

HUSSERL'S ACCOUNT OF COGNITION AND THE LEGACY OF KANTIANISM

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Introduction: the “theory of cognition” (*Erkenntnistheorie*) in the wake of Kant

It is widely accepted that an overarching goal across Husserl's career is to provide a better understanding of the nature of cognition (*Erkenntnis*). Dallas Willard, for example, claims that the “clarification” of the nature of cognition “is the primary aim of Husserl's philosophical work, at least up to 1913” (1995, 138). Bernet, Kern, and Marbach extend this claim of a central focus even further: “*Philosophy of Arithmetic, Crisis, Ideas, and Formal and Transcendental Logic* all indicate the same philosophical interest in the subjective life of cognition” (1993, 13).

In this centering of philosophy upon the theory of cognition (*Erkenntnistheorie*), Husserl shows himself to be a close kin to the critical tradition in German philosophy stemming from Kant and still very much active during Husserl's lifetime most prominently in the hands of neo-Kantians, such as Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Heinrich Rickert. What is more, as Kern (1964) has demonstrated, we know that, at key moments in Husserl's own development, he was wrestling directly with Kant's writings – something manifest especially in both his private notes and also his lectures from the 1900s on; we also can see a running dialogue with the neo-Kantians that spans the full breadth of his published writings. Yet while much of the focus in previous comparisons between Husserl and the Kantian tradition has been on the nature and extent of Husserl's own brand(s) of “idealism” (compare Pradelle 2015 and Chapter 6 in this volume) there remains much to learn about Husserl's views of cognition itself in light of their relation to the broader Kantian tradition of *Erkenntnistheorie* and “critique of cognition” (*Erkenntniskritik*). Such a comparative examination promises to bring to the fore important points of continuity between Husserl and the broadly Kantian position, while also allowing us to more clearly differentiate certain aspects of Husserl's account of cognition that diverge from, or go beyond, the Kantian account, and whether in letter or in spirit.

***Erkenntnistheorie* in Kantianism and in Husserl's intellectual formation**

Because Kant takes it as evident that, if there is such a thing as philosophical cognition, it will be “cognition of reason” (*Vernunftbegriffnis*) (B741), Kant's major criticism of existing attempts at philosophical cognition consists in a “Critique of Pure Reason.”¹ The main aim of the *Critique*

is thus to render a verdict on the claims to philosophical cognition by means of “pure” reason within the tradition – especially the metaphysical cognition recently challenged by the radical skepticism of Hume and others, concerning its objective validity. On the path to this criticism of reason, Kant undertakes an assessment of the nature and limits of human cognition more generally.

Kant prepares the way for his verdict about rational cognition in metaphysics by first examining sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and the understanding (*Verstand*) as the two faculties (“stems,” B29) which make possible the most elementary form of human cognition – namely, the cognition that we find in our “experience [*Erfahrung*]” of things that occupy the space and time of nature, including (in “inner experience”) our own mental activities. Prior to the activity of the understanding, sensibility supplies “sensations [*Empfindungen*]” and “intuitions [*Anschauungen*]” (B33–34, B132). Through these sensory representations, “an object is given to us” (B74), though on their own, sensations and intuitions are “blind” representations within us (B75), until we become “conscious [*bewußt*]” of them by “apprehending” them in what Kant calls “perception [*Wahrnehmung*]” (B160). Even in perception (in Kant’s sense), however, we only achieve a consciousness of the representations that are “in me” (i.e., the representations become something “for me,” B132), rather than a cognition of the objects that such representations represent.² For “cognition in the proper sense” (B103) to be achieved, a further act of the understanding is necessary, a synthesis which brings perceptions themselves under a concept of the object that they represent, and in this way transforms perceptions into an experience (B218). Experience thus occurs when the understanding forms a “judgment” about this object on the basis of the consciousness of its sensory representations (Kant 2004, 4:300), which entails that experience is a “mediate” (indirect) cognition of the object itself (B93).

Though “all our cognition begins with experience,” Kant also holds that cognition does “not all arise from experience,” since there is cognition that is “independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses,” in the sense that its “source [*Quelle*]” does not lie in any individual experience, but lies instead in something given “apriori” (B1–2). It is reason, rather than the understanding, that achieves this “cognition apriori”: by taking up the cognitions already achieved by the understanding in experience and then inferring to their “principles,” reason “gives unity apriori to the understanding’s manifold cognitions” (B359). The resulting “cognition from principles” is “something entirely different from mere cognition by the understanding” (B358), and “never applies directly to experience or to any object but instead applies to the understanding” (B359; see also B363).

Because reason is concerned not with attaining mere cognition, but with grounding cognitions on principles, it is reason that supplies “knowledge [*Wissen*],” which Kant identifies as a “holding-true” of a true judgment on the basis of subjectively and objectively sufficient “grounds” (B848f.). In its most developed form, reason is able to “make a system” out of a body of cognitions and achieve “science [*Wissenschaft*]” of a domain of objects (B860f.), as in mathematics and the science of nature (both identified as “sciences of reason” [B14f.]; see also B740), and also in the *Critique*’s own “aesthetic” – “the science of the rules of sensibility in general,” which yields cognition of the universal and necessary forms of sensory representation (time and space) – and its “logic” – “the science of the rules of the understanding in general,” which yields cognition of the universal and necessary forms of thinking (B76).

The history of philosophy and especially metaphysics indicates that reason does not rest content with isolated bits of knowledge or even the systematic ordering of empirical cognitions into a physics as the science of nature. Reason also strives to determine what lies beyond the physical altogether – i.e., the fundamental (“absolute”) principles or “metaphysical” grounds of everything whatsoever, regardless of whether it can be an object of experience or not (B391–392).

What is more, here, too, reason “seeks” ultimately for a “system” of knowledge in the form of a “science” of metaphysics (B7; B18). It is reason’s hitherto problematic efforts specifically in the domain of metaphysics – and its inability to decisively answer even the basic question of “how is metaphysics possible as science?” – that Kant intends for his *Critique* to assess (B22).

For our purposes, we must bracket Kant’s own conclusions concerning the possibility of specifically metaphysical cognition, knowledge, and science – along with the transcendental idealism he introduces to support these conclusions – as we must instead highlight several key features of his doctrine of cognition in general. First, though it is a key component in knowledge and science, cognition itself (and its first form, experience) is not identical with either knowledge or science. Whereas cognition (viz. experience) is something achievable by the understanding by way of a judgment about the object of perception, knowledge goes beyond mere cognition in requiring both the holding-true of a judgment, the truth of the judgment, and the cognition of sufficient grounds for holding-true. By contrast, Kant explicitly allows for false cognitions: “a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related” (B83).³ Science in turn requires something beyond mere knowledge, insofar as it orders a whole body of cognitions and grounding-relations into a complete system. Finally, cognition itself is composed out of still more basic elements: in the most elementary case (experience), cognition incorporates representations (sensations, intuitions) from sensibility, a consciousness (apprehension) of them in perception, and then an act of judgment (synthesis under a concept) by the understanding.

