LOGICAL QUANTIFIERS

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This chapter offers a logical, linguistic, and philosophical account of modern quantification theory. Contrasting the standard approach to quantifiers (according to which logical quantifiers are defined by enumeration) with the generalized approach (according to which quantifiers are defined systematically), the chapter begins with a brief history of standard quantifier theory and identifies some of its logical, linguistic, and philosophical strengths and weaknesses. It then proceeds to a brief history of generalized quantifier theory and explains how it overcomes the weaknesses of the standard theory. One of the main philosophical advantages of the generalized theory is its philosophically informative criterion of logicality. The chapter describes the work done so far in this theory, highlights some of its central logical results, offers an overview of its main linguistic contributions, and discusses its philosophical significance.

I. STANDARD MODERN QUANTIFIER THEORY

1. Historical Beginnings

Modern quantifiers were first introduced by Frege (1879). The quantifiers All and Some were already recognized as logical operators by Frege's predecessors, going all the way back to Aristotle. But Frege offered a new analysis of these operators that enabled him to deal with multiple-quantifier prefixes and, more generally, multiple nesting of quantifiers. This, in turn, enabled him to extend traditional logic from a logic of "terms" (1-place predicates standing for properties) to a logic of relations. These changes revolutionized logic. Among the many achievements of Frege's theory, three are especially relevant for the present discussion:

(a) Frege's theory generated a considerably larger array of quantifiers than traditional logic: Starting with All as his basic logical quantifier, Frege construed not just the traditional Some, No, and Not all as (defined) logical quantifiers, but also infinitely many others, e.g., Exactly $n$, At least $n$, and At most $n$, for every natural number $n$.

(b) Frege's theory offered a systematic interpretation of multiple-quantifier prefixes and other nesting quantifiers.

(c) Frege's expansion of logical quantifiers gave rise to languages with enormous expressive power. Extensive parts of natural language as well as the entire language of classical mathematics and many segments of the language of science are expressible using his quantifiers.

Frege regarded 1st-order quantifiers as 2nd-order functions or concepts. The 1st-order quantifier Some is the 2nd-order concept of non-emptiness, the 1st-order All is the 2nd-
order concept of universality. Using contemporary terminology, 
"(\exists x)\Phi x" says that the extension of \(\Phi\) is not empty, and 
"(\forall x)\Phi x" says that the extension of \(\Phi\) is universal.

Frege sanctioned both 1st-order and higher-order quantifiers. The former quantify over 
individual variables, i.e., variables ranging over individuals; the latter quantify over 
functional and predicative variables, i.e., variables ranging over functions, properties, and 
relations. For reasons for that go beyond the scope of the present chapter (but see 
discussion of completeness in Section II.1 above), most logicians, linguists, and 
philosophers today focus on 1st-order quantifiers. In what follows I will limit myself to 
such quantifiers.

Note: Throughout this chapter I am using contemporary terminology.

2. Semantic & Proof-Theoretic Definitions of Quantifiers

Tarski (1933) developed a semantic definition of truth for languages formulated within 
the framework of modern logic. The recursive entries for the standard quantifiers – All 
(\forall) and Some (\exists) - are:

Given an assignment \(g\) of objects (in the intended universe) to the variables of the 
language,

(\exists) "(\exists x)\Phi x" is true under \(g\) iff (if and only if) at least one object \(a\) (in the universe) 
satisfies "\(\Phi x\)" under \(g\);

(\forall) "(\forall x)\Phi x" is true under \(g\) iff every object \(a\) (in the universe) satisfies "\(\Phi x\)" under 
\(g\);

where "\(a\) satisfies '\(\Phi x\)' under \(g\)" iff it satisfies "\(\Phi x\)" when all the free variables of "\(\Phi x\)"
other than \(x\) are assigned values by \(g\).

Gentzen (1935) developed a proof-theoretic method for defining logical constants in 
terms of introduction and elimination rules. Such rules tell us, for a given logical 
constant, under what conditions we can derive a statement governed by it from a 
statement (or statements) not governed by it, and under what conditions we can derive a 
statement (or statements) not governed by it from one governed by it. The entries for the 
standard logical quantifiers are, essentially:

(\exists) \textit{Introduction: } \Phi(a) \vdash (\exists x) \Phi x \\
\textit{Elimination: } (\exists x) \Phi x \vdash \Phi(a) \text{ provided 'a' plays a merely auxiliary role}

