The final exam for this course will take place on Monday, June 6, from 11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. in WLH 2112 (our regular classroom).

The final exam will comprehend all course materials (required readings, lectures, and handouts) but will emphasize the material not covered in the midterm exam.

No use of books or notes will be permitted at any time during the final exam.

The final exam counts for 40 per cent of your overall course grade. (If you are enrolled in this course on a Pass/Not Pass basis, you must earn a C- or better grade on the final exam in order to get a Pass grade in the course, with one exception: If you have an A- or better average grade on the midterm and the writing assignment, you have earned a Pass grade and you are not required to take the final exam.)

The first hour and a half of the exam will consist of short-answer questions testing comprehension of course readings. These questions are to be answered in a paragraph-length “essay.” You will have some choice as to which questions to answer. Short-answer exam questions from past years may be viewed at the course web page.

The final hour and a half of the exam will consist of essay questions drawn from the list below. Not all of the questions stated below will be on the exam. On the actual exam, four questions drawn from the list below will be posed, and you will be asked to answer two of the four posed questions. You will be asked to answer one A question and one B question. Each of your two essays counts equally toward your final exam grade.

Each of the two sections of the final exam (the short-answer section and the essay section) counts equally toward your final exam grade.

ESSAY QUESTIONS.

A1. In “Political Equality and Majority Rule,” Peter Jones writes that when democratic institutions work in such a way that some group of voters never becomes part of a winning majority coalition, this “persistent minority has reason to complain in terms of the very principle of equality that underlies democracy.” State the argument that Jones advances in support of this claim. Evaluate the cogency of his argument.

A2. Suppose that the nation of Potzrebie is divided into two groups of people, Purples and Greens. The two groups speak different languages. The members of each group live concentrated together in a separate region of the country. The Purples make up two-thirds of the population and the Greens one-third. The Greens demand that they be allowed to separate from the nation of Potzrebie, taking the land they inhabit with them and forming a new independent nation. According to Allen Buchanan, what determines whether or not the Greens have a moral right to secede? Defend or attack Buchanan’s view.

A3. Many people criticize undemocratic governments such as the present political regime in China both for the character of the policies it enforces and for the undemocratic character of the regime. But just suppose that the current rulers of China continue to rule without any democratic accountability to the people, but enact and implement ideally just policies in a thoroughly efficient way. The policies of the regime are now beyond reproach, but the political system remains undemocratic. Drawing on course readings by J. S. Mill, Peter Jones, Jon Elster, or Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, state some serious reasons for holding that the Chinese regime as described is unjust or significantly morally defective just in virtue of failing to conform to democratic norms. Assess these arguments.
B4. The Lockean individual rights doctrine elaborated by Robert Nozick implies that paternalistic restriction of an individual's liberty against her will for her own good is always a violation of her rights (unless she has voluntarily relinquished her liberty in this respect). In chapter 6 of *Sovereign Virtue* Ronald Dworkin develops a challenge model of human good and argues that one advantage of the model is that it shows what is wrong with the kinds of paternalistic restriction of individual liberty we should find morally objectionable. Elucidate Dworkin's views on the moral acceptability of paternalism, especially what he calls "coercive critical paternalism." Where Nozick and Dworkin disagree on the location of the boundary between morally acceptable and morally unacceptable paternalistic restriction of liberty, whose position is more defensible in your view? For what reasons?

B5. "When inequalities in income and wealth are the result of choices, not circumstances, the difference principle creates, rather than removes, unfairness." The quoted statement criticizes Rawls's difference principle from the standpoint of Dworkin's equality of resources doctrine. Evaluate this criticism. To what extent are Rawls's and Dworkin's principles of distributive justice regulating social and economic inequalities vulnerable to Nozick's complaint that the implementation of patterned and end-state principles of justice in a society would require continuous and obviously wrongful restrictions of individual liberty?

B6. Suppose that a state limits its activities to protecting people from violations of what are uncontroversially (according to your own favored standards) their rights to live as they choose without wrongful interference and not to be harmed wrongfully by others. Initially the state tries to finance its activities by requesting that those it protects voluntarily pay a specified fair share of the costs of providing this protection. Some people pay this specified fair share of the costs of protection and some do not. The state then forces those who do not voluntarily pay their fair share of these costs to pay this amount. Explain to what extent, if at all, Robert Nozick's and A. John Simmons's positions on the Hart-Rawls principle of fairness or fair play might justify such coercive enforcement. Defend or attack the Simmons and Nozick positions.

B7. "What each of us owes to each other by way of distributive justice obligations is not to maintain equality of outcomes across persons or even equality of opportunity but rather to bring it about that everyone has a fair opportunity to attain at least a minimally decent or "good enough" quality of life. What is fundamentally unjust in a society is not that some have more than others but rather than some people lead horribly grim lives when it is possible by our concerted action to prevent this state of affairs from occurring."—In different ways John Rawls, Robert Nozick, and Ronald Dworkin all disagree with the quoted statement. Pick any two of these authors and explain in what ways each of the two authors you have chosen holds that distributive justice involves something more, or something different, from what the quote asserts. In this three-way conflict, what position is more defensible in your view? Defend your answer.