Kant’s insistence that the clarification of the theory of cognition is a necessary preliminary to the assessment of philosophical cognition has had perennial appeal in the centuries since – as has his specific conception of the nature of the elementary cognition in human experience as a unity of sensibility (intuition) and understanding (concept, judgment), along with his conception of knowledge and science as a still-higher unity of cognitions brought about reason. Throughout the nineteenth century, early neo-Kantian thinkers would expand and deepen – and often advocate for partial revisions of (see Beiser 2014) – Kant’s original investigations into the components of cognition (compare Helmholtz’s investigations of sensation and perception), and into the place of cognition within the logico-deductive order of science (compare Bolzano’s formulation of a theory of science or *Wissenschaftslehre* (as in Bolzano 1838)). The neo-Kantians at the turn of the century furthered developments in the theory of cognition along both of these fronts – psychological (see Rickert 1892; Natorp 1912), science-theoretic (see Cohen 1902; Rickert 1902; Natorp 1910) – while also adding to this the renewed study and reinterpretation of Kant’s own texts in light of these subsequent developments (Cohen 1885). Even while disagreements arose – about the best way to characterize the contributions from sensibility and the understanding, about the relation between elementary cognition and science, about the precise form of idealism concerning the objects of cognition that results from the revisions in Kant’s framework (see Friedman 2000, Chapter 3) – the broad contours of Kant’s vision of the proper axes of investigation for the theory of cognition remained upheld.

The full picture of Husserl’s own intellectual formation would of course include many more influences than Kant and the neo-Kantians.⁴ For our purposes, two additional lines of influence are especially worth mentioning: first, Husserl’s early work in mathematics gives a specific impetus in his initial philosophical investigations to explore the nature of arithmetical cognition in particular, with a growing sensitivity to the need for sharper distinctions within the dimensions of cognition to account for the various forms of objectivity outlined in the theory of science and in related work (by Bolzano, Frege, and others), and in particular a need to better differentiate the psychological from the logical dimensions with respect to the contents of cognition (concepts, propositions, truths). Second, Husserl’s early exposure to work

in the emerging science of psychology itself, from Brentano and Stumpf especially, amplifies the importance of clarifying the place of cognition within the broader account of psychical life, and its relation to representation (*Vorstellung*), consciousness (*Bewußtsein*; apperception), synthetic activity, and especially the intentionality that Brentano had designated as the unifying mark of psychical activity.

Acknowledging these (and other) influences, however, we will see in the next sections that, for the first several decades of his career, the general contours of Husserl's understanding of cognition nevertheless remains broadly within the Kantian outlines sketched above in several important respects. Husserl, too, conceives of cognition as a psychical achievement that goes beyond the mere having of sensory representations in mind, and beyond the kind of consciousness enjoyed in perception. Cognition, for Husserl, also involves a judgment about an object, and judgment is again theorized in terms of thinking and the understanding. Husserl likewise distinguishes cognition per se from more advanced psychical achievements like knowing and scientific comprehension,⁵ which are viewed as incorporating consciousness of the grounding of the truth of cognitions and are ultimately also assigned to reason – even as Husserl is increasingly interested in the extent to which the act of cognition might *already* be marked by specifically rational consciousness.

Early investigations into the elements of cognition

Husserl's early writings give evidence of a developing analysis of cognition and anticipate important distinctions and lines of inquiry that will become central in *Logical Investigations*. In the Foreword to the 1891 *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl characterizes his approach in this work as also consisting in investigations that are both “psychological and logical” and guided by “the interest in an *erkenntnis-theoretisch* research of arithmetic” (2003, 5–6).⁶ What is more, Husserl engages directly with the Kantian conception of arithmetical cognition, and begins to position his views in relation to Kant's own *Erkenntnistheorie*.

Husserl is sharply critical of Kant precisely for confusing psychological and logical aspects of arithmetical cognition in his specification of the content of basic arithmetical concepts such as “number” (*Zahl*) in terms of “determinations” of the intuition of time, specifically as to the “time-series” (see Kant 1998, B182–85). Husserl accepts that “succession in time” functions as a “*psychological* pre-condition” for numbering, and hence, precondition for both the “formation of the majority of number concepts and concrete multiplicities,” and ultimately for the act of cognizing number-relations (Husserl 2003, 29). Even so, Husserl rejects what he takes to be Kant's own inference from this fact – namely, that “temporal order enters into the *content* [*Inhalt*] of these concepts” (ibid.; my italics), or, as Husserl later characterizes it, the “*logical* content” or “*logical* significance” of these concepts (Husserl 2003, 33; my italics).

Taken out of context, this might suggest that Husserl means to assign intuition entirely to the psychological, in contrast to cognitive content which belongs wholly to the logical. When Husserl himself later turns to the “analysis of the concept of number according to its content,” however, Husserl insists that “no concept can be thought without a founding [*Fundierung*] in a concrete intuition” (Husserl 2003, 83). What is more, Husserl maintains that this is true not just of the number-concepts, but also of even the most abstract and generic concept, the concept of “something [*Etwas*]” (Husserl 2003, 84). Husserl thus does not mean to reject the necessity in general of an integration with intuition for cognitive content, but only to reject the necessity of the intuition of time (or space) in particular as an essential constituent of the cognitive content of arithmetical concepts.

The retention of a necessary relation between cognition and intuition becomes evident from Husserl's discussion of the manner in which even the most general concept of "something" is formed on the basis of something given (present) in the mind:

"Something" is a name that applies to every thinkable content. Every actual thing or thing in thought is a something. We can also, however, name a judgment, an act of will, an impossibility, a contradiction, etc. in this way. [...] What all objects – actual and possible, real and not real, physical and psychical, etc. – agree in, is only this, that they are contents of representation or become represented by contents of representation in consciousness. Clearly the concept of something owes its origin to reflection upon the psychical act of representing, as whose content precisely every determinate object is given. [...] Naturally, the concept *something* would not be thought unless some content or other is present [*gegenwärtig*], upon which some reflection can be performed.

Husserl 2003, 84

Here we see Husserl making a point not far from Kant's characterization of the cognition a priori that is available within aesthetic and logic: while all cognition begins with the engagement of thinking with something given, what we can come to cognize on the basis of this initial givenness – through what Husserl here calls the work of reflection – can extend to universal and necessary features of psychical acts and their contents. In the case of the most general concept of "something," what is itself made present or given in reflection is the basic structure or form of the act of representing itself, and its universal and necessary relation to some content or other, and each of these contents being thinkable.

