in particular from the “Transcendental Analytic”, but from the “Transcendental Dialectic” of the first Critique. Hegel then radically and systematically transforms everything else, including epistemology, in light of those metaphysical issues. The metaphysical issues concern grounds or conditions, and ultimately the completeness of grounding or ‘the unconditioned’. Now Kant argues that, although there are such metaphysical issues of basic interest to our reason itself, our attempts at a theoretical philosophy to resolve them necessarily result in contradictions, preventing us from answering questions on this domain. But Hegel seeks to show that the contradictions of the “Dialectic” teach a different lesson, about how to revolutionize metaphysics (in that same sense involving the objects of reason). So Hegel’s project in the Logic is neither like Kant’s positive project of the deductions from the “Transcendental Analytic”, nor like Spinoza’s pre-Kantian metaphysics. Hegel’s project is more distinctive: it is to reconstruct a metaphysics-centered philosophy on grounds of what he takes (rightly, in my view) to be the strongest criticism of metaphysics, from the contradictions of Kant’s “Dialectic”.

I will return below to some other ways of drawing the broader contrasts involved in my shift to a dialectic/metaphysics of reason interpretation, and why I think it makes such a big difference – for example, in Pinkard’s question about why I resist the appeal he sees in approaching the Logic as a meta-theory, and in following up Tolley’s reference and taking issue with Ameriks’ reading of Hegel in his defense of Kant. For now, I just want to add that my aim here is not to claim a somehow definitive weighing of costs and benefits in Hegel’s favor over Kant. Nor is it to defend both by assimilating them. Rather, it is to find one approach that brings into view strong arguments on conflicting sides of a deep divide. But my discussion partners have done a wonderful job of bringing out crucial junctures in the argument of the book from this point, so I turn the floor over to them.

II. Hegel and Kant on Reason and the Unconditioned

by Clinton Tolley

A. Introduction

Kreines’ book stands in a very fine line of books on Hegel – by Marcuse, Findlay, Pippin, Pinkard, Longuenesse, Beiser, Redding, Stern, Bristow, Sedgwick, Bowman, Yeomans, among others – which are distinctive in their successful combination of readability and philosophical richness – despite being about

2 See the A-Preface definition of metaphysics as conflict concerning questions posed by our reason, but which it cannot answer. Of course, Kant also seeks to transform (see CPR Bxxii) metaphysics into a new form, and to answer questions within that different kind of project.
Hegel. Kreines’ book is distinctive in that it aims to provide a unified overview of Hegel’s metaphysics. As Kreines sees it, for Hegel, metaphysics “addresses the most general and direct questions about *why* or *because* of things” (RW 3); this is the sense in which metaphysics “concerns what Hegel calls ‘reason’ (*Vernunft*) or ‘the rational’ (*das Vernünftige*) ‘in the world’” (RW 3; with reference to ENC § 241 and GW 21: 353). For Hegel – and, as Kreines reads him, for Kant, too – reason is something that is “not at base epistemological” in the sense that it is *not* first and foremost about “*justifications* for beliefs or actions” (RW 3; cf. 8); rather, the reason at issue in metaphysics is “in the world” because it consists in “the explanatory reasons why things do what they do, or are as they are” (RW 3; my ital.).

