1. Suppose that you believe that you have two legs and two arms, but a skeptic argues that if you were a brain in a vat in a laboratory being stimulated by neuroscientists using technologically very sophisticated technology from the culture of another planet, you could be having all of the experiences you are now having including the experience of perceiving that you have two arms and two legs. According to Robert Nozick's view expressed in his essay “Knowledge and Skepticism,” might it be the case that your belief that you have two arms and two legs qualifies as knowledge in the face of the possibility described by the skeptic? If so, how so? If not, why not?

2. According to Karl Popper, how can we find out whether or not astrology (using the mutual alignment of the stars and planets to predict the course of individual human lives) is a science or a pseudoscience?

3. Is the enterprise that Thomas Kuhn calls “normal science” really a pseudoscience according to Karl Popper’s standard for distinguishing genuine science from pseudoscience?
4. According to A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*, what is the status of moral claims such as "It is morally wrong to torture and kill people just for fun"? Are they meaningful assertions or not?

5. In his essay "The Mind-Body Problem" Jerry Fodor asserts that the phenomenon he calls "multiple realizability" shows that the claim that mental states are type-identical to brain states is implausible. Explain what the type-type version of the mental state-brain state identity theory asserts, and explain the multiple realizability objection. Describe how one might continue to hold the type-type identity theory and also accept multiple realizability.

6. Descartes argues that I can clearly and distinctly conceive myself continuing to exist and continuing to think even though as a thinking thing I have no connection to any material body, and therefore my mind is a substance distinct and independent of my body. State the response to this argument that is implicit in the position that J.J.C. Smart defends in his essay "Sensations and Brain Processes."
7. In his essay “Evil for Freedom’s Sake?”, David Lewis describes the problem of evil, an objection against believing in the existence of a God with the traditional Christian attributes. Explain how the conjecture that human beings have free will might provide a partial response to this objection, and explain why the free will response even if it should succeed would only be a partial response.

8. According to Thomas Kuhn, when there is a period of scientific crisis and a choice must be made among contending scientific paradigms, the alternatives among which scientists must choose are incommensurable. Explain what Kuhn means buy this claim and what his reasons are for holding it.

9. According to the common-sense realist, many ordinary objects in the universe such as mountains and oceans and moons and stars exist independently of us and of our conceptions and perceptions of them. Most of the stuff in the universe would have existed even if we humans had never existed. Can Ayer’s position on the meaninglessness of philosophical doctrines such as realism and idealism accommodate the common-sense claims just stated?
10. Compare the eliminative materialist and the logical behaviorist on this issue: Are there any such mental states as desires and beliefs? What view does (a) the eliminativist and (b) the logical behaviorist hold on this issue, and for what reasons?

11. According to Soren Kierkegaard, what is wrong with the project of considering rational proofs and other evidence for the existence of God with a view to becoming a Christian as the result of the inquiry?

12. In his essay “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Frank Jackson embraces a doctrine he calls “epiphenomenalism.” Toward the end of his essay he considers three objections against epiphenomenalism. He replies to these objections, then considers a further objection, so all in all he discusses four objections. Carefully state any two of these four objections against epiphenomenalism.
13. According to the position David Lewis outlines in his essay “Elusive Knowledge,” what is it exactly that makes knowledge elusive?

14. In his essay, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, David Gettier arrives at a NO answer to the question posed in the essay’s title. According to Gettier, why is justified true belief insufficient for knowledge?

15. What is the basic idea of the argument from design for the existence of God presented and affirmed by Robert Hambourger? In what way does he hold that his version of the design argument is an improvement over simpler versions such as that proposed by William Paley?