In gesturing at a kind of givenness or presence of form that arises only on the basis of the act of reflection, Husserl is thus right on the cusp of articulating a broader notion of intuition than Kant's (finally enunciated in *Logical Investigations*; see below), insofar as it will be able to give universal objects (forms) that themselves lack the spatial and temporal contents that Husserl accepts belong to the primary contents of intuitions. Due to its determination solely with reference to the universal form of representing (*viz.* thinking), and its indifference to, and generality with respect to, any particular contents represented, Husserl calls the concept of "something" – and "one" (*Eins*), "multiplicity" (*Vielheit*), and even (against Kant) "cardinal number" (*Anzahl*) – a "form-concept or category" (Husserl 2003, 89), in an echo of Kant's title (himself echoing Aristotle's) for the most universal concepts of "objects in general" (see Kant 1998, B346).

In the second part of the work, another key component of the background theory of cognition comes into view: in addition to primary direct intuition of contents, and then the secondary intuition ("presence") of acts themselves and their forms (as secondary contents) in reflection, we are also conscious of representations whose contents point us *to still further contents*. This happens in representations in which "a content is not directly given to us as that which it is, but rather only indirectly *through signs* [*Zeichen*] which univocally [*eindeutig*] characterize it" (Husserl 2003, 205). Such representations are not representations in the "proper [*eigentlich*]" sense, but are instead "symbolic" representations ("through signs") (*ibid.*).

As an example of this contrast, Husserl distinguishes the "proper representation" that we have when "we have an outer appearance of a house that we are actually considering," over and against the "symbolic representation" that we have in mind "when someone gives us the indirect characteristic: the corner house on such and such side of such and such street" (Husserl 2003, 205–206). In the second case, the "description [*Beschreibung*]" of the object comes "to take the

place of” the “actual representation” of the house, and function as “a sign-representation that stands in for it” (Husserl 2003, 206). The latter case involves a “symbolic representation,” since what is present and given – though itself a content in its own right – is one that “refers” to some other object which is itself not “actually” (properly) given and present, by “describing” it through “characteristic features [*Merkmale*],” which “distinguish the object in a way that it can be recognized [*wiedererkannt*] when it is given” (ibid).⁷

In addition to being relevant for the analysis of ordinary cognition of mundane objects, Husserl thinks that this distinction is of special importance in the context of arithmetic in particular, due to the fact that its cognition extends to objects – such as infinite sets (*Menge*) – which cannot themselves *ever* be given in either primary or reflective intuition, yet of which we nevertheless not only have representations but can also demonstrate certain truths. For such objects, the *only* possible representations we can come to have are symbolic ones (see Husserl 2003, 231). In fact, in the concluding paragraphs, Husserl reports that this is the general situation in arithmetic, since only concepts of very small numbers (less than twelve or so; see Husserl 2003, 202) can have their correlates given and recognized in proper representations. For this reason, “in the overwhelming majority of cases, we are restricted to symbolic number formations” (Husserl 2003, 299). Yet even though the proper representation of objects like infinite sets and higher numbers is “forever denied to us,” we can not only “speak of such numbers in a symbolic but wholly determinate sense” but also “establish [*feststellen*] the ideal infinity of the realm of numbers” (Husserl 2003, 236). Arithmetic itself thus demonstrates that the domain of objects of proper representations is not equivalent to the domain of the objects of possible cognition.

In the writings following *Philosophy of Arithmetic*, Husserl articulates more directly the background theory of cognition that his early work was presupposing. His views on the demarcation of the psychological and the logical dimensions of cognition also undergo development along several lines, not least on account of criticisms (most famously by Frege), but also due to his own extensive reviews of recent work in logic and psychology. In his 1894 “Psychological Studies pertaining to Elementary Logic,” Husserl works to clarify what pertains to the content of a representation, and what distinguishes proper (actual) representations from symbolic (viz. descriptive) ones, which leads to an advance in his formulation of the nature of cognition itself.

Concerning the nature of what is contained “in” a representation itself, Husserl now more sharply distinguishes the content of a representation from the object or thing that it represents (though he also seems to still allow content and object to coincide in special cases). In the case of symbolic representations, this distinction is more obviously necessary, since what is immediately contained in the representation is not the object itself but only a sign or a description of it.

The sign and what is designated are here entirely alien as to content [*inhaltsfremd*] and only associatively connected. The sign does not render intuitive that which is thought of, but rather only refers to it. [...] [Such] representations have the peculiarity that they do not include in themselves [*in sich schließen*] their “objects” as immanent contents [*Inhalte*] (hence, present in consciousness), but rather they *merely intend* [*bloß intendieren*] them.

Husserl 1979, 107

The symbolic representations themselves do have their own contents which are present to consciousness; it is just that such content is now a means for referring to some other content or object. For this reason, Husserl describes this group of representations – or rather, as we might now render the German *Vorstellungen*: this group of “presentings before [*Stellungen-vor*]” the

mind or consciousness – as *Repräsentationen* in the specific sense of including as their content a “representative” for some further object (Husserl 1979, 108).

Symbolic representation is also now even more closely associated with conceiving (thinking of, merely intending) an object, and opposed to intuiting the object or having it actually present in mind: Husserl classifies “concepts, judgments, and all other sorts of logical activities” as involving “*Repräsentationen* as foundations or presuppositions” (Husserl 1979, 120). Correlatively, Husserl now proposes to restrict the term “intuition” (*Anschauung*) for non-representative-involving “presentings before” the mind, and more specifically for those which, in contrast to *Repräsentationen*, “do not merely intend their ‘objects’ but *actually comprise them in themselves* as immanent contents” (Husserl 1979, 108).

At this point, Husserl acknowledges that there is a common view that the very same object can be both merely intended but also intuited, and indeed that “intuition” might just as commonly be used to refer to “the psychical happening [*Erlebnis*] in which the ultimate goal of a *Repräsentation* is achieved,” such that “an immanent object of the act appears to us just as it was in the act through which it was intended” (Husserl 1979, 108). Husserl himself, however, maintains that the term “intuition” should be reserved only for “proper,” rather than “symbolic,” representations, in the sense that an intuition always “include its object within itself immanently” (*ibid.*). Husserl’s classification will therefore exclude various psychical happenings which are often called “intuitions” – perhaps most notably, those in which we recognize a physical thing on the basis of our sensing. Even so, Husserl’s verdict is that the common use of the term “intuition” by “natural consciousness” in such cases is actually misleading:

Natural consciousness believes itself to grasp [*erfassen*] the objective thing itself, this unified manifold, as what it is and is intended, in one glance in one simple act of intuiting. We know that this is merely an illusion. Only a small part of that which we here presume to intuit is actually intuited; only a few aspects of the factual content are present in this act as they are intended in the thing-representation [*Dingvorstellung*] which it mediates and as they actually co-exist in the “thing itself.”