Kreines’ presentation of Hegel’s views also engages throughout in a fruitful dialogue with two distinct philosophical traditions. First, Kreines aims to show how Hegel’s critiques of the insufficiency of certain metaphysical positions are echoed or mirrored in more recent literature on related topics. Second, Kreines puts himself in a running conversation with the work of many recent English- and German-language commentators on Hegel, in order to bring more sharply to the fore how his own approach complements, builds off of, or simply outperforms some of the leading interpretive options currently on offer. The two interpretive traditions that Kreines perhaps most directly engages with are, on the one hand, one that takes its cue from aspects of Kant’s agenda in the “Transcendental Analytic”, concerning the conditions (‘demands’) for self-consciousness, most fully and thoughtfully exemplified by Robert Pippin, and, on the other, one that takes its cue instead from Spinoza’s metaphysical monism, such as Rolf-Peter Horstmann’s and Frederick Beiser’s. Kreines aims to diverge from the ‘demands of self-consciousness’ approach by (following Karl Ameriks and Terry Pinkard in) insisting that we should take our cue instead from Kant’s own account of metaphysics and reason in the “Dialectic”. Kreines’ approach aims to diverge from the ‘pre-Kantian rationalist metaphysics’ approach to Hegel by arguing that Hegel’s own view of reason must be sharply distinguished from traditional ‘foundationalist’ views which model rational explanation (and hence, ‘the absolute’) too exclusively on the substrate-property dependence relation (cf. RW 6; 22).

There is very much to recommend in Kreines’ attempt to refocus our attention on the possibility that Hegel is interested in affirming something that is at once more metaphysical than we might have anticipated, but nevertheless

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3 Translations are my own in consultation with the editions of Kant’s and Hegel’s works listed at the end under “Abbreviations”. The abbreviations GW 21 and GW 12 for the German edition of Hegel’s *Logic* in the *Gesammelte Werke* refer also to George di Giovanni’s translation, where these numbers are provided in the margins of the translation.

4 Among others, on mechanism and explanation: Jaegwon Kim, David Chalmers, David Armstrong; on monism and grounding: Jonathan Schaffer; on teleology: Robert Cummins, Karen Neander, Ruth Millikan.
also ‘post-Critical’ in its direct responsiveness to Kant’s critical challenge to the very possibility of metaphysics. In what follows, however, I want to switch to the role of critic, raising questions first about Kreines’ presentation of Hegel’s diagnosis of the failures of Kant’s analysis of the absolute in his “Dialectic” (B), and then (more briefly) about Kreines’ account of Hegel’s alternative portrayal of the absolute as absolute idea and absolute spirit (C).

B. On Kreines’ treatment of Kant’s “Dialectic”

Kreines argues that Hegel is critical of Kant’s estimation of the possibility of metaphysics, not because of Kant’s general characterization of metaphysics as reason’s search for the absolutely unconditioned, but because of Kant’s specific misunderstanding of what the absolutely unconditioned must look like if it were to satisfy the demands of reason. Hegel “seeks to deflate” Kant’s notion that the absolute will consist in “substance as bare substrate” (my ital.), as “something absolutely or unconditionally corresponding to the subject of the subject-predicate judgment” (RW 155). As Kreines sees it, Kant’s basic presupposition is that “any given explanatory regress must have an endpoint in a substratum for that regress, which need not be absolutely bare but would have to be at least bare relative to that regress” (RW 156; my ital.).

Now, from the passages Kreines goes on to furnish, it is clear that Hegel is critical of the view that reflection on the nature of judgment shows that the (explanatorily) absolute (‘unconditioned’ from the point of view of reason) must be conceived of as a bare substrate. What is less clear is that Kant himself holds this view.

For one thing, Kant coordinates the concepts (ideas) that reason forms of the unconditioned, not with forms of judgment, but with the three elementary “species of syllogism”, since it is in the series of syllogistic inferences (‘prosyllogisms’) that reason “proceeds to the unconditioned”, to determine it in several distinct ways (CPR B 379). More specifically, reason’s inferences proceed: “one, to a subject that is no longer a predicate, another to a presupposition that presupposes nothing further, and the third to an aggregate of members of a division such that nothing further is required for it to complete the division of a concept” (CPR B 379–380; my ital.).

