and essentially conservative? * Should analysis be the only valid method for all forms of philosophical inquiry (even, say, in ethics and aesthetics)? * If we cannot conceive of certain traditional philosophical questions and projects (in, say, metaphysics) as ones that can be resolved through analysis, what should we say about them? Would this mean that the questions themselves are invalid or meaningless? But then why would we have been tempted to ask them in the first place, and so frequently throughout the history of philosophy? We will try to answer these questions (and more!) by working through proposals made by the central figures in the historical development of the tradition which has come to be known as 'analytic' philosophy: Gottlob FREGE (1848–1925), Bertrand RUSSELL (1872–1970), Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN (1889-1951), and A.J. AYER (1910–89). Prerequisite: upper-division standing or consent of instructor. Despite what the catalog and the registrar may think, Phil 120 is *not* a prerequisite for this course (though having taken 120 might help you get more out of the course). If you are having problems registering for the class because of this, please send me an email so that I can give you permission to enroll. |
| * assignments {tbd} * attendance * participation |
| {tbd} |
| Routledge
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
entries (requires sign-in) Overview of 'analytical
philosophy'
Gottlob Frege G.E. Moore Bertrand Russell Ludwig Wittgenstein Rudolf Carnap A.J. Ayer The Vienna Circle W.V. Quine Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
entries
Analysis in the history of philosophy Analysis in analytic philosophy John Stuart Mill Gottlob Frege G.E. Moore Bertrand Russell Ludwig Wittgenstein A.J. Ayer The Vienna Circle Logical Empiricism W.V. Quine |