Husserl 1979, 102–103

The “thing itself,” e.g., a melody, is not an “immanent content” wholly contained in any one of the momentary intuitions: “as the melody is playing, the immanent contents of hearing differ from moment to moment, but in no one of these do we grasp the melody itself” (Husserl 1979, 110).

The thing that the natural consciousness takes itself to intuit instead only comes into view via “the full material of a thing-representation,” something that is itself not identical to any one intuition but rather “becomes intuitive in a continuous course of contents [*Inhaltsverlauf*]” (Husserl 1979, 103). Even the mere sequence of intuitive contents, however, is not itself sufficient for a thing-representation, since this requires, in addition, “certain psychical acts which are accompanying the sequence of the intervening partial-intuitions,” and which “identify, by relating one meaningfully to the other, and work out, within the course of *one* continuous act, the objective unity” of the thing itself (Husserl 1979, 103).

In this contrast between a thing-representation and a mere intuition, we therefore see the continuing echoes of the Kantian distinction between the “immediacy” of intuition and the “mediacy” of conceptual representation (Kant 1998, B377) and the Kantian account of experience itself as the “mediate” cognition of a physical thing. Husserl here gestures, however, at an important modification to Kant’s account, by insisting that the mere pairing of intuitions with a concept is not sufficient for such cognition, since what is needed is a consciousness “that what

is intuited is also what is meant,” a “*consciousness of the fulfilled intention*” (Husserl 1979, 109) – an idea that will take centerstage in the Sixth Logical Investigation’s more elaborate account of cognition, as we will now see.

The account of cognition in *Logical Investigations*

One “eminently noteworthy” feature that these early writings identify, as pertaining both to the low-level psychological transition from intuition to thing-representation as well as in the advance in scientific cognition within elementary mathematics, is that “a psychical act can refer beyond [*hinausdeuten*] its own immanent content to another one that it is in no way conscious of,” at least not immediately (Husserl 1979, 120). Like the “higher” objects of mathematics, the physical thing itself is never the immediate content of any intuition, whether individually or even as a series. This capacity for “referring beyond its own immanent content” is thus discovered to be central not only for scientific cognition in particular (as in arithmetic), but for “the possibility of cognition in general” (Husserl 1979, 121). Even so, Husserl concludes the 1894 study by lamenting that this central phenomenon “lies so far outside of the usual directions of attention that it itself has been left out of notice by eminent psychologists and logicians,” and so remains “the darkest part of *Erkenntnistheorie*,” a “great and unsolved riddle” (Husserl 1979, 121), so much so that “the ‘doctrine of science’ itself must concede, if it is being serious, that all science is a mystery to it” (Husserl 1979, 122).

Over the next decades, Husserl’s research was devoted, if not exclusively then almost always primarily, to bringing light to precisely these elementary yet still “mysterious” moments within cognition. In 1900–1901, Husserl published a major work containing, first, *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, followed by six “investigations toward the phenomenology and theory of cognition,” as the subtitles of the two volumes of *Logical Investigations* indicate. The work itself culminates in a final (Sixth) Investigation providing “elements of a phenomenological clarification [*Aufklärung*] of cognition,” in which the doctrines of intention and fulfillment are finally more fully elaborated to provide an account of cognition itself as the “synthesis of fulfillment” (Husserl 2001b, 191). This opens the way for a reexamination of the Kantian distinction between “sensibility and the understanding” (Husserl 2001b, 269), and the manner in which Kant portrays the contributions of each within cognition – including Husserl’s novel proposal for an official expansion in the use of the term “intuition” itself.

At the outset of *Prolegomena*, we find Husserl clarifying the distinction between cognition, knowledge, and science, along lines closely akin to those we saw in Kant above. Husserl recognizes logic’s traditional claim (as in Bolzano; Husserl 2001a, 142–143) to provide “the doctrine of science [*Wissenschaftslehre*]” (Husserl 2001a, 16–23). *Science (Wissenschaft)* itself (“as the [German] name suggests”) incorporates “knowing [*Wissen*]” (2001a, 16), though its “concept” includes more than “mere knowing,” since it also requires “*systematic coherence [Zusammenhang]*” of knowledge, in the sense of “the grounding [*Begründung*] of knowing and the appropriate connection and ordering in the sequence of groundings” (Husserl 2001a, 18). *Knowing* itself, “in the narrowest, strictest sense,” involves several conditions: first, “in knowing, we possess the truth [*Wahrheit*]”; second, “we possess it as the object of a correct judgment [*Urteil*]”; third, we do so with “evidence [*Evidenz*], the luminous certainty [*Gewissheit*] that what we have acknowledged [*anerkannt*] is” (Husserl 2001a, 17).⁸

When Husserl finally specifies his “preferred sense of the term *cognition*” itself, “in the strictest sense,” we can see several key components reprised from Kant’s own analysis, along with an anticipation of an important modification:

If we now perform an act of cognition, or as I would prefer to express it, live in it, we are “occupied with the objectivity” that it intends and posits, in a cognizing way; and it is cognition in the strictest sense, i.e., we are judging with evidence, when the objectivity is *given* [gegeben]. The state of affairs [Sachverhalt] stands before us now, not merely presumed to be, but actually is before our eyes, and in it the object itself, as what it is i.e., exactly so and not otherwise, as it is meant in this cognition: as bearer of these properties, as member of these relations, etc. It is not merely presumptively but actually so constituted and is given as actually so constituted to our cognition; in other words, as such it is not merely intended (judged) in general, but rather *cognized*.

Husserl 2001a, 145

With Kant, cognition here is said to consist of an act of *judging* in relation to an *objectivity*; unlike Kant, however, Husserl claims that, in cognition, this same objectivity (state of affairs) is not merely judged “mediately” but is itself “given” (“actually” present) and in an “evident” manner.

