draft of 11-11-04
PHIL 161: Topics in the History of Ethics
Fall 2004; Greek Ethics
David O. Brink
Handout #11:  Aristotle's Politics and Democracy

THE GOOD AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Aristotle says that the most complete good is studied by political science (1094a23-b12, 1181b13-25), and at the beginning of the Politics he tells us that political association aims at the highest good (1252a3-7).  He believes that different views about political community reflect different assumptions about the nature of and means to happiness (1317a39-b2, 1323a16-19); mistaken views about happiness help explain what is wrong with non-ideal states, and a correct conception of happiness helps us avoid these errors and identify the ideal state (1328a37-b2).

It is common to conceive of happiness as a life of pleasure or honor (EN 1095a19-23).  Both views assume that happiness consists in or depends upon scarce and contested external goods (1168b15-19).  This is why different political constitutions are often specified in terms of their divisions of goods and responsibilities between rich and poor (1279b38-80a5) and why they employ different conceptions of distributive justice (1280a7-10).

An ideal form of government must concern itself with the common good (1279a18-22).  Aristotle ranks three ideal constitutions in descending order of desirability (1279a32-b4, 1289a26-8).

The non-ideal states correspond to each of the ideal states but do not serve the common good (1279a20-1, 1289a28-31). All existing states are non-ideal (1260b35).  Aristotle's chief concern is a special kind of non-ideal theory that aims at the best feasible constitution.
We have now to inquire what is the best constitution for most states, and the best life for most men, neither assuming a standard of excellence which is above ordinary persons, nor an education which is exceptionally favored by nature and circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only, but having regard to the life in which the majority are able to share, and to the form of government which states in general can attain [1295a25-32].
Because tyranny is clearly the worst non-ideal constitution (1289a38-b3), much of his discussion focuses on the merits of oligarchy and democracy (1309b29-30), concluding that some form of democracy is least bad (1289b4-10).   Oligarchy and democracy are non-ideal constitutions, because neither aims at the common good of its citizens; each rests on mistaken assumptions about happiness.  Democrats want to be left free to indulge their appetites, whereas oligarchs aim at accumulating wealth; both must be concerned with amassing e-goods.  But whereas happiness does require some e-goods, it is controlled by virtue, rather than e-goods, and requires only modest amounts of the latter (1266b25-28, 1295a35-b1, 1323a15-24a1).

POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DEMOCRACY
Another way in which non-ideal constitutions are mistaken about happiness lies in their mistaken assumptions about the value of political activity.  Each thinks that political rule is necessary to secure the appropriate distribution of wealth and liberty.  But then political rule must be only instrumentally valuable.  By contrast, Aristotle thinks political rule is intrinsically valuable.  He thinks friendship is part of an individual's good because individuals are not self-sufficient and friendship extends one's interests.  But he also thinks that a just political community is a more inclusive and greater good than the good for an individual (EN 1094a26-b11, Pol 1252a5, 1282b14-16) and that the consensual public deliberations that characterize a just political community further extend one's interests.  If so, sharing in political rule must be an intrinsic good.  Aristotle draws this conclusion explicitly when he contrasts parts and necessary conditions of wholes and argues that, whereas manual labor is a necessary condition of the happiness of the community, political activity is an organic part of happiness (vii 8-9, esp. 1329a35-38; cf. EE 1214b11-27).

If political activity is an intrinsic good for rational agents, then all rational agents should have a share in ruling, and the proper constitution would be some form of democracy (1275b5-6, 1325b7-10).  But citizenship involves having a share in judging and ruling (1275a22-33).  If there are no qualifications for citizenship, then all will rule to satisfy their appetites, rather than to promote a common good.  Oligarchy is right to demand qualifications for citizenship, Aristotle thinks, but wrong to conceive of the qualifications in terms of wealth or property.  He believes that the right qualifications should exclude slaves and manual laborers from citizenship (1278a3-9); indeed, he thinks that manual laborers ought to be barbarians and natural inferiors (1329a24-26).

Part of Aristotle's justification for restricting citizenship assumes that some people are naturally inferior, competent only to follow the reason of another (ii 4-7, 12-13).  (1) But if inequality is the product, rather than the cause, of unequal treatment, then these doubts about democracy are unjustified.  (2)  Unlike animals, slaves and other natural inferiors participate in reason (1254b21-23, 1259b27-35; cf. 1260a12).  But does their comparative inferiority justify their complete exclusion from (collective) self-governance?