This itself points up the extent to which Kant’s own account of reason is meant to yield a plurality of such concepts of ‘what is unconditioned’. What is more, it is only the first concept of the unconditioned, formed through “the categorical synthesis” in inference in particular, which leads to the concept of an unconditioned as subject; the unconditioned in the “hypothetical synthesis”, by contrast, is thought of as relative to the synthesis of “members of a series”, and
that of the “disjunctive” synthesis is thought of as relative to the synthesis of ‘parts in a system’ (CPR B 379). Neither of these latter two relations of conditioned to what is unconditioned can be reduced, thinks Kant, to the manner in which a subject as substance functions as something ‘unconditioned’ in relation to its inferences, let alone a bare substrate. Especially with the second two ideas of reason, the distance from subject-predicate judgment-form is especially pronounced, as these do not arise through reasoning about the categorical (subject-predicate) form at all, and do not determine their objects as absolute in virtue of being a subject in which a totality of predicates inhere. For the idea of the world-whole is the idea formed through reflection on “the unity of the series of conditions of appearance” (CPR B 391), insofar as this object is determined by reasoning about the form of hypothetical syllogism. Likewise, the idea of God is formed through reflection on “the absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of thought in general”, as “the thing that contains the supreme condition of the possibility of everything that can be thought” (CPR B 391), with this object being determined through reasoning about the form of disjunctive syllogism.

Crucially, then, though Kant does talk about an absolute subject, and though he does hold that this subject relates to a totality of conditioned things of a certain sort (representations) as their condition, nowhere does Kant claim that this subject is itself the only thing that is unconditioned – let alone itself absolutely unconditioned, i.e., unconditioned in every respect. Nor does Kant claim that the absolute subject serves as what is unconditioned with respect to every condition. If anything were to receive this title, it would have to be reserved only for the object of the transcendental ideal – namely, God. God alone, and not the absolute subject, is characterized as the “supreme condition of the possibility of everything that can be thought” (CPR B 391) – which itself points up a further difficulty with Kreines’ account of Kant. Yet Kant argues that this most absolutely unconditioned thing is represented by reason not as the absolute subject of all predicates, but by being (or grounding) a sum-total of all (positive) reality. God’s absoluteness is not thought of, by Kant, as being absolute with respect to the category of substance (a la Spinoza), in the sense of everything else being its inherence or accident. Rather, God’s absoluteness is conceived through the pure rational concept of “the whole of possibility” (CPR B 600), formed through reflection on disjunctive syllogistic form. But then not only is Kant’s understanding of something’s being the reason for something else (as being a part of its metaphysical explanation) not limited by an inference from the regress of predicates to an absolute subject that bears them as ‘bare’ substrate, it does not even take the subject-predicate sort of regress to be the most paradigmatic, ‘supreme’, case of such explanation-relations.

Surprisingly, Kreines says very little about how his diagnosis is supposed to apply to Kant’s account of reason’s most ‘absolute’ determination of the absolute,
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Kreines motivates his preferred reading (cf. RW 162) primarily by looking at the Prolegomena’s discussion of the idea of “the complete [vollständige] subject (the substantial)” of all experiences (AA IV: 330). And sure enough, here Kant does speak of reason’s “demand that for each predicate of a thing we should see its appropriate subject”, and if this subject turns out to be a predicate as well, then “we should seek its subject again, and so forth to infinity”, until we reach something which is a “final subject” and not a predicate of some further subject (AA IV: 333).

This, then, might initially seem to provide at least one particularly good case for Kreines’ substrate-reading of Kant’s absolute. Upon closer inspection, however, even Kant’s discussion of the absolute subject in particular simply does not seem to involve reason’s conceiving of this subject as absolute because it functions as a ‘bare’ substrate relative to a set of fundamentally external properties. For one thing, to repeat: Kant sees the subject as being absolute (unconditioned) only in a very particular respect, and only in relation to an all of experiences. More specifically, this “absolute subject” for all experiences is something that we think of as “the substantial” which would bear “the absolute totality of all possible experience” (AA IV: 328) as its predicates, insofar as each individual experience itself is given “in inner sense” as a “predicate” of some thinking (experiencing) subject (cf. AA IV: 334). Now, Kant’s own analysis about what is problematic concerning the idea of the absolute subject rests on a very specific thesis about cognition, which limits the possibility of cognition to what can be given through intuition. Kant argues that the absolute subject is not an object we can cognize, as it is never itself the object given in any particular intuition (AA IV: 333–334).5 Kreines, by contrast, takes Kant’s point to be instead the much more general one, that to be an absolute subject in the first place, the thinking subject must be “something independent of everything corresponding to predicates of judgment” (RW 162; my ital.) – without any qualification on the kinds of predicates that are at issue, or any reference to the concern for givenness. But Kant nowhere makes this further general claim about the absolute subject and its independence from all predicates, only the more limited one that the absolute subject is not identical with any of the specific predicates which can be given in intuition. Moreover, the latter does not seem to imply that the absolute subject need to be ‘indifferent’ to even these predicates, rather than more internally related to them (say, perhaps by these predicates also being representations of its states).