We will take up Husserl's advance on Kant concerning of the givenness of the objectivities of judgment below. For now, let us note first the continuities in the manner in which Husserl distinguishes cognition from both knowing and science. Though both cognizing and knowing involve a judgment and a relation to evidence, knowing has as its “object” not the state of affairs judged, but the *truth* of this state of affairs.⁹ Cognition, by contrast, Husserl, like Kant, seems to allow to be false (and even absurd),¹⁰ and at the very least allows cognition to occur without the truth (or falsity) of the relevant judgment also becoming the object that is given. In this respect, knowing involves “*having insight*” into the “*grounding*” of the truth of this state of affairs, not merely having the state of affairs itself “given” in an “evident” manner: “to cognize the ground of anything means to *have insight into* [einsehen] the necessity of its being so and so ..., thus to *have insight* into its truth as necessarily valid” (Husserl 2001a, 146).¹¹ Finally, as with Kant, even with the attainment of insight (knowledge) here or there, we have not yet reached the level of *science*, since “to science belongs a certain unity of an *interconnection* of grounding” (my italics), constituted by an ordering of grounding–relations according to a “basic lawfulness” that allows for both the “systematic deduction” of a series of truths as “necessarily” obtaining, but also the comprehension of truths according to their “explanatory [erklärende] grounds” (Husserl 2001a, 146–147).¹²

In the first five Investigations, Husserl sets out to clarify the various elements that belong to cognition, before bringing them all together in the systematic account of cognition itself in the Sixth Investigation. Early on Husserl takes up the symbolic (representative) moment in consciousness – i.e., the ability for something contained “in” consciousness to nevertheless relate to or signify something that lies beyond or outside of itself. Husserl here draws the distinction as one between contents which function as “indicators [Anzeichen]” of further objects (akin to the simple “signs” in “Psychological Studies”), and contents which have “meaning [Bedeutung]” (“sense [Sinn]”) which they “express [ausdrücken]” (akin to the “description” in “Psychological Studies”), in the course of also referring to further objects (Husserl 2001a, 183). In both cases, the content present to mind is to be distinguished from the related objectivity (Husserl 2001a, 184–186, 196–198), not least because both kinds of symbolic content can be present in mind without the object itself also being given (viz. in intuition) to consciousness (Husserl 2001a, 199–200; see 2001a, 206–210). Even so, Husserl now clarifies that, in the course of both “ordinary, everyday thinking [Denken]” as well as “scientific thinking,” mere signs or indicators are never “the objects of thoughtful consideration”; instead “we live entirely within

consciousness of *meaning*, of *understanding* [*Verständnis*],” which, Husserl adds, “is not lost even in the complete absence of an accompanying intuition” (Husserl 2001a, 210; my italics).

On its own, however, “the act of meaning is not the act of cognizing” (2001b, 207). To achieve cognition, more is required than the consciousness of meaning in thinking or judging: cognition involves “*evidence* in judging,” “all actual cognition in the fullest sense” is such that it “presupposes *intuitively fulfilled meanings*” (Husserl 2001a, 212; my italics). While the emphasis on “*intuitive fulfillment*: echoes Kant’s claim that cognition is not possible in the absence of an intuition related to the object of judgment, Husserl here goes beyond the official letter of Kantianism in two respects: first, by referring to the fulfillment of the judgment-intention by its objectivity (state of affairs) *itself being given* “intuitively,” and second by including the requirement that this intuitive givenness render the judgment “*evident*.”

Both of these advances are taken up in more detail in the Sixth Investigation. On the second point, Husserl argues that the mere addition of an intuition (fulfillment) to the thought (intention) is not actually enough to suffice for cognition, since the having of an intuition which in fact fulfills my thought will only render my thought or judgment evident if there is a consciousness of the intuition *as fulfilling* the corresponding thought. There must be both “*fulfillment and identification*,” i.e., consciousness of the *identity* of what is given *as fulfilling* the intention (Husserl 2001b, 275; my italics). Cognition thus ultimately involves not just the pairing of concept (intention, meaning) and intuition, but also a third component: “First, there is the meaning-intention, and indeed given for itself; then next the corresponding intuition comes to join it. At once the phenomenological unity is produced, which now manifests itself as *consciousness of fulfillment*” (Husserl 2001b, 206).

To work our way to the first advance, we must first spell out the *Investigations*’ own account of the differentiation of cognition from ordinary sensory intuition and also from what Husserl also calls “perception” (*Wahrnehmung*). Recall that, in Kant, experience arises as the empirical cognition of an object on the basis of perception, by synthesizing (in judgment) a series of perceptions (consciousnesses of intuitions) together under a concept of an object, as all “of” this same object. For Kant, this concept – and with it, the resulting consciousness of the object of cognition itself – does not already lie in perception itself (and a fortiori not in any intuition), even if there is something that is noticed about the relevant sensations in the course of perception that forms the basis for the application of the relevant concept. The *Investigations* provides a very similar account. To take one of Husserl’s examples (see Husserl 2001b, 195–196): when “I look out into the garden,” I first thereby come to have a perception; I can then “give my perception expression in the words: a blackbird flies away,” which expresses a “meaning” – but this meaning “does not lie in the perception, at least not it alone” (Husserl 2001b, 195). Husserl takes the gap here to follow from the fact that “on the basis of the same perception one could make an entirely different assertion [*Aussage*] and thereby unfold an entirely different sense” (Husserl 2001b, 195). For this reason, a further act is necessary, one that “serves as genuinely sense-giving,” over and above the perception itself (Husserl 2001b, 196–197). In fact, Husserl ultimately claims that “no part of the meaning itself lies in perception,” such that “the perception, which gives the object,” and “the assertion, by means of which the judgment, i.e., the ‘acts of thought’ woven together into the unity of judgment, is thought and expressed,” must be understood as “completely separate” (Husserl 2001b, 199).¹³

In this transition from mere perception to a *judgment* about an object on the basis of perception, an apprehension of a further kind takes place, one that involves additional *acts* of connection (*Verknüpfung*) and synthesis which are absent from mere perception, and one in which the corresponding *objectivity* toward which consciousness is directed in the resulting meaning is of an entirely new type from that which is involved in perception:

We employ this word ["judgment"] in its principle meaning, which is oriented toward assertions (predications), and so *excludes perceptions*, remembrances, and similar acts. [...] In the judgment a state of affairs [*Sachverhalt*] "appears" to us. *A state of affairs*, even when it pertains to something sensibly perceived, *is not itself*, however, *an object that could appear to us in the manner of what is sensibly perceived* (whether in "outer" or "inner sensibility").

Husserl 2001b, 139; *my italics*

Husserl describes this transition as follows: first, in perception, "an object is presented to us as itself present;" then, "on the basis of this perception we make the judgment *that it is*;" in this second act (judgment) "that which appears, that of which we are intentionally conscious, is not the existing sensible object, but rather the fact [*Tatsache*] *that it is*." (Husserl 2001b, 139–140).

The absence of the state of affairs (fact) from the initial sensory intuition involved in perception (and from sensory perception itself), however, now finally returns us to the gap that Husserl insists must be crossed, if the final transition from *judging* about perception to actual *cognition* is to occur. As we noted above, beyond the act of sense-giving in judgment, made on the basis of perception (which nevertheless goes beyond the perception itself; Husserl 2001b, 196–197), Husserl thinks that cognition only comes about through a still-further identifying act, one of a higher order, one that "*experiences* [*erlebt*] the identificatory *congruence* [*Deckung*]" of intention (meaning) and something given in an intuition (Husserl 2001b, 208; *my italics*). This further step occurs even "in the case of the judgment of perception," where meaning and intuition "stand [*stehen*] in the most intimate relationship to one another" – even, in fact, when they stand "in the relationship of congruence, of the unity of fulfillment" (Husserl 2001b, 199). Here too, cognition only occurs with the further *consciousness* of this congruence (fulfillment), the consciousness that perception is giving the very object that is meant (intended). Husserl uses the term "adequation" to refer to this act of undergoing not merely a pairing of signification and intuition, but a consciousness of "the unity of fulfillment" between them – an act that therefore has as its objectivity neither the perception or the meaning (intention) but "a more or less complete identity" of the two (Husserl 2001b, 207).