(\forall) \textit{Introduction: } \Phi(a) \vdash (\forall x) \Phi x \text{ provided 'a' is arbitrary} \\
\textit{Elimination: } (\forall x) \Phi x \vdash \Phi(a)

where "\(a\) is an individual constant and certain syntactic conditions are given for "\(a'\) 
plays a merely auxiliary role" and "\(a'\) is arbitrary".
II. STRENGTHS & WEAKNESSES OF STANDARD QUANTIFIER THEORY

1. Logical Results

The logic of the standard quantifiers, i.e., standard 1st-order logic, is rich in logical, or rather meta-logical, results. Three results that are especially relevant for our discussion are:

(a) The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem (1915/20): If a sentence $\sigma$ (set of sentences $\Sigma$) has a model, it has a countable model, i.e., a model whose cardinality (i.e., the cardinality of its universe) is smaller than or equal to the cardinality of the natural numbers ($\mathbb{N}_0$).

(By definition, $\sigma/\Sigma$ has a model iff there is a model M such that $\sigma / \Sigma$ is true in M.)

This result is naturally viewed as a limitation on the expressive power of standard 1st-order logic: Within the framework of this logic we cannot "seriously" define the notion of "uncountably many" and many other infinitistic notions, since every consistent statement of the form "There are uncountably many F's" comes out true in some countable model, i.e., a model in which there are only countably many F’s. This result is sometimes called "Skolem's Paradox", although it is not a real paradox. But it does imply that the representational powers of the standard 1st-order quantificational languages are limited, since they cannot determine uniquely the intended meanings of formal terms, and as a result, the meaning of claims (or theories) containing such terms. For example, a consistent theory that says there are uncountably many objects has a model (i.e., is true in a model) that does not have uncountably many objects.

(b) The Completeness Theorem (Gödel 1930): Standard 1st-order logic has a complete proof system. I.e., A sentence $\sigma$ follows logically from a set of sentences $\Sigma$ in the semantic sense ($\Sigma \models \sigma$) iff it follows logically from it in the proof-theoretic sense ($\Sigma \vdash \sigma$).

The completeness result is perhaps the most important theoretical result of standard quantification theory. It says that in standard 1st-order logic the proof-theoretic relation of logical consequence is just as powerful as the semantic relation of logical consequence. This result is one of the main reasons most contemporary philosophers and logicians prefer standard 1st-order logic to standard (full) 2nd-order logic. (Full) 2nd-order logic is incomplete: its proof system is less powerful than its semantic system.

One consequence of the completeness of standard 1st-order logic is the co-extensionality of the semantic and proof-theoretic definitions of the standard quantifiers. Since proofs, unlike models, are finite structures, this might be viewed as an advantage of the proof-theoretic definition over the semantic definition.
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(c) The Compactness Theorem (Gödel 1930). Two significant formulations are: (i) If \( \sigma \) follows logically from an infinite set \( \Sigma \), then it follows logically from a finite subset of \( \Sigma \); (ii) If every finite subset of \( \Sigma \) has a model, \( \Sigma \) has a model.

The compactness result is naturally viewed as an advantage: it enables us to deal with infinite sets by dealing with their finite subsets.

2. Linguistic Strengths & Weaknesses

Standard quantifier theory made a substantial contribution to linguistic semantics and syntax through the works of Montague (1973), Partee (1987), Geach (1962), Kamp (1981), May (1985), and numerous others. Not only did it allow linguists to analyze complex linguistic structures involving multiple-quantifier prefixes (e.g., "(\( \forall x \))(\( \exists y \))", "(\( \exists x \))(\( \forall y \))(\( \exists z \))") and other nesting quantifier structures (e.g., "(\( \forall x \))(\( \exists y \)) ... \( \exists y \)---")], it enabled them to formulate important questions concerning quantifier scope, indefinite nouns, anaphora, etc. A well-known problem of this kind is the quantificational structure of "donkey sentences", i.e., sentences like

(1) Every farmer who owns a donkey, beats it.

Moreover, the theory of standard quantifiers played a central role in the development of important linguistic theories (e.g., LF theory), the establishment of new semantic frameworks (e.g., Montague grammar), and so on.

But the expressive power of the standard quantifiers is linguistically very limited. Even such simple quantitative determiners as "most", "few", "half", "an even number of", "all but ten", "finitely many", "uncountably many", and so on, cannot be expressed by any (well-formed) combination of standard 1st-order quantifiers. As far as quantifier-structures in natural language are concerned, it is quite clear that standard quantifier theory offers no more than a preliminary framework for their study.

