1. In chapter one of *On Liberty* Mill affirms the liberty principle as a constraint on restrictions of individual liberty that should be followed only given certain qualifications and conditions. State the major chapter one qualifications and conditions that Mill attaches to his endorsement of the liberty principle.

2. According to Kant, is it impossible for my actions to have moral worth if I have desires or inclinations that favor doing the morally right act in my circumstances? Why or why not? According to Kant, what determines whether or not an action I do has moral worth?
3. State the difference between hypothetical and categorical imperatives as Kant conceives them.

4. State the difference between act utilitarianism and act consequentialism.

5. Imagine that neuroscientists of the future develop an experience machine, which can give you a perfect duplicate of any experience you might wish. You can have the experience of falling in love, or writing a novel, or drinking a cold lemonade on a hot day, or whatever you choose. Actually you will be floating in a tank with electrodes hooked to your brain. Your having an experience of X means that so far as your conscious awareness is concerned, it will feel to you exactly as if you were actually doing X. Assume further there is no risk that someone will pull out the plug on the machine and prematurely interrupt or disrupt your chosen life on the experience machine. Suppose your only goal is to be prudent, to lead a life that is good for you. Should you spend your life plugged in to the experience machine, according to (a) Mill’s hedonistic theory of human good and (b) the desire satisfaction account of human good? For what reasons?
6. Suppose I am testing the moral permissibility of a proposed course of action (a maxim) by applying Kant’s universal law version of the categorical imperative test. I find I can consistently conceive, but not will, that I along with everybody else adopt the maxim under review. According to Kant, what is the status of maxims that pass the can-consistently-conceive but not the can-consistently-will test?

7. Robert Adams affirms that a divine command theory of moral obligation retains most of the advantages and avoids the “salient defects” of the social requirement theory of moral obligation. According to Adams, what are the shared good features of the two theories and what are the special merits of the divine command theory?

8. In his essay “Legal Paternalism” Joel Feinberg makes a proposal as to how to draw the boundary line between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable paternalism (restriction of the liberty of adult persons against their will for their own good). State his proposal.
9. What exactly is moral luck as conceived by Thomas Nagel in his essay “Moral Luck”? Give an example of a judgment about conduct that assumes that moral luck in Nagel’s sense exists.

10. In chapter 2 of *Utilitarianism* Mill writes. “It is better to be a human being satisfied than a pig satisfied, better to be Socrates (a philosopher) dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” Assume that Socrates would not be willing to trade places with the fool and the fool would not be willing to trade places with Socrates. So, what in Mill’s doctrine of happiness gives him a basis for maintaining that the life of Socrates is more desirable (better for the one who is leading the life) than the life of the fool?

11. In his essay “Rights and Agency” Amartya Sen rejects Robert Nozick’s position that moral rights are “side constraints.” What is Nozick’s view, to which Sen is opposed? What is Sen’s reason for rejecting it?
12. Explain the distinction drawn by Thomas Nagel between agent-neutral and agent-relative values.

13. Kant states the humanity formulation or version of the categorical imperative principle in these words: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.” State what Kant is asserting here in your own words. What does it mean to say that one should use humanity “never merely as a means” but rather “always at the same time as an end”?

14. Suppose that in the future the science that studies the functioning of the human brain delivers enormously detailed and compelling accounts, strongly supported by evidence, that explain how human choices are caused by prior events in the brain according to physical laws. According to the account of the problem of freedom of the will that Kant puts forward in section 3 of the *Groundwork*, should a rational person change her beliefs about free will and moral responsibility in the face of these scientific developments? Why or why not?