5 Since the absolute totality of all possible experience “is not itself an experience” (AA IV: 328), it (this totality) is likewise not given “in inner sense” as a predicate of the thinking subject.
After his discussion of Kant’s most direct account of the ‘absolute subject’ as ‘the substantial’, Kreines then turns to Kant’s remarks in the Second Antinomy (cf. RW 167), in which Kant is analyzing a second “idea” of reason – namely, the idea of “the unconditioned unity of objective conditions in appearance” (CPR B 433), what Kant also calls the “world-whole” (CPR B 434). There Kant portrays the Thesis position of this Antinomy as committed to the inference that, because there are composite substances, the world-whole must itself be composed of “first subjects of all composition” which are “simple beings” that function as the most “elementary substances” (CPR B 464; my ital.).

Now, despite Kant’s mention of substances here, as what is being thought of as furnishing the end-point of the regress of composition, it is not at all clear that Kant means to be claiming the whole-part relation between these ‘elementary substances’ (‘first subjects’), and the composites they form – including the ‘whole’ of the world – is itself an instance of what is expressed in the categorical subject-predicate judgment-form in particular. For the compositions are not said to stand to the elementary substances in a relation of being predicates (accidents or inherences) of these same substances. Instead, as has already been noted above, Kant seems to view the relevant whole-part relation as rather an instance of the distinct relation of conditioning that pertains to a ‘series’ (e.g., of composition and division) and is expressed in the hypothetical syllogistic form. For Kreines’ judgment-argument diagnosis of Kant’s conception of the unconditioned to apply here as well, we would have to be able to shoehorn this seemingly distinct relation into the categorical relation of independent-substrate/dependent-attribute.

In any case, as with his treatment of the paralogism’s absolute ‘subjective conditions’ for experience, Kreines’ own analysis here again tries to do an end-around past what would seem to be Kant’s much more specific concerns – first, with limits of determinate cognition of the (relatively) absolute ‘objective conditions’ for appearances, as well as the basis for these limits given the nature of what can be given in intuition (in space and time) – so as to focus on how Kant’s picture overall might be made to coordinate with the more abstract conception of unconditionedness as substrate/property. With this, Kreines’ treatment comes close to assuming that Kant could (or should) have embraced what Karl Ameriks has characterized as a ‘short argument’ for epistemic humility, based solely on some generic, merely intellectual conception of the objects of reason, rather than the one that Kant himself seems to insist on, which is based on specific considerations concerning our sensibility. This is likely because Kreines wants to have Hegel be able to make an argument against Kant, concerning the nature of the objects of reason, that also “has nothing to do with an application to a specific domain” (RW 168; my ital.) – and so is not constrained by specific difficulties that might pertain to the application of reason to the domain of ex-
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perience in particular. Instead, as Kreines sees it, “the problem is rather entirely internal to the conception of the unconditioned that is so applied” (RW 168; my ital.). The entire problem is that “we [Kant included] tend to think of reasons and their completeness through the lens of the form of subject-predicate judgments” (RW 168), and this has nothing to do with specific issues concerning the nature of space and time or the specific applicability of the ideas of reason in relation to the spatial or temporal domain. As Kreines acknowledges in footnotes, this will surely seem unsatisfying to many Kant-scholars as a successful reading of the “Dialectic” – not least because (as noted above) the whole set-up of the “Dialectic” is given precisely in terms of the attempt of reason to use syllogistic inference-forms to go ‘beyond’ any one experience, to the very specific ‘absolute totality’ of ‘all possible experience’, to then form concepts (ideas) of the specific ‘absolute’ conditions on this totality, and thereby attempt to determinately cognize the existence and nature of such conditions.  