3. Philosophical Strengths & Weaknesses

Standard quantifier theory has had a privileged status in contemporary analytic philosophy since its birth in the early years of the 20th century. It is interwoven into most analytic theories, and its position has been sealed by such works as Quine's influential Philosophy of Logic (1970). Even philosophers who have challenged the standard theory have rarely viewed its choice of quantifiers as a problem. They have assigned \( \forall \) and \( \exists \) a large array of alternative interpretations, going all the way from the substitutional interpretation (Marcus 1972) to the intuitionistic (Dummett 1973) and paraconsistent (Priest & Routley 1983) interpretations, but few have contested its restriction to the standard quantifiers. Perhaps the most celebrated feature of the standard theory is the completeness of its proof method, i.e., the fact that it is integrated into a powerful logic with a complete proof system (see above). This, indeed, is a desirable feature. For many, including Quine, the incompleteness of stronger quantifier theories justifies their rejection.
But standard quantifier theory is also widely recognized to have many problems. Here I will focus on seven problems of philosophical significance (some mentioned above, and some interrelated):

(a) *Inability to account for basic inferences.* In his 1962 abstract, Rescher points out that standard "quantificational logic is unequal to certain childishly simple valid arguments" like "Most things are A's, Most things are B's; therefore: Some A's are B's", and "Most C's are A's, Most C's are B's; therefore: Some A's are B's" *(ibid.*: 374). Since these inferences are of the same kind as the inferences logic is designed to account for (e.g., "All things are A's, Some things are B's; therefore: Some A's are B's"), this state of affairs is problematic.

(b) *Limited logical expressive power.* As noted in Section II.2 above, many elementary quantificational notions, including quantitative determiner notions like "most", "few", "half", "finitely many", and "uncountably many" are indefinable in terms of the standard quantifiers (and other standard logical constants).

(c) *Limited formal expressive power.* As demonstrated by the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem (Section II.1(a) above), many formal (mathematical) notions, and in particular infinitistic notions like "uncountable", are not only indefinable as logical notions within the standard quantificational framework, but are also inadequately definable as non-logical notions within that framework. I.e., it appears that the standard framework does not enable us to define them in a way that adequately captures their meaning. (In logicians' terminology, it enables us to define "uncountable" only as a "relative" notion but not as an "absolute" notion.)

(d) *Absence of a theoretical criterion for logical quantifiers.* It is a surprising fact about modern logic that it has a theoretical, precise, systematic, informative, and philosophically explanatory criterion for logical *connectives* but not for logical *quantifiers* or predicates. Logical connectives (at least in classical logic) have a precise and philosophically informative criterion, *truth-functionality*, which is given a mathematically precise definition by Boolean algebra. Every logical connective is represented by a Boolean operator in a 2-element Boolean algebra, and every Boolean operator of that kind determines a logical connective. Philosophically, every truth-functional connective – i.e., a connective that takes into account only the formal pattern of truth-values of its arguments - is logical, and every logical connective is truth-functional. (On the philosophical ramifications of this criterion, see (e) below.)

In contrast, for logical quantifiers and predicates we have nothing more than an utterly uninformative, unexplanatory, and unsystematic characterization, namely, a characterization by *enumeration*. All this characterization says is that ∀ and ∃ are logical quantifiers and = is a logical predicate, and that any quantifier definable from ∀ and ∃ (using logical predicates and connectives) is also a logical quantifier, and any predicate defined from = (using other logical constants) is also a logical predicate. Why *these rather than others* are logical, why *only these* are logical, remains a mystery. We
may try to justify the standard choice on pragmatic grounds, by appealing to custom or
convenient features of the associated logic (e.g., completeness), but unless we add a
theoretical dimension to such a justification it remains philosophically shallow.
Furthermore, even on purely pragmatic grounds, how do we know that a stronger 1st-
order system, i.e., a 1st-order system with additional logical quantifiers, will not give us
an overall more desirable logic. The current situation is thus philosophically
unacceptable.

(e) Lack of philosophical understanding of logicality. Given the central role that logic
plays in all areas of knowledge, including philosophy, the nature of logicality requires a
theoretical account. The nature of logicality, however, has so far resisted such an account.
One of the problems facing us is finding a fruitful standpoint from which to launch the
investigation, i.e., a standpoint, or a perspective, which will enable us to formulate the
question in a precise, systematic, and philosophically enlightening terms. It is quite clear
that such a perspective requires an informative account of the logical constants. We know
that logical truth, logical consequence, logical consistency, etc., are largely due to the
logical constants involved; understanding the nature of the logical constants is therefore a
prerequisite to a theoretical understanding of logicality.

