"Abortion is morally wrong."
"Abortion is not morally wrong."
--What sort of disagreement is this? When we speak of ethical or moral claims, what are we talking about?

Moral claims belong in the category of evaluations, which are distinct and separate from the category of empirical (factual) claims. Empirical claims, from common sense judgments such as "there is a crow now on the roof" to sophisticated assertions of theoretical science, are confirmed by observation. They rest on the evidence of our senses. Evaluations are different. The category of evaluations includes aesthetic judgments (e.g., "This movie stinks") and judgments about what is good and bad, desirable and undesirable, and much else. An empirical claim like "the cat is on the mat" is true just in case the cat is on the mat, but what in the world would make it true or false that abortion is morally OK?

Two views about evaluations, morals included:
**Noncognitivism**: Evaluative claims are not genuine assertions, they cannot be true or false, correct or incorrect.
**Cognitivism**: Evaluations are genuine assertions, they can be true or false, correct or incorrect. (Our main course authors, Mill and Kant, go for cognitivism.)

One example of a noncognitivist view about ethics: **emotivism**. The emotivist holds that ethical judgments don't make assertions but instead express the pro and con attitudes of the speaker. Thus, saying "abortion is wrong" is roughly equivalent to "Boo on abortion!" and "abortion is morally OK" is roughly equivalent to "Yeah for abortion!"--this is according to the emotivist.

Another example of a noncognitivist view: **the error theory**. The error theorist holds that the language of morals embeds a big mistake. A person who sincerely makes a moral claim purports to make a genuine assertion, but this presumption that ethical claims can be true or false is mistaken across the board.

Turn to the question, what distinguishes moral/ethical claims from the rest of the broader category of evaluations?

Suppose your toe is infected and sensitive and I stand on your foot to gain elevation to get a better view of a passing parade. What does it mean to say it's wrong for me to do this and to continue standing on your toe, which is causing you excruciating pain? Like most questions about ethics, the answers to this are controversial. Some identify morality with God's commands. Among course
authors, Robert Adams pursues this line. A different line, also represented in course readings, is that the basis of morality is a belief that good and harm to particular people (or animals) are good or bad not just from their point of view, but from a more general (impartial) point of view, which every thinking person can understand. Good and harm to particular individuals matters from an impartial point of view, which regards all people's comparable harms as comparably important. Reasons generated from this impartial point of view are general at least in the sense that if it's wrong for me to step on your infected toe in these circumstances, it would be wrong for anyone else to do the same in relevantly similar circumstances.

What sorts of things are moral reasons? What if I am just not motivated by the thought that my standing on your toe is causing you pain, or the thought that I am violating your rights, or the like? If I say, "I don't care," we may want to reply, "Nevertheless, you should care"--but what backs up this last claim? The thought is that in these circumstances your pain is a consideration that should move me to action or that partly fixes what I should do whether or not I am actually motivated to prevent or stop your pain.

Two views about moral reasons and motivation:
a. If there is a moral reason for you to do something, and you understand/appreciate this reason, then you must be motivated at least to some degree to do that thing.
b. If there is a moral reason for you to do something, and you understand/appreciate the reason, it may still be the case that you are not motivated even in the slightest to do that thing.

Both views are problematic. (It turns out Mill holds b, Kant a.)

In the stepping on toes example, it may seem pretty clear where the balance of reasons lies, what the agent should do all things considered. In other cases, and maybe in all cases, this is far from clear, and we find widespread moral disagreement among people both about what to do in particular cases and about general principles.

In some cases what seems like moral disagreement may turn out to be disagreement about facts. One person may believe making war is always morally wrong and another may disagree. It may be that they hold different factual beliefs about what the consequences of war making are. In practice we may not be able to resolve such factual disagreement, but in principle, we can.

But even if two people agree about the facts, they may continue to disagree. Or they may disagree about the facts but also disagree about morals. One may believe killing innocent people is always wrong and the other may reject this
claim. At this point, have we hit bedrock? Is argument about moral issues futile?

Not necessarily. In some cases, one may find one's moral view rests on a confused or incoherent idea. I may believe homosexuality is wrong because it is unnatural, but when pressed I am unable to explain why being "unnatural" is bad, since morally innocent activities like composing opera count as unnatural by my lights.

For most of us most of the time, our ethical beliefs are in disequilibrium. I believe some particular judgments and I believe they are backed up by some general principles, but in fact the principles I want to affirm imply particular judgments I do not accept. My ethical beliefs taken together are inconsistent, so they do not cohere.

Consider a requirement of **articulate consistency**: one's particular ethical beliefs should be consistent with one another and should all be derivable from general principles one accepts.