C. On Kreines’ Account of Hegel on Absolute Idea and Spirit

In conclusion, let me turn briefly to note concerns about what I see as Kreines’ more humanistic, rather than theological, account of Hegel’s own conception of ‘the absolute’. As Kreines notes, Hegel’s own route to the absolute idea runs through a reflection on life: even if the absolute form of the idea is something that goes beyond mere life, Hegel himself claims that “the idea is, first of all, life” (GW 12: 177; cf. RW 199, 203). Life itself exemplifies the sort of relation needed to understand why we must consider the absolute not merely as concept (judgment, syllogism) or as object of this concept, but rather as the ‘unity’ of concept and object. To see what this amounts to, Hegel points first of all to the fact that “the idea is essentially process” (ENC § 215). Yet life, and the idea, is not merely process; rather, “what is living” is in fact “the process of its concluding together [Zusammenschließen] with itself” (ENC § 217; my ital.). By this Hegel means, first, that though it individualizes itself in some sense, the nature of the instances of a species of living being is clearly and thoroughly mediated by the species (concept) itself, and so these instances do not have a claim to be self-sufficient as individuals. Secondly, and even more dramatically, the individual is something whose existence necessarily “perishes [untergeht]” in the “power [Macht]” of the

6 At the outset of the “Dialectic”, the “transcendental ideas” themselves are first introduced precisely as those “pure concepts of reason” which have their “origin [Ursprung]” when “one applies [anwendet] the form of inferences of reason [syllogisms] to the synthetic unity of intuitions”, as that according to which “the use of the understanding will be determined in the whole of the entire [gesamte] experience” (CPR B 378; my ital.).
“species” or genus (ENC § 221). In fact, it is precisely as a result of “the death of the merely immediate singular living thing” that “the idea” comes to be a “free genus for itself in existence” (ENC § 222) in the first place. Already with life, then, we have the idea being identified with something that is reducible neither to the abstract concept or species of living being, nor to any individual instances (objects) of this species (concept), but rather to be the process of the species ‘realizing’ itself, through the ongoing and continued production and reproduction of its instances, and (in this way) the continued going beyond or over each of them.

Crucially, it is also precisely this “going under” of the individual (“the death of life”: GW 12: 191) which Hegel takes to constitute “the coming forth [Hervorgehen] of spirit” (ENC § 222). The coming forth of spirit therefore occurs with the freeing of the genus for existence, as both “the completion [Vollendung] of the idea of life” and the “realizing of itself [the genus] as universal […] through the sublation [Aufheben] of the particular singular individualities opposite one another” (GW 12: 190). Spirit, too, is the idea as a unity that self-realizes by “sublating or superseding [aufheben]” both its objects (individuals) and its abstract concept (the idea).

Now, over and above mere life, Hegel takes spirit to also include thinking and freedom (cf. RW 220 f.). For this reason, Kreines sees spirit as distinctively human: it is “our own species, kind, or concept – which Hegel calls spirit” (RW 220; my ital.). At this point, however, it becomes somewhat unclear what it is about humanity that ‘is’ spirit, on Kreines’ account. The last remark suggests that what possesses thinking and freedom (beyond mere life), is not any one of us individual humans, but instead something more like human kind. This is also strongly suggested by the foregoing analysis of the idea as life, in which the idea is not any one of its instances, but rather the unity of its instances in the processual realization of its concept. Along similar lines, Kreines writes later that while “the absolute idea is no substrate”, “nor is it an individual”, since “it is a process or movement, and one connecting kind and particular individual” (RW 232).