Our experience with sentential logic shows that a theoretical criterion for logical
constants can, indeed, make a significant contribution to our philosophical understanding
of logicality. Philosophically, the truth-functionality of the logical connectives means that
they abstract from everything but the bare truth pattern of their arguments, and this
explains why logical consequences based on these connectives preserve truth rather than
other features of sentences. Furthermore, this, together with the fact that truth-functional
connectives correspond to mathematical operators, i.e., operators governed by necessary
laws, and the fact that the test for logical truth/consequence based on such connectives is
truth/preservation-of-truth under all possible variations in truth patterns, explains some of
the philosophically significant features of sentential logic. In particular, they explain its
great generality, topic neutrality, immunity to (at least most) empirical discoveries, and
necessity.

A philosophically informative criterion for logical quantifiers (and predicates) is needed
to extend this understanding to all of logic.

(f) The shaky status of the semantic definition of logical consequence for quantificational
logic. In his 1936 paper, "On the Concept of Logical Consequence" Tarski constructed a
semantic definition of logical consequence for quantificational logic that established
logical semantics (model theory) as one of the two major fields of contemporary logic,
along with proof theory. Tarski's semantic definition says that:

\[(LC) \quad \Sigma \models \sigma \iff \text{every model of } \Sigma \text{ is a model of } \sigma \text{ (or: there is no model in which all the sentences of } \Sigma \text{ are true and } \sigma \text{ is false).}\]

Tarski anchored his semantic definition in the intuitive idea that a logical consequence is
a necessary-and-formal consequence. To determine the adequacy of his definition, he
asked whether it accurately captured this idea. Investigating this question, he realized that the answer varies according to the choice of logical constants. For some choices of logical constants - e.g., treating Is-a-Property-of-Napoleon as a logical quantifier or treating $\forall$ as a non-logical constant - the answer is clearly negative, while for others, including the standard choice of logical constants, no conflict seems to occur. But even in the latter case, Tarski realized, it is not clear that his definition fully captures the idea it was supposed to capture. Adding such non-standard logical quantifiers as Finitely Many also accords with this idea. The scope and justification of the contemporary definition of logical consequence, thus, require a systematic criterion for logical quantifiers.

A solution to all the above problems is offered by generalized quantifier theory.

III. GENERALIZED QUANTIFIER THEORY

1. Brief History

The history of generalized quantifiers starts with Mostowski (1957). Mostowski suggested that we might generalize the standard notion of logical quantifier along two dimensions, syntactic and semantic. Syntactically, a logical quantifier is a variable-binding operator that generates new formulas from old formulas. Semantically, a logical quantifier over a universe $A$ is a cardinality function from subsets of $A$ to a truth-value, satisfying a certain invariance condition. For example, the existential and universal quantifiers over $A$, $\exists_A$ and $\forall_A$, are functions that, given a subset $B$ of $A$:

(2) $\exists_A(B) = T$ iff the cardinality of $B$, $|B|$, is larger than 0; i.e., iff $|B| > 0$.

(3) $\forall_A(B) = T$ iff the cardinality of the complement of $B$ in $A$ is 0; i.e., iff $|A-B| = 0$.

It is easy to see that both $\exists$ and $\forall$ satisfy the following the following invariance condition:

(4) A quantifier $Q$ on $A$ is invariant under all permutations of $A$.

I.e.: For every $A$, $B$, $B'$, where $A$ is a non-empty set and $B$, $B'$ are subsets of $A$: If $B'$ is obtained from $B$ by some permutation of $A$, then: $Q_A(B) = Q_A(B')$, where a permutation of $A$ is a bijection $p: A \rightarrow A$, i.e., a 1-1 function from $A$ onto $A$. Using "$\subseteq"$ for "is a subset of" and "$p*" for "the function on subsets of $A$ induced by $p$", we can spell out (4) by:

(5) If $A$ is a non-empty set, $B \subseteq A$, $B' \subseteq A$, and there is a permutation $p$ of $A$ such that $p*(B) = B'$, then: $Q_A(B) = Q_A(B')$.

Generalizing, Mostowski arrived at the following criterion for logical quantifiers:

(PER) A Quantifier $Q$ is logical iff for any non-empty set $A$, $Q_A$ is invariant under all permutations of $A$. 

Under this criterion, every 2nd-order 1-place cardinality predicate is a 1st-order logical quantifier, and every 1st-order logical quantifier is a 2nd-order 1-place cardinality predicate. Examples of logical quantifiers in addition to $\exists$ and $\forall$, are Most (interpreted as, say, "more than half"), An even number of, Finitely Many, Uncountably Many, and $\alpha$-Many for every cardinal number $\alpha$, finite or infinite. Such quantifiers appear in English sentences like

(6) Most things are beautiful.