Ethical argument appeals to this requirement. If I say abortion is OK but the principle I offer as showing that abortion is OK would also show that infanticide is OK, I have a problem if I do not accept that infanticide is OK. I am then challenged to revise either my particular or my general beliefs to gain consistency, and perhaps better, a system of beliefs that coheres (in which all elements are mutually supporting).

I may believe that terrorism, deliberate infliction of death and suffering on innocent people to further a political end, is always wrong, but also believe that the Allied terror bombing of German cities in World War II was morally OK. Something must give.

What ethical truth might amount to: If one is a cognitivist, one needs to explain what it could be for evaluative (including moral) claims to be true or false, correct or incorrect. One suggestion appeals to the requirement of articulate consistency. Start with one's considered moral judgments--the ones made in a cool hour, not involving cases in which one has a strong personal interest, etc. These are moral judgments made in circumstances least likely to induce distortion. We then seek to reflect and examine one's beliefs to eliminate disequilibrium, to get a consistent, coherent set. This would be a state of reflective equilibrium.

**Reflective equilibrium**: the state of a person's moral beliefs in which the particular claims she affirms are consistent with the general claims she affirms.
A given reflective equilibrium can be upset by further thought or new experience, which changes one's mind. We might imagine reflective equilibrium attained after reflection and rational scrutiny of pertinent facts and arguments. **Wide** reflective equilibrium: a state of reflective equilibrium reached after critical scrutiny.

We can also imagine an ideally extended process of critical scrutiny that rationally considers all pertinent arguments with all relevant information. **Ideal reflective equilibrium**: what an agent would believe about ethics after ideally extended rational scrutiny.

Suggestion: What is true ethically is what would be affirmed in ideal reflective equilibrium. What makes an ethical claim true or false is that it would/would not be affirmed in ideal reflective equilibrium. (Not that any of could get to such a state any time soon, or in our lifetime.)

The fact of persistent ethical disagreement among individuals and between different cultures and societies and across the sweep of history suggests two other possible views about moral truth.

**Relativism**: Nothing is universally morally true or false, rather a moral claim is correct or incorrect relative to a given society or culture.

**Skepticism**: no moral claims are true or false. Appearances to the contrary are misleading.

The puzzling character of morality is exhibited in the handout excerpt from the novel *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* by Mark Twain. In the novel Huck faces a decision, whether to help his friend Jim escape from slavery or whether to assist in returning this runaway slave to his owner. Huck sees this as a choice between wickedness and morality and he decides to choose wickedness, in this instance and in general. He will save his friend and in general do what he wants rather than try to follow conscience, the voice within that tells him what is morally right. (Huck seems to be a cognitivist and to adopt the b rather than the a position on moral motivation.)

The reader may applaud Huck's choice to help his friend but may be uneasy about the choice to pay no heed to conscience.

Reflections on Huck's choice:

1. Doing what you think is right, following your conscience faithfully is good or bad depending on how accurately your conscience detects what is right and wrong.
2. Huck's confidence that conventional Missouri morality circa 1850 is correct my give us pause. How do we know that our morality, conventional California morality circa 2004, will not from the standpoint of a future age seem just as defective as Huck's morality seems to us?
3. Huck is incurious about conventional morality and not at all inclined to probe it by scrutiny and argument. We might say, Huck should distinguish between conventional and critical morality and also between morality as it appears to him and morality as it really truly is. He might then think that by argument he can improve his moral opinions somewhat, discover some flaws in his unreflective beliefs. For what it is worth, Mark Twain disagrees. For Twain, morality is a matter of feeling not reasoning. And your moral feelings are more likely to be true when they eschew civilization and society and spontaneously arise from one's mind in tune with nature, as Huck and Jim are when they are on the river, away from society on the shore. This course explores the path Mark Twain firmly rejects as wrong-headed.

4. Another way of looking at Huck's choice: He sees moral reasons (respect private property; return slaves to their rightful owners) opposing nonmoral reasons (do what you like; be loyal to your friends) in his circumstances. Leave aside the issue whether or not Huck correctly identifies the reasons that bear on his choice of conduct. Another issue is what authority do moral reasons have when in practice they come in conflict with reasons of other sorts, such as reasons of self-interest. Do moral reasons always "trump" (that is, take priority over) any reasons that might oppose them? Huck might be construed as being of the opinion that moral reasons do not always trump other reasons, that sometimes the all-things-considered rational thing to do is different from the choice recommended by specifically moral reasons. (Of course he goes further and resolves to pay no heed at all to what he takes to be moral reasons.) Among our course authors, Susan Wolf denies that moral reasons must always take precedence over other types of reasons and Immanuel Kant affirms that a fully rational person will never act against what morality commands.

5. Huck's plight might be taken to be grist for the mill of the noncognitivist, the relativist, or the skeptical positions.