But then, if cognition is the consciousness of the congruence (identity, adequation) of the object *as meant* or intended in a judging, with something *given* in intuiting, and if the object as meant is as belonging to a state of affairs, then there must be some way for the state of affairs itself that is meant in judgment to also be given in some intuition – even if not in a sensory intuition. At the outset of the Part entitled "Sensibility and the Understanding" – which is itself in several respects the culmination of both the Sixth Investigation and the work as a whole – Husserl sets this problematic out as follows:

In the case of a perceptual assertion it is not only the nominal representations woven into it which are fulfilled; the meaning of the assertion as a whole finds fulfillment through the underlying perception. [...] [H]ence we pose the question, how is the fulfillment of the *whole* assertion to be understood, in particular that in it which reaches beyond its "matter," i.e., here beyond its nominal terms. What should or even could supply fulfillment to the moments of the meaning that are constituted by the form of the proposition as such and to which the copula, for example, belongs [...]?

Husserl 2001b, 272

It is precisely at this point that Husserl proposes his expansion in the technical use of the term "intuition." If cognition requires consciousness of the fulfillment of the meaning-intention of

a judgment, then it must also be possible for objectivities in forms correlative to those of judgmental contents (propositions) – i.e., states of affairs – to be “given” just as they are judged, so that we can also become conscious of this coincidence and finally achieve cognition itself. We are thus led to “an entirely *unavoidable extension of the originally sensory concepts, intuition and perception*, which permits us to speak of *categorial* and in particular *universal* intuition” – including, most importantly for our purposes, those intuitions which will “give” the objectivities correlative to categorially-formed judgment contents (Husserl 2001b, 186).

In order to achieve such categorial intuition, Husserl takes still further acts to be required – like judgment, beyond mere sensory intuition, but also distinct from the forming of a meaning-intention in judgment, insofar as (unlike judgment) these acts genuinely yield a giving, and so belong to sensibility in an expanded sense: “*mere sensibility* can never provide categorial fulfillment, or more precisely, fulfillment of intentions including categorial forms; rather, the fulfillment lies in each case in *a sensibility formed through categorial acts*” (ibid.; my italics). That is, these further categorial acts – which allow for categorial objects (viz. state of affairs) to be “given in the manner of ‘perception’” – will themselves be “*founded* on other acts, ultimately in acts of sensibility” (Husserl 2001b, 186).¹⁴

What, then, are these categorial acts and how do they form sensibility itself and yet remain in the realm of givenness or presence? Here Husserl introduces a further development in the account of apprehension. When a sensible object is first apprehended “in a direct [*schlichter*] manner,” the object “stands as it were uniform [*einfältig*] there before us,” in the sense that “the parts which constitute it are certainly in it, but in the direct act they have not become explicit objects for us” (Husserl 2001b, 287). Beyond this, however,

we can apprehend the same object also in an explicating manner: in dissecting [*gliedern*] acts we “raise [*heben*]” the parts “into emphasis [*heraus*],” in relating [*beziehenden*] acts we posit what has been brought to emphasis into relation, whether with each other or with the whole.

Ibid.

Neither of these two further acts are contained in the direct perceptual apprehension, nor are their correlative objectivities (parts, relations) given to us as explicit objects for us in the original apprehension. Only after such acts of raising to emphasis do the relevant objectivities themselves become given for us; in this way, “new objects come to life, belonging to the class *state of affairs*, which comprises only ‘objects of a higher order’” (Husserl 2001b, 289).¹⁵

Yet if categorial intuition fills in a key stage missing from the official Kantian *Erkenntnistheorie*, we are still not yet to cognition for Husserl. Recall that cognition requires not just the (categorial) intuition of the object (state of affairs) intended in the judgment (i.e., fulfillment), but also the still further *consciousness* of the identity (*identification*) of this object of categorial intuition with the object of judgment (consciousness of fulfillment). Hence, cognition as evident judging depends essentially not just on direct or sensory intuition, and not just on the forming of sensory intuition by categorial acts, but also on the consciousness that the higher objectivities given through these categorially formed intuitions are what was meant in the judgment in the first place. It is only this even more complex unity – “a judging synthesis, an *intuitive* ‘thus it is’, or ‘thus it is not’, through which this act of the intuition of the state of affairs is measured against the expressed intention” – which “accomplishes the cognizing of the intuited state of affairs,” and which Husserl describes as achieving the “actual unity of cognition” (Husserl 2001b, 324).

Cognition as a task of reason

The details of the sophisticated picture of cognition presented in the 1900–1901 *Investigations* – which maintains much of the spirit of the Kantian account, while advancing beyond it in key respects – would remain in place, in its broad outlines, throughout the remainder of Husserl's career. One indication of this continuity is that, with Husserl's revisions of the *Investigations* over the next two decades, we do not find the second editions altering the core components of the view of cognition itself – even as he sets out to bring other aspects of his presentation better into line with his deepened understanding of phenomenology itself as a methodology. Another indication is its persistence in Husserl's lectures on *Erkenntnistheorie* in the 1900s–1910s – though here too we find an increasing concern with the challenges of skepticism to the idea that we have any objectively valid cognition whatsoever, and an increased devotion of focus to the anti-skeptical responses by Descartes and Kant himself.¹⁶ Finally, though the major writings of the 1910s–1930s take up in earnest the project of setting forth “pure phenomenology” as “the science of pure consciousness” – arguing for its priority as “first philosophy,” and establishing the credentials of its findings as genuine cognition, knowledge, and (“rigorous”) science in its own right – these shifts in emphasis again do not transform the basic outlines of the underlying account of the essence of cognition itself.¹⁷

Still, the pronounced shifts in Husserl's writings after 1900 – beyond a concern for the description of the form of cognition, knowledge, and science, and toward the actual and direct refutation of skepticism and the systematic “grounding” of the claims to cognition, knowledge, and science on behalf of philosophy – such shifts do leave definite marks on both the overall framing of the theory of cognition as well as on Husserl's treatment of key elements within cognition itself. Terminologically, this impact is registered already in his 1906–1907 lectures *Introduction to Logic and the Theory of Cognition* (*Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*), with Husserl's introduction of the idea of a “new discipline” which he calls “noetics” (*Noetik*). Noetics goes beyond the “theory of cognition” in the narrow sense (as the theory that spells out the *essence* of cognition) in that it will provide “the doctrine of right [*Rechtslehre*] in cognition,” and in particular will investigate structures of “justification [*Berechtigung*]” and the provision of evidence specifically in relation to “claims to right” on behalf of individual cognitions (Husserl 2008, 132, compare 136–137). Noetics is thus the discipline that addresses skepticism in relation to claims to cognition, and in fact itself advocates for a radical “skeptical position-taking” (an “absolute epoché,” in an early use of the term) as “the first and fundamental component of the method of the theory of cognition” (Husserl 2008, 183–184).