(7) There is a finite number of stars.

They are symbolized by the formulas

(8) $(Mx)Bx$

(9) $(Fx)Bx$,

using obvious abbreviations.

Examples of 2nd-order 1-place predicates that are not logical quantifiers are "Some men", "All women", "is a property of Napoleon", and "is a color property".

Lindstrøm (1966) generalized Mostowski's criterion further in two ways. First, he extended it to 1st-order predicates of all types (e.g., "is red" and ",=", and second, he extended it to 1st-order quantifiers (2nd-order predicates) of all types (e.g., "is a relation between humans" and "is symmetric").

Lindstrøm's criterion for logical quantifiers and predicates can be formulated as follows:

(ISO) A Quantifier/predicate $Q$ is logical iff for any $Q$-structure $S$, $Q$ is invariant under all isomorphisms of $S$.

By a $Q$-structure $S$ we mean a structure $<A, \beta_1,\ldots,\beta_n>$, where $A$ is a non-empty set (the universe of $S$), and $\beta_1,\ldots,\beta_n$ are elements or structures of elements of $A$ of the same types as the corresponding arguments of $Q$. Let $S = <A, \beta_1,\ldots,\beta_n>$ and $S' = <A', \beta_1',\ldots,\beta_n'>$. We say that structures $S$ and $S'$ are isomorphic - $S \cong S'$ - iff there is a bijection (a 1-1 and onto function) $f$ from $A$ to $A'$ such that for $1 \leq i \leq n, f^*(\beta_i) = \beta_i'$, where $f^*$ is induced by $f$. $Q$ is invariant under all isomorphisms of $Q$-structures $S$ iff for any $Q$-structures $S, S'$, if $S \cong S'$, then $Q_A(\beta_1,\ldots,\beta_n) = Q_A'(\beta_1',\ldots,\beta_n')$.

Among the new quantifiers/predicates satisfying ISO are, in addition to all the quantifiers satisfying PER, the identity predicate of standard 1st-order logic as well as such non-standard quantifiers as the 2-place Most and Only, and the 1-place Symmetric and Well-Ordered. As the last two examples suggest, logical quantifiers, according to ISO, are not
limited to (although they include all) cardinality quantifiers. Examples of a predicate and a quantifier which do not satisfy ISO are "is red" and "is a relation between humans".

We can indicate the type of a given quantifier by an n-tuple representing the types of its arguments, using <1> for a property on, or a subset of, the universe, <1,1> for a pair of subsets of the universe, <2> for a 2-place relation on the universe, and so on. Quantifiers of types involving only 1's we call "predicative", those of types involving at least one number larger than 1 we call "relational" or "polyadic". Thus, the standard \( \forall \) and \( \exists \) are predicative quantifiers of type <1>, but the 2-place Most is a predicative quantifier of type <1,1> and the 1-place relational (polyadic) Symmetric is of type <2>. The last two are defined, semantically, as follows:

Given a universe A, subsets B, C of A, and a binary relation R on A,

\[
(M^{1,1}_A) (M^{1,1}_A(B, C) = T \text{ iff } |B \cap C| > |B - C|.
\]

\[
(S^2) (S^2_A(R) = T \text{ iff } R \text{ is symmetric}.
\]

They appear in English sentences like:

(10) Most presidents are women.

(11) Equality is a symmetric relation.

Syntactically, these sentences have the logical forms:

(12) \((M^{1,1}_x)(Px, Wx)\).

(13) \((S^2_{xy}) Exy\).

Literally, (13) say, "Symmetric xy, x=y". It means something like "For x and y to be equal is for them to be symmetrically equal".

Tarski (1966) formulated essentially the same criterion, albeit in terms of permutations. As demonstrated by McGee (1996), a formulation in terms of isomorphisms is preferable.

Note: the presentation of this section is based on Sher (1991).

2. Logical Results

Generalized quantifier theory has had a considerable impact on the development of mathematical logic since the 1960's. It has led to the development of a new field, model-theoretic logic, and the establishment of numerous results. (For a representative collection of articles in this field see Barwise & Feferman 1985.) Two results of special interest are due to Lindström (1969, 1974) and Keisler (1970).
Lindström's Theorem. By offering a model-theoretic generalization of the notion of logical constant, Mostowski and Lindström created tools for comparing the strength of different 1st-order logical systems (with respect to their ability to define model-theoretic structures). These tools enabled Lindström to arrive at an important characterization of standard 1st-order logic:

\[(\text{FOL}) \text{ Standard 1st-order logic is the strongest logic that has both the compactness/completeness and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties (see Section II.1 above).}\]

Keisler's Result. Keisler showed that completeness is not limited to standard 1st-order logic; some stronger logics are also complete. In particular 1st-order logic with the generalized quantifier Uncountably Many has a complete proof system.

