1. In chapter four of *Utilitarianism* Mill argues that happiness, and happiness alone, is desirable as an end. He raises the objection that in fact people seek as ends many things besides happiness—such as fame, glory, and virtue. State Mill’s response to this objection.

2. Would it be compatible with the Liberty Principle affirmed by Mill in *On Liberty* to restrict the liberty of willing adults to procreate (bring a child into the world and raise it as their own)? Why or why not? (If you need more information to answer the question, explain exactly what information you would need and why.)
3. Suppose that I want to do the morally right thing for the right reasons, but not very much. If I faced temptation, I would yield, and do what is seriously morally wrong, but I never in fact face serious temptation, and go to my grave without ever doing any seriously morally wrong acts. Now consider an act I perform, let's say feeding some hungry cats. I do the right thing for the right reason. What does Nomy Arpaly’s account of moral worth imply regarding the question, to what extent am I morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for doing this act?

4. Some cave explorers are scrambling to exit from a cave. Flood waters are rising, and they will die unless they are able to escape. They find a shaft that would allow them to get out of the cave, except that a stout man has tried to exit the cave by this route and has become hopelessly stuck. They blow him out of the cave mouth with a stick of dynamite to they can escape through the shaft. They live; he dies. They invoke the Doctrine of Double Effect to argue that their action is morally permissible. “We did not actually intend to kill the stout man, but only to force his body from the cave exit. The fact that he was blown to bits and died was not part of our plan.” According to Warren Quinn’s reformulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect, it distinguishes between two kinds of harmful agency, and asserts a presumption that action of the one type is morally permissible and action of the other type is not. How does Quinn’s formulation of the Doctrine of Double Effect affect its assessment of the killing of the stout man?

5. Suppose you and I voluntarily agree to a contract whereby I become owned by you as private property—I become your permanent slave. How should a society committed to the Liberty Principle that Mill affirms in On Liberty respond to such a voluntary contract? For what reasons? Mill discusses this example in On Liberty. State his response.
6. Consider Sam and Samantha. They could develop their individuality, but they find doing so crushingly boring. Suppose that the qualified experts that Mill described in chapter two of *Utilitarianism* prefer the pleasures of developing one’s individuality to any other pleasures. Is Mill then committed to holding that Sam and Samantha attain the most happiness when they devote their lives mainly to the pleasures of developing their individuality even though they gain hardly any pleasure from this activity and there are many feasible alternatives they could pursue that would be more enjoyable for them? Why or why not?

7. You are testing the moral permissibility of a proposed course of action (a maxim) by applying Kant’s Universal Law version of the Categorical Imperative test. You find that you can consistently conceive, but not will, that you along with everybody else adopts and acts on this proposed maxim. According to kant, what is the moral status of maxims that pass the can-consistently-conceive test but not the can-consistently-will test?

8. If I love my friends for their desirable qualities, one might think it follows that if I see other people with more desirable qualities, my love should be expected to transfer automatically away from my friends and to these other people, but love that is fickle in that way seems incompatible with genuine friendship. What is Neera Badhwar’s suggested resolution of this puzzle?
9. “Despite Kant’s strongly held moral opinions, it is not merely morally permissible but actually morally required to tell a lie, other things being equal, whenever doing so would save the life of a morally innocent nonthreatening person who wants to continue living.” Is there a plausible interpretation of Kant’s Categorical Imperative principle, according to which the principle endorses the quoted judgment? If so, how so? If not, why not?

10. In her essay “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil,” Christine Korsgaard argues that the Humanity Formula version of the Categorical Imperative test and the Universal Law version of the same test yield opposed verdicts regarding the moral permissibility of telling a lie to a would-be murderer in order to save the life of the intended victim. State the reasoning by which she arrives at this conclusion.
11. According to Robert Nozick, moral rights as understood by ordinary pre-theoretical common sense are side constraints on the choice of what to do. Explain what it means to regard moral rights as side constraints. Are the reasons generated by side constraints agent-relative or agent-neutral reasons? How is this so?

12. According to Michael Walzer, what renders it the case that a war is a war of aggression? Walzer thinks that resistance against aggression is standardly a just war, but that there are other reasons for waging war that can qualify as a just cause for war (so the war fought for that reason is a just war). State these exceptions to the claim that only a war against aggression can be a just war.