Welcome to Philosophy of Action
Welcome to Philosophy of Action
In this course, we will explore two sets of related issues with direct implications both for ethics and for our self-conception. We will start with a challenge: contrary to our everyday assumptions, our actions can never be truly free. We will then examine a number of attempts to show that (and how) we can act freely. In the process, we will consider the relationship between free action and responsible action, the relationship between our emotional capacities and the possibility of responsible agency, and what implications new research in neurocience has for the question of whether we are free and responsible agents.
We will then broaden our enquiry by turning to the problem of moral luck. The problem of moral luck arises because, on the one hand, we seem to be committed to the “Control Principle” which states that we are morally assessable only to the extent that what we are assessed for depends on factors under our control. On the other hand, when it comes to particular cases, we morally assess people for things that depend on factors that are not in their control. (If we were correct in doing so, then there would be moral luck.) For example, we tend to blame a drunk driver who has killed a person more than one who arrives home without mishap, even though the presence or absence of a victim in a crosswalk is something over which neither driver has control. And we tend to blame Nazi sympathizers in 1930’s Germany, even though their actions depended in large part on where and when they were born and raised, also factors not in their control. Even more troubling, a very natural line of reasoning suggests that it is impossible to morally assess anyone for anything if we adhere strictly to the Control Principle. In this course, we will examine and evaluate a variety of solutions to the problem of moral luck, and their connections to theories of free and responsible action.
LINKS
Pereboom’s “Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities”
Markosian’s “A Compatibilist Version of the Theory of Agent Causation”
ASSIGNMENTS
Advice for Writing a Philosophy Paper
(please note: drop in review is Monday 10-12)