Keisler's result weakens the case for the standard 1st-order quantifiers based on completeness (see II.1. and II.3. above). Since Keisler's logic does not have the Löwenheim-Skolem property, it might turn out to be superior to standard 1st-order logic, although this has not been established.

3. Linguistic Results

Generalized quantifier theory has led to a renaissance in linguistic semantics. We can divide its linguistic contributions into two: contributions to the study of natural-language determiners, and contributions to the study of natural-language polyadic (relational) quantifiers. In both cases the restriction to logical quantifiers is relaxed, but here we will limit ourselves to logical quantifiers.

(a) Determiners. Determiners form an important linguistic category of noun modifiers (different from adjectives). Determiners include quantity modifiers that are naturally construed as quantifiers. Some of these – e.g., "all", "every", "each", "any", "a", "some", "at least (exactly, at most) one" – are naturally construed as the standard quantifiers, \(\forall\) and \(\exists\), or as quantifiers defined in terms of these. However, many quantitative determiners cannot be analyzed using the standard quantifiers. A few examples are "most", "few", "half", "more ... than ---", "finitely many", "uncountably many", "\(\aleph_0\)", and so on. Generalized quantifier theory enables linguists to account for the semantics of all these determiners by treating them as predicative quantifiers. Among the pioneers in this field are Barwise & Cooper (1981), van Benthem (1983), Westerståhl (1985), and Keenan & Stavi (1986).

Quantifiers representing determiners are for the most part of type \(<1,1>\), and sometimes of more complex types, like \(<<1,1>,1>\). We have seen above how Most\(^{1,1}\) is defined. \(\exists^{1,1}\) is defined as follows:

\[(\exists^{1,1}) \quad \exists^{1,1}_{A}(B,C) = T \text{ iff } |B \cap C| > 0\]
We may say that $\exists^{1,1}$ is generated from $\exists^1$ by relativizing it to a subset of the universe, $B$. Most existential quantifications in English have this (or some derivative) form. In the simplest case, linguists assign

(14) Some B's are C's

the logical form

(15) $(\exists^{1,1}x)(Bx, Cx)$

rather than

(16) $(\exists^1x)(Bx \& Cx)$.

A determiner-quantifier of type $<<1,1>>1$ appears in

(17) More students than teachers attended the lecture,

whose logical form is:

(18) $(O^{<1,1>,1}x)(Sx, Tx, Lx)$.

$O^{<1,1>,1}$ is defined by:

(19) $O^{<1,1>,1}_A(B, C, D) = \text{T iff } |B \cap D| > |C \cap D|$.

Linguists and logicians have developed a rich theory of the characteristic features of determiner-quantifiers. For an up-to-date account see Peters & Westerståhl (2006), Chs. 3-6.

(b) Relational or Polyadic Quantifiers. Generalized quantifier theory enables us to go beyond determiners to more complex quantificational structures. The study of relational or polyadic quantifiers in natural language has been pursued by Higginbotham & May (1981), Keenan (1987), van Benthem (1989), Sher (1991), and many others. The simplest relational quantifiers are of type $\langle 2 \rangle$. We have already defined one relational quantifier of this type, Symmetric.

One way to arrive at relational quantifiers is by combining predicative quantifiers in some order. In the simplest case, relational quantifiers of this kind correspond to linear quantifier-prefixes (of other quantifiers); in more complex cases they correspond to non-linear, branching or partially-ordered quantifier-prefixes.

An example of a relational quantifier equivalent to a linear prefix of predicative quantifiers is $\forall \exists^2$, where
(20) \((\forall \exists^2 xy) \Phi_{xy}\)

is logically equivalent to

(21) \((\forall^1 x)(\exists^1 y) \Phi_{xy}\).

While \(\forall \exists^2\) simply says "for every \(x\) there is a \(y\) such that", a more intricate relational quantifier that resembles it, but cannot be expressed by a linear prefix of \(\forall\)'s and \(\exists\)'s, says "Every \(x\) has its own \(y\)." This quantifier appears in, e.g.,

(22) For every drop of rain that falls, a flower grows,

(23) Every family has its own misery. (Every family is unhappy in its own way. Tolstoy)

If we symbolize this quantifier by "\(\forall \to \exists^2\)" the logical structure of (22) and (23) is:

(24) \((\forall \to \exists^2 xy)(Bx, Cy)\).