Elsewhere, however, Kreines writes as if spirit is instead realized primarily at the level of individual human persons; compare: “if we ourselves can think this process” that constitutes the idea, then “this is testament to the reality of the absolute idea and spirit” (RW 241; my ital.); similarly: “our own thinking is what realizes the idea” (RW 244; my ital.). That is, the very thinking through of Hegel’s Logic by an individual (e.g., by Hegel himself, by each of us) is what demonstrates (or at least gives a ‘testament’ to) the actual concrete realization of the

7 Elsewhere Hegel identifies this “going under” with “begetting [Begattung]”, which “extinguishes [erstirbt] the immediacy of living individuality” (GW 12: 191).
absolute idea in absolute spirit (RW 241). More specifically: “our following along [of the Logic] is spirit coming to itself”, in the form of the final completion of the demand for explanation (RW 244; my ital.).

Yet any suggestion that it is individuals (‘us’), after all, which constitute the ultimate reality of spirit as absolute idea, and hence what sort of being is ultimately self-explanatory, will be very hard to square with the progression toward absolute spirit that Hegel himself gives in the Encyclopedia. For though Hegel’s development of the path toward absolute spirit does pass from the merely living (‘natural’) soul through what he calls ‘subjective’ spirit – which itself does have the form of individual (personal) consciousness (and self-consciousness) – this shape of spirit is overcome by spirit’s taking the form of reason and then ultimately ‘objective’ spirit, and the latter is manifest not in any one individual but in groups of individuals and institutions (families, civil societies, states; cf. RW 223 f.).

What is more, spirit must take a still further step beyond even this non-individualized objective shape, in order to become genuinely ‘absolute’. Absolute spirit is said to “supersede” not just “the spirit of the people [Volksgeist] in its state” but even “the thinking spirit of world history [Weltgeschichte]” (cf. ENC § 552) – showing itself as art, religion, and ultimately, philosophy. While, when viewed out of context, it may be tempting to think that any of these final shapes are ‘realized’ in and through any one individual, the reader who has passed through the earlier parts of the Encyclopedia has been suitably prepared to resist this, in order to see shapes of thinking that definitively overcome their own individuality.

Yet despite these dimensions of Hegel’s own development of absolute spirit, Kreines himself appears to suggest, in effect, that absolute spirit is only truly reached when it returns back to the perspective of the individual person: “what is important with spirit does not go on so much behind the back, as it were, of the individual. On the contrary, the development of spirit turns on thinking or reflective capacities, and the resulting development explains the growth of improved understanding of our kind or concept, and its immanent purpose or freedom.” (RW 225; my ital.) Kreines thinks this is necessary because, for spirit to be absolute, “what is required is self-determination involving this consciousness of its own concept” (RW 225; my ital.), where the locus of consciousness is or seems to be, once again, in an individual person.

Giving into this impulse, however, would force Kreines into the following difficult interpretive dilemma. On the one hand, if this were the right way to read the final move to absolute spirit, then despite the initial advertising, Kreines’ approach actually seems to lead us directly into the territory that Pippin, Pinkard, and others have been charting for some time, since Hegel’s account would culminate in a complicated reconceiving of the nature and structure of
individual self-consciousness – one that, to be sure, incorporates the effects of forces of social and cultural mediation on its constitution, but one that is nevertheless importantly continuous with Kant’s ‘I’ of apperception. But then despite the initial focus on the metaphysics of reason (Kant’s “Dialectic”), rather than self-consciousness (Kant’s “Analytic”, the apperception problematic), for Kreines, too, the metaphysics of reason is completed in the realization of a certain kind of self-conscious self-determining self-explanatory individual human person. What it ultimately means for something to be a complete reason is completely understood (explained) only through the (admittedly mediated) individual’s self-consciousness of self-consciousness itself.

