

Introduction [§111-112]

- a) [§111]H introduces perc. as a model that takes the object (what is present to it) to be universal. I (act of perceiving) and object (what is perceived) are also universals, thus essential, but since they are opposed to each other, the object is the essential (whether perceived or not), the I unessential.
- b) [§112]H describes how the content that was grasped immediately in SC is to be grasped by perc. as a *thing with many properties*, since universals are “mediated”, i.e. are instantiated.

A. Dialectic of Simple Apprehension [§§113-117]

- a) [§§113-115]Description of *Object* of Perception
 - i) [§113]Thinghood/pure essence of object is positive universality, thus the Also, or simple medium, of many universals (white and tart and, etc.) [identity with self]
 - ii) [§114]Thinghood is also negative universality, thus the One, which excludes opposite properties. (thing is white, not black, tart, not sweet, etc., which makes it one thing) [difference from others]
 - iii) [§115]Summary of §§113-114. What one needs for a thing with determinate properties is the relation of the universal to both the positive and the negative, the Also and the One.
- b) [§116]Description of *Subject* of Perception
 - i) I simply *takes* the object as it is (i.e., object is self-identical). If it adds to or subtracts from object, it alters the object [see Intro.] and deception occurs.
- c) [§117]*Experience* of Perception (in the guise of Simple Apprehension)
 - i) Object is One (thus singular), but the universal (qua universal) transcends the singular. [Fa is one, but F goes beyond a in Fb, Fc, etc.]
 - ii) Object is community (one universal with many instances), but one universal is different from another. [White is not Black, F is not G or F is not ~F]
 - iii) Object is One that excludes, but object is mutually indifferent. [a is F and H]
 - iv) Object is indifferent medium and exclusive one, but we do not perceive that; what we literally see in perception is Fness rather than an indifferent medium or a determinate property.
 - v) If Object is thus universal as pure relating of self to self, then it loses negativity and particularity, except insofar as this is captured by SC’s “intending”[*Meinen*], which is unsuccessful & deceptive and puts us back where we started this chapter.

B. Dialectic of Reflected Apprehension [§§118-122]

- a) [§118]Intro./Description of Reflected Apprehension
 - i) [§118]Perception cannot be simple apprehension. It must be apprehension that reflects on itself so as to take responsibility for itself (without holding that it is itself the truth, as SC maintained)
- b) [§§119-121]Actual Dialectic
 - i) [§§119-120]First moment:
 - A) [§119] If thing is One and the I is universal medium/Also for universals, whose diverse content is tied to us and due to us [The thing is “white to our eyes” and “tart to our taste”],
 - B) [§120] then the problem is that One is one only in virtue of opposition, but notice that the opposition does not occur in it, but rather in something else, the I. =>things must have determinate properties in their very essence (1, 2, 3)=>Thing is universal medium, not One.
 - ii) [§§121]Second Moment:
 - A) If I is One, then thing is F, G, H (=>diverse) but one can make sense of the diversity only by understanding it such that *insofar as* it is F, it is not G or H, etc.,
 - B) then the problem is that consciousness takes responsibility for unity (with the “insofar as”) and thing is not actually a One; instead it is a mere surface for independent properties/matters.
- c) [§122]Summary
 - i) At first, thing is One and consciousness is, or takes responsibility for, Also
 - ii) Later, thing is Also and consciousness is, or takes responsibility for, One (with “insofar as” move).
 - iii)=>Both consciousness and thing are revealed in both modes, no stability in this way of understanding perception=>new form of perception must be considered that incorporates this movement.

C. Dialectic of Two Things [§123-129]

- a) [§123]Description of Two Things

i) [§123]Description of Object

A)As consisting of two things: Since movement cannot be attributed to consciousness (cf. §122), it must be attributed to object. That would be a contradiction, unless the contradictory unity and diversity were attributed to different things. So the object is essentially two things.

B)Things are intrinsically self-identical, but are also related to each other as different. [cf. §§113-4]

b) [§§124-125]Experience of Dialectic of Two Things

i) [§124]

A) Different things exist in virtue of their own essences. What differentiates them from each other is also supposed to be in their own essences.

B) Each thing has within its essence both the grounds for its identity and the grounds for its difference from other. The former is essential, the latter inessential. => no opposition within a thing.

ii) [§125]

A) Contradiction is that it is supposed to exist in virtue of its own essence, not in virtue of its relations to other.

c) [§§126-128] Summary of Dialectic of Two Things

i) [§126]Thing is supposed to be intrinsically independent, but independence just is independence from others, i.e., requires a relation to others (even if negative), so it is self-referentially problematic to try to understand it as independent (because relations are inconsistent with independence).

ii) [§127]The thing needs a relation to other to incorporate its diversity (i.e., its being different from the other thing), but this necessary relation is not supposed to be essential (contained in its essence).

iii) [§128]Each thing is supposed to be independent, but is so only in virtue of depending on another, at the same time that it is supposed to be dependent in virtue of its own independence. So independent existence is not essential (as it was posited in this model).

D. Transitional Reflections [§§129-131]

a)[§129]Analysis of development and introduction of Understanding

i)In transition from sensuous being of SC to universality of Perception, the universal is still conditioned by the sensuous and thus is not the right kind of universal (self-identical), causing

ii)a division of being into individuality and universality and unity and indifferent medium.

iii)The properties that were supposed to express being's essential nature (as independent) depend on another. Insofar as one places both independence and dependence within a single thing, we have an unconditioned absolute universality and the Understanding is involved.

b)[§130]Summary of Development of Conceptions of Object from SC through Perception

i)Description of how conception of object changes from SC to Perception. Singular being of SC changes to universality, but sensuously conditioned universality with two beings-for-self that are supposed to exist in a unity, but are also supposed to be distinct/opposed and therefore not being-for-self.

ii)The sophistry of Perception can't avoid contradiction despite its attempts to do so by I) distinguishing aspects II) sticking to the Also and the Insofar as, and III) distinguishing unessential from essential.

iii)Perception ends up empty because its universals end up being unable to account for diversity.

c)[§131]

i)Just as SC took itself to be about the infinite richness of reality, when its essence is really universality, so Perception takes itself to holding fast to opposite essences having wholly substantial material and content, when it is really the master of these pure essences in their specific determinateness.

ii)Perception does so by employing "insofar as" and "aspects or by taking responsibility for one essence so as to retain the other as true. However, keeping the essences separate is futile, as they naturally come together.