Other interesting relational quantifiers appear in:

(25) Different students answered different questions on the exam. (Keenan 1987)

(26) No three students answered the same number of questions. (Keenan 1987)

(27) Most pairs of people are not married to each other.

An up-to-date discussion of relational (polyadic) quantifiers appears in Peters & Westerståhl (2006), Ch. 10.

A special type of relational quantifier corresponds to a branching quantifier-prefix. But the branching prefix is more interesting when thought of as a complex prefix. Two examples of irreducibly branching quantifier-prefixes are:

\( (\forall x)(\exists y) \)

(28) \( \Phi_{xyzw} \). (Henkin 1959)

\( (\forall z)(\exists w) \)

(29) \( \Phi_{xy} \). (Barwise 1979)

\( (M^1 x) \)

\( (M^1 y) \)

English sentences exemplifying these forms, or in the case of (29), the more complex form:
(M^{1,1}x)\Psi_1x

(\Phi xy) (Barwise 1979)

(\Psi_2 y)

are:

(31)  Some relative of each villager and some relative of each townsman hate each other. (Hintikka 1973)

(32)  Most boys in my class and most girls in your class have all dated each other. (Variation on Barwise 1979)

The branching form raises interesting questions of interpretation. In particular, there is no consensus on the interpretation of non-monotone-increasing branching quantifiers (Q^1 is monotone increasing iff Q^1(\emptyset)=T, B\subseteq C \Rightarrow Q^1(C)=T) and on how to formulate a general semantic definition of branching quantifications that will deal with branching prefixes of any complexity. Most importantly, the branching form raises the question of compositionality, i.e., the question of whether the interpretation of logically complex formulas is always determined by that of their simpler components. The key issue is the structure of the branching prefix, which need not be a tree structure (but only a partial ordering). In addition to the works mentioned above, see Westerståhl (1987) and Sher (1990, 1997). For a further development (IF languages) and a discussion of compositionality see Hintikka & Sandu (1989, 2001).

4. Philosophical Results

Generalized quantifier theory provides solutions to all the philosophical problems plaguing the standard theory that were discussed in Section II.3 above. How successful these solutions are, is an open question. But generalized quantifier theory undoubtedly makes an important contribution to philosophy by creating a framework for confronting philosophical questions that were earlier thought to resist any systematic investigation. This is especially true of the last three questions, (d)-(f), which concern fundamental issues in the philosophy of logic.

Briefly, the solutions to the six problems raised in Section II.3 are:

(a) Basic (non-standard) logical inferences. The problem of recognizing and accounting for basic inferences based on quantifier-notions is largely, and perhaps fully, solved by the generalized theory. All inferences based on such quantitative notions as "most", "few", "half", "finitely many", "as many as", etc., can be accounted by this logic.

(b) Logical expressive power. This problem is also largely (perhaps fully) solved by generalized quantifier theory. All common quantitative notions, including all quantitative determiner notions, can be construed as logical notions in this theory. Indeed, every classical mathematical notion can be construed as a logical quantifier, predicate, or
function according to this theory, often by transforming it to a 2nd-order notion. As a result, the expressive power of generalized 1st-order logic as a whole is very large. (See McGee 1966.)

(c) **Formal expressive power & the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem.** In many systems of generalized 1st-order logic the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold. As a result, formal or mathematical notions that lose their intended meaning in standard 1st-order logic retain their intended meaning in such systems. There are two possible ways of achieving this result: by constructing such notions as logical, and by constructing them as non logical within an appropriate generalized logical system. The first was noted in (b) above. We can, for example, construct the formal notion "uncountably many" as a logical quantifier, UNC¹, defined, for an arbitrary universe A by:

\[(UNC^1) \quad UNC^1_A(B) = T \iff |B| > \aleph_0.\]

Since the interpretation of logical constants is built into the apparatus of models (see Sher 1991), UNC¹ will preserve its intended meaning in every model. Sometimes, however, we prefer to define a formal notion as a non-logical notion (e.g., in order to explain its meaning or establish its properties). In this case we might be able to construct an appropriate generalized framework that blocks the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, and define the desired concept within that framework without subjecting it to the Löwenheim-Skolem effect.