On the other hand, if Kreines were to give up on this re-individualizing impulse, and instead emphasize absolute spirit’s supersession of both human individuals, human institutions, and even world history, in favor of a more human-species/kind-oriented interpretation (recall: spirit is “our own species, kind, or concept” (RW 220)), then Kreines would face a renewed pressure to show why Hegel’s conception of absolute spirit should remain specifically human-focused at all, rather than becoming more theological – as Hegel’s own repeated characterizations of absolute spirit might otherwise suggest. Already in the very first introductory paragraphs in the Encyclopedia, for example, philosophy is said to “have its object in common with religion”, insofar as “both have truth as their object, and indeed in the highest sense – in which God is the truth and God alone is the truth” (ENC § 1; my ital.). Likewise, at the end, philosophy in general is to culminate in “the self-thinking idea” (ENC § 574), “the self-knowing reason” (ENC § 577), which is nothing other than “the idea eternally in and for itself, eternally active as absolute spirit” (ENC § 577; my ital.) – or, as the final word of the Encyclopedia has it: God itself (in Aristotle’s Greek: theos). And this is already prefigured back in the Logic, where Hegel (infamously) claims that the content of logic consists in “the presentation of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit” (GW 21: 34). None of these characterizations seem to point to humanity at all, and seem even further removed from any thought that absolute spirit – as what is fully self-explanatory – could ever be realized within the consciousness of individual human persons.

To be fair, at the end of his book, Kreines himself acknowledges that he hasn’t said much at all positively about how his view can be compatible with the connections Hegel draws between “spirit’s absolute knowledge of itself” and, e.g., “Aristotle’s account of God as thought thinking itself” (RW 264). I suspect Kreines has been motivated to swerve Hegel’s analysis back toward individual self-consciousness by his desire to avoid any Spinozist-sounding notes in his interpretation of absolute spirit (cf. RW 259–261).

Nevertheless, to the extent to which Kreines modulates the subject-matter of the Logics (and philosophy itself) away from ‘the presentation of God’ as what
is absolute, and toward the presentation of (something about?) our own human species or kind, especially if it can be ‘realized’ in its instances, Kreines will face the additional pressure of differentiating his own ‘humanized’ interpretation of absolute spirit from the other more Kant-focused interpretive camp he means to distance his reading from. For Pippin and others, who see Hegel’s account of the absolute knowing of absolute spirit as a radicalization of Kant’s account of the demands implicit in human rational self-consciousness, Kreines’ interpretation will bottom out in friendly territory, with absolute spirit as the complete self-explanation of the ‘thinking’ that we humans are capable of – rather than in the absolute thinking spirit thinking itself.

I hope that these critical remarks will draw Kreines out to say more in defense of his account of Hegel’s critique of Kant’s dialectic, and also more about the extent to which he means to de-theologize the conclusion of Hegel’s metaphysics without collapsing into the apperception-humanistic interpretation of absolute spirit itself as channeled back through individual self-consciousness. I also hope, however, that these remarks will give some indication just how helpful, informative, and instructive Kreines’ book itself is with respect to Hegel’s conception of metaphysics, how useful a guide it is into several crucial lines of thought in Hegel’s system, and how rich of a philosophical and hermeneutical contribution it makes to the field.

III. Reasons in the World and the Shadows They Cast
by Terry Pinkard

There is much to praise in Kreines’ work, at least from my perspective. He has given us a way of looking at Hegel that both unites and goes beyond some earlier readings, and in doing so, he has, while staying close to Hegel’s texts, shown us how Hegel’s thoughts and arguments play into contemporary concerns (or perhaps how what we thought were contemporary concerns were really old ones). Although the session for which this paper is written is called ‘author meets critics’, I fear I’ll have to let down the side a bit. I have learned much from the book. There are some things Kreines says that did not change my mind, but that’s just because his earlier articles had already done that. In fact, I tend to agree with Kreines on so many things that if I just get carried away with listing all the good things about the book, I’ll run the danger of turning the session into something resembling some Star Trek fanboy get-together, where we all just go over and over again our favorite parts. Instead, what I have are more like questions for Kreines to think over and tell us his own views on the answers.