In line with this concern for justification and grounding, the broader “theory of cognition” itself is now described no longer as a theory of “the *understanding*,” but instead – and with clear Kantian resonance – as a theory of reason (*Vernunft*), tasked in particular with the articulation of the “ideal” of “absolute rationality” (Husserl 2008, 233–234).¹⁸ This recentering is manifest throughout Husserl's next major publication, the 1913 *Ideas I*. Early on Husserl famously sets forth as the “principle of all principles” – one with respect to which “no conceivable theory can possibly make us stray,” and which will thereby serve as the basis for his own defense of the possibility of philosophy itself against radical skepticism – the following proposition:

that each intuition that is originarily giving is a source of right [*Rechtsquelle*] for cognition, that everything that is provided to us originarily in “intuition” (in its living actuality, as it were), is to be taken up [*hinnehmen*] simply, as it gives itself, but also only within the limits within which it gives itself.

Husserl 2014, 43; compare §20

This clearly signals Husserl's increasing concern to respond not only to the question of the "essence" of cognition – and how intuition might cooperate with the understanding (judgment) so as to provide consciousness of fulfillment – but also to challenges of "right" in relation to cognition – i.e., how intuition will ultimately cooperate with reason itself, so as to factor into the grounding or justification of claims to cognition (knowledge, science).¹⁹

This shift ultimately has its effects on Husserl's account of the essence of cognition itself, with Husserl in *Ideas* only finally turning directly to articulate two key features of the essence of cognition itself – the fulfillment of judgment in intuition (perception) and the identification of such fulfillment in a higher consciousness – quite late in the work, and doing so specifically under the heading of "the phenomenology of reason" (Husserl 2014, §§135–145).²⁰ What is more, Husserl here offers an explicitly noetic-theoretical account of the specific dimension of cognition that the *Investigations* had characterized as its meaning-intention – i.e., that which constitutes the content of the act of judgment that is then consciously ("evidently") fulfilled in cognition itself.²¹ Husserl's guiding characterization of the general act-type associated with intending is now in terms of certain "noetic moments" which are responsible for making it "contain within itself a 'sense'" and "which effect a 'sense-giving [*Sinngebung*]" to the act as a whole (Husserl 2014, 174). The sense itself is now described as "a correlative noematic material," or more briefly, a "noema" (ibid.). What moves Husserl to now call the act "noetic" and the sense "noematic" is the new (or at least newly emphasized) thesis that "to the essence of every intentional lived experience, there belongs at least one, though as a rule, many, 'characters of positing [*Setzungscharaktere*]" (Husserl 2014, 232), and the further claim that when "a positional act posits [*setzt*]," "it also posits doxically" – i.e., in relation to "believing [*Glauben*]" (ibid., 232), such that "doxic modalities enter into all positing characters" (ibid., 234). This noetic aspect is thus taken to extend to "every intentional lived experience," such that not only judgment but even perception "has its noema" (Husserl 2014, 174–175).²²

In conjunction with this shift to the noetic analysis of intention – away from the (at least arguably) more epistemologically neutral terms of meaning, toward the explicit integration of the epistemic (doxastic) dimension – Husserl's account of fulfillment is now likewise introduced within the scope of "the claims of right" and the "noetic" concerns of reason, rather than the (again, arguably) more epistemologically neutral terms of "givenness" or "evidentness." Husserl now presents even the most elementary mode of the "fulfillment of intention" – a "seeing" or "perceiving" that is in fact "originarily giving" of "what is posited," prior to even becoming conscious of this fulfillment and so making an "evident" judgment – as itself already a "basic form of the consciousness of reason [*Grundform des Vernunftbewusstseins*]" (Husserl 2014, §136, 314).²³ A fortiori, both judging with evidence about sensory perception ("assertoric" seeing), and especially judging with insight (*Einsicht*) about an essence ("apodeictic" seeing), are now also all counted as forms of "consciousness of reason" (Husserl 2014, §137). Finally, reason even becomes implicated in the concept of the objectivity involved in that adequation hitherto thought as being achieved in cognition: the concept of the "adequate givenness of a thing" is now explicitly classified as "an idea in the Kantian sense" (Husserl 2014, §143) – i.e., as a concept of reason which can never itself be given adequately in any experience.

The foregoing gives sufficient evidence of Husserl's increasing preoccupation with the reason-theoretical problematic as the necessary framework within which any account of cognition itself must be placed, such that "the claims to right [*Rechtsprechungen*] by reason" – especially concerning which objects are "actual [*wirklich*]" – now predominate Husserl's discussion of what is required for cognition itself to be achieved (Husserl 2014, 269).²⁴ By the final pages of *Ideas I*, we find confirmation of the ascendancy of the account of reason itself within phenomenological philosophy more generally (Husserl 2014, 308–309).

Both this general reason-theoretical re-framing of the task of philosophy, and the corresponding reorientation of the theory of cognition itself, remain constant in Husserl's writings after *Ideas I*. In his lengthy, though unpublished, 1917 essay on "Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition" – meant as a contribution to a special issue of *Kant-Studien* – Husserl describes "the theory of reason in general" as a "more general way of speaking" about "the theory of cognition" (Husserl 1987, 125), and again advocates for the need of a "noetic logic" within the theory of cognition which would give "a doctrine of the right for cognizing grounded upon objective validities in general" (Husserl 1987, 127). *Formal and Transcendental Logic* bears the subtitle "Attempt at a Critique of Logical Reason," and concludes with a chapter entitled "Objective Logic and the Phenomenology of Reason" which takes up the question of "the absolute grounding of cognition" (Husserl 1969, §103). The *Cartesian Meditations* announce that "reason is a universal theme for phenomenology," and more specifically "a universal structure-form of the essence of transcendental subjectivity" (Husserl 1960, 56–57). Similar notes are sounded at key moments in the *Crisis* (compare Husserl 1970, §3, §49). Even in the overarching path of Husserl's trajectory, then, we can discern a familiar Kantian outline being traced: *Erkenntnistheorie* in service of a "critique of reason."