(d) **A theoretical criterion for logical quantifiers.** Generalized quantifier theory provides a criterion (necessary and sufficient condition) for logical quantifiers and predicates – ISO – that is as theoretical, systematic, precise, and comprehensive as is the truth-functional, Boolean criterion for logical connectives. Both criteria are essentially invariance criteria. The truth-functional criterion says that a sentential connective is logical iff it does not distinguish anything about its arguments besides their bare truth value. ISO says that a quantifier/predicate is logical iff it does not distinguish anything about its arguments besides their bare formal structure. I.e., logical connectives are invariant under all truth-preserving variations in their arguments; logical quantifiers are invariant under all structure-preserving variations in their arguments. Both criteria are also precise mathematical criteria: the sentential criterion is based on Boolean algebra, the quantificational criterion is based on set theory (most commonly ZFC). Finally, both criteria determine a maximal collection of logical constants, connectives and quantifiers, respectively. In so doing, both sanction the existence of a far larger number of logical constants than one would anticipate based on (mere) intuition, indeed an infinite number of logical connectives and quantifiers. (The fact that we cannot reduce the collection of logical quantifiers to a small finite collection as in the case of the logical connectives is to be expected. The power of quantificational logic is so much greater than that of sentential logic that it cannot have as simple a logical apparatus as the latter's.)

(e) **Philosophical understanding of logicality.** For reasons indicated in the discussion of this topic in Section II.3 above, a theoretical criterion for logical constants can be instrumental in providing a philosophically informative characterization of logicality.
What is the philosophical content of ISO? The idea of invariance under isomorphisms is a systematic rendering of the intuitive idea of being indifferent to, or not distinguishing, the individual characteristics of objects in any given universe of discourse. There is a very long tradition of viewing this idea as characterizing logic. Two examples, taken from Kant and Frege, are:

[General logic] treats of understanding without any regard to difference in the objects to which the understanding may be directed. [Kant 1981/7: A52/B76]

Pure logic ... disregard[s] the particular characteristics of objects. [Frege 1879: 5]

ISO offers a precise characterization of this condition and places it at the center of our understanding of logic. To be logical is to abstract from, or disregard, everything about objects and their relations besides their formal features or structure. I.e., to be logical is to be formal or structural in a very strong sense. (It is, in a certain sense, to be maximally formal or structural.)

This characterization explains some of the intuitive features of logic: its high degree of necessity, extreme generality, topic neutrality, strong normativity, and even apriority (or quasi-apriority). Very briefly, since logical constants are formal, the laws governing them are necessary. Since logical constants apply regardless of what objects exist in the domain (universe of discourse), their laws are highly general and topic neutral. Since they are not affected by the empirical features of objects (or the laws governing these features), their laws are (largely) non-empirical. And since their invariance is greater than that of physical and other constants (which are not invariant under all isomorphisms), the laws associated with them are normatively stronger than those associated with other constants (logic does not have to obey the laws of physics, but physics has to obey the laws of logic).

(f) Foundation of logical consequence. By providing a general criterion for logical constants (combining ISO for predicates and quantifiers and the Boolean criterion for logical connectives), generalized quantifier theory enables us to evaluate the adequacy of Tarski's semantic definition of logical consequence. The question is whether Tarski's model-theoretic test yields intuitively necessary and formal consequence in languages with logical constants satisfying the above criterion. The answer appears to be positive. Since (i) Tarskian consequences depend on the logical constants of the given language, and the apparatus of models, since (ii) according to the above criterion, logical constants are formal (in the sense of taking into account only the formal or structural features of their arguments), and since (iii) Tarskian models represent all formally possible situations relative to the given language, consequences based on formal constants satisfying Tarski's test are necessary and formal.
For a view claiming that the problem of logical constants is a "red herring", see Etchemendy (1990). For a discussion of this and the other issues raised in (d)-(f) see Sher (1991, 1996, 2008).

5. Criticisms & Alternatives. To date, generalized quantifier theory has been criticized mostly on two grounds.

Some of the criticisms (e.g., Hanson 1997 and Gómez-Torrente 2002) concern the applicability of ISO to natural language quantifiers. The critics present examples of natural-language quantifier expressions that purportedly satisfy ISO yet are intuitively non-logical. They conclude that the characterization of logical constants should be pragmatic rather than theoretical.

Other criticisms (e.g., Feferman 1999) focus on more theoretical issues, like the relation between logic and mathematics and certain meta-mathematical features of quantifiers satisfying ISO (although here too, "gut feeling" plays a central role). Two logicians (Feferman 1999 and Bonnay 2008) offer alternatives to ISO, e.g., invariance under homomorphisms (Feferman).

For further discussion see Sher (1001, 2003, 2008).

Related Topics

1.3. Quantifiers and Determiners
1.4. Anaphora
2.1. Model Theory
2.9. Montague Grammar
4.4 Logical Form
4.5. Compositionality
6.1. The Role of Mathematical Methods
7.4. Frege, Russell and the Early Wittgenstein

References