Notes

- 1 I will cite Kant's *Critique* according to the second "B" edition (1787) pagination and his other works according to the volume and page numbers from the Kant *Gesamtausgabe*; I have silently amended the Cambridge Edition (Kant 1998) translations throughout.
- 2 The specificity of Kant's use of the term *Wahrnehmung* (as consciousness of representations) is often occluded by assumptions about what is meant by "perception" in the now-more common sense of the term, which is often much closer to what Kant himself means by "experience" insofar as it includes the recognition of a physical thing; compare Tolley 2016.
- 3 For more on the nature and importance of the distinction between cognition and knowledge in Kant, and the problems that beset interpretations which assume *Erkenntnis* can just be understood as knowledge (and so as a species of belief, assent, "commitment," etc.), compare Tolley 2017; Watkins and Willaschek 2017.
- 4 In this volume, see Pradelle, Chapter 6, for a discussion of Kant and Husserl on idealism the chapter; for a defense of Husserl's method in response to his contemporary critics the chapter by Staiti; for the historical influences on Husserl's conception of metaphysics, see the chapters by De Santis and Majolino; and for the historical influences on his ethics, see Crespo and Römer.
- 5 As in Kant studies, interpretations of Husserl's views on cognition have likewise been hampered by a running-together of the topics of cognition and knowledge, whether in the course of commentary, or even in the direct rendering of Husserl's use of *Erkenntnis* and its cognates as "knowledge" (*Erkenntnistheorie* as "epistemology," etc.); compare Willard 1995 and Willard's 2003 translation of *Philosophie der Arithmetik*; see also Moran and Cohen 2012, 49, 105, 183.
- 6 I have made use of the Collected Works edition (Husserl 2003), though I have often edited these translations to better highlight the occasions of Husserl's use of key technical terms with roots in Kantianism, especially with respect to *Erkenntnis* and its cognates.
- 7 Husserl's emerging views here (and elsewhere) anticipate Russell's later distinction between acquaintance and description; compare Hintikka 1995.
- 8 For more on Husserl's epistemology qua theory of knowledge (*Wissen*), see Hopp and Berghofer, Chapters 23 and 24 in this volume; on science, see Cavallaro, Chapter 33 in this volume.
- 9 Husserl spells out the shift in focus that occurs in knowing as due to a further act of reflection: "If we reflect this act [of cognizing], then the truth itself takes the place of the objectivity, as the object, and now it is given in an objective manner" (Husserl 2001a, 145).
- 10 Though Husserl also claims that such cognitions will not be "logically of value or complete" and so not "cognitions in the pregnant sense of the term" (Husserl 2001b, 226).
- 11 In his lectures on logic, Kant, too, positions "insight" at several levels above mere "cognition," though below scientific comprehension (see Kant 1992, 9:65, 569–570).

- 12 This threefold differentiation, and the tradition that lies behind it, speaks strongly against the running-together of *Erkenntnis* with either “knowing” (as in Willard 1995) or with “science [episteme]” (as Moran and Cohen 2012).
- 13 It is worth emphasizing that the parallels with Kant continue in Husserl’s own account of sensory perception (*Wahrnehmung*) itself: for Husserl, too, perception arises on the basis of “a lived-through complex of sensations [*Empfindungen*]” which is first given and then taken up in an apprehension (*Auffassung*) which Husserl also calls “apperception” (Husserl 2001a, 213).
- 14 Because only categorially formed perceptions, rather than direct sensory perception, can fulfill judgment-intentions, Husserl should be counted as a conceptualist about the kind of perception needed for cognition—even if he is a non-conceptualist about the contents of sensory perception itself; for a conceptualist reading of Husserl on sense perception see Kidd 2019.
- 15 Though Husserl also describes these acts as ones “which constitute new objectivities,” the further glosses he gives suggest that we should understand constitution relationally, as instituting a relation of an object to consciousness (a new appearance of the object), rather than creating the object (in) itself; these are “acts in whose new manner of consciousness a new consciousness of objectivity comes of age which essentially presupposes the original one,” acts “in which something appears as actual and itself given, in a way that itself, as it appears here, was not yet given and could not be in the founding acts alone” (Husserl 2001b, 282–283). Compare Ameriks 1977 and Renaudie 2015.
- 16 Compare the 1902/1903 lectures on “Universal Theory of Cognition [*Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie*],” which begin with “the problem of cognition [*Erkenntnisproblem*]” in the face of “radical skepticism,” and the need to account for “the origin, validity, levels of security [*Sicherheit*], and extent of human cognition,” in addition to its “essence” (Husserl 2001c, 4–5).
- 17 One key enrichment comes in Husserl’s ongoing lectures on time-consciousness, as in the concluding discussion of the 1906/1907 lectures of “the lowest layers among cognitive phenomena” (Husserl 2008, 250–251), where Husserl focuses not only on the synthesis in perception but also on the more fundamental “flow of time” which underlies the most basic moments of consciousness and gives form even to the layer of “originary [*ursprüngliche*] sensations” below perception (consciousness) (Husserl 2008, 264–265).
- 18 The consonance between the basis for Husserl’s shift from understanding to reason and the conceptual distinction Kant himself draws between *Verstand* and *Vernunft* is something that speaks against interpretive claims that Husserl’s own emerging understanding of reason “has nothing to do with Kant’s use” of the term (Nenon 2003, 64–66), that it involves a “decisive break” with the tradition (Dahlstrom 2015, 274), or that Husserl (even after the early 1900s) has no concern for the “*quaestio juris*” in relation to the claims to the validity of cognition (Crowell 2001, 33, 185).
- 19 Compare Berghofer, Chapter 24 in this volume.
- 20 Though Husserl does not change the title of the central chapter on sensibility and understanding in the revised 1920 edition of the Sixth *Investigation*, Husserl’s new Preface does explicitly highlight the crucial distinction between sensory and categorial intuition as “fundamental for every theory of reason” (Husserl 2001b, 178).
- 21 For Husserl’s continuing use of “noetic” in *Ideas I* to refer to the dimensions of “right,” “grounding,” “norms,” “rationality,” etc.; compare Husserl 2014, 15–16, 36, 109.
- 22 Compare Smith 2013, 245–297; and Erhard, Chapter 12 in this volume.
- 23 For discussion of the integration of dimensions of rationality even at the level of pre-predicative perceptual, merely “attentive,” phenomena, compare Jacobs 2016 and Crowell 2013, Chapter 6. For the general framing of all conscious life within the “teleology of reason,” compare Rinofner-Kreidl 2015. For anticipations of this broader reach of reason in Husserl’s earlier account of motivation in perception see Walsh 2013.
- 24 Compare: “questions about actuality enter into all cognitions as such,” and hence so do the “correlative” problems about “the consciousness of reason” which claims to “demonstratively resolve [*ausweisen*]” them (Husserl 2014, 270).

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