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Friends as Ends in Themselves

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I. Introduction

I define friendship as a practical and emotional relationship of mutual and equal goodwill, affection and pleasure.1 In a general discussion of friendship I would unpack and defend this broadly Aristotelian definition. But my concerns in this paper can be addressed without doing so. My chief concern is to give an analysis of end love in friendship, distinguishing it from means love, as well as from other notions of end love I regard as unjustifiable. I discuss love outside of friendship only insofar as it has a bearing on love in friendship.

I shall give a preliminary sketch of my topic by invoking widely-held intuitions about end friendship as that in which the friend is loved for her essential, not incidental, features; as an intrinsic, not instrumental, value; and as a unique and irreplaceable individual; and by showing how these intuitions fit in — or not — with the common but ill-understood distinction between conditional and unconditional love. The explication of these intuitions will follow in later sections as part of the analysis of end friendship.

1) Ends and Means Friendships. The best, most complete friendships are those in which friends love and wish each other well as ends in themselves, and not solely, or even primarily, as means to further ends — social advancement, amusement, the promotion of some cause, or even mutual edification or improvement. In such friendships, the friends value each other’s separateness — the fact that each has, and gives importance to, her own life and perspective, no matter how similar this life and perspective to the other’s; and take pleasure in being together primarily because of the

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1 Hence a friendship can exist between lovers, siblings, parent and child, as well as between those who are related only as friends.
persons they are. The other’s usefulness in bringing about a desired end may, of course, be the initial spark of the friendship, and most friendships are useful in many ways. Indeed, if friends were not useful in times of need, they would not be friends. But in the best friendships, the central feature of the friendship is simply that the friends love, and wish each other well, as ends in themselves, whereas in lesser friendships, the central feature is the instrumental or means value of each to the other. The friends value each other’s life and perspective only to the extent that it is useful to do so; and each takes pleasure in the other primarily as a means to a further end.¹

The two kinds of friendship differ in their object or focus as well as in their attitudes. Part of what it means to love something as an end, say a certain work of literature, is that one loves it for the features that make it the work it is. In friendship, too, then, part of what it means to love a friend as an end is that one loves her for the features that make her the person she is. As Aristotle puts it, those who are “most truly friends” love each other “by reason of their nature,” i.e., for being the persons they are.³ The friend is seen as lovable on account of what she essentially is, and not just on account of incidental features that make her useful or pleasurable. In instrumental friendships, by contrast, the object of love is primarily or only the other’s incidental features.

How far must the person seen as intrinsically or non-instrumentally lovable be actually thus lovable by objective standards of human worth,⁴

¹ This does not mean that instrumental friendships are inherently exploitative or unjust: they could not count as friendships if they were. What makes a relationship exploitative is not the mere fact that it serves an end beyond itself, but that it violates the rightful expectations and obligations of one or both parties, where “rightfulness” is itself determined by wider moral criteria. And elements of such injustice are present in practically all relationships.

³ Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter NE), 1156a18-19.

⁴ The notion of intrinsic worth is often construed Platonically, i.e., as a worth which is independent of any valuer, even potential valuer. But this interpretation is necessary only for that which is conceived as a value because it is the source of all value — the Good or God. This must, logically, have a value which is independent of any valuer. But it is possible as well as more plausible to hold that all other values, including intrinsic values, are relational, the other term of the relation being that for which it is a value (cf. NE, 1097a1-22). What makes something a value is its actual or possible relation to a valuer as an ultimate end (an end in itself), or means to such an end. If it were not even a possible end in itself, or means to it, it could not be a value, any more than something which is not even a possible object of perception could be perceptible. (It should be clear from the analogy with perception that the question of the objectivity or rationality of our value choices and judgments is independent of the ontological claim that values are relational.) What makes something an intrinsic value is that it is valued just for being what it is, for its very nature, not for its usefulness in bringing about some other valued state of affairs. But
if the love is to count as genuine end love in friendship? It is at least necessary that she be an end in herself (Sec. III below), and have the dispositions and qualities that are needed for being a good friend. (Whether a person can combine these good dispositions towards her friends with nasty dispositions towards everyone else — thus be grossly deficient in human worth — is not a question I can pursue here. Here I shall assume that someone who is deficient in this way is also deficient in her capacity for the best kind of friendship, the friendship that is an end in itself.)

In end friendship, then, the friends are ends in themselves, and love each other as ends in themselves, i.e., non-instrumentally, and by virtue of their essential features. Because the friends are not primarily means to each other’s ends, they cannot — logically cannot — be replaced by more efficient means, or abandoned on the achievement of the end. It is this irreplaceability that most obviously marks off end friendship from means or instrumental friendship, in which the friends are thus replaceable or dispensable.

Is it possible to love someone who is an end for her essential features, but also, primarily, as a means to an end, say, to the end of self-improvement? The two sets of attitudes and emotions are psychologically incompatible, but it is surely possible for a person to have psychologically conflicting attitudes towards someone. In such a case, however, the friendship in question is neither fully instrumental, nor fully an end in itself. Accordingly, when I discuss the objects of the two kinds of friendship, I shall assume that the object of end love is always the other’s essential features, the object of instrumental love, the other’s incidental features.

2. Loving Someone as a Good to Oneself. Friendships are generally recognised to involve pleasure. In end friendships, friends are a source of pleasure or happiness by virtue of their intrinsic worth or lovability. They are thus a good to each other, and love each other as such. A strong, opposing view, however, is that so long as one loves another as a good to oneself, then whether the source of this good is the other’s intrinsic worth or instrumental worth, one loves her as a means to an end. A recent proponent of this idea is George Nakhnikian, whose target is Aristotle’s theory of friendship, a theory which shares in its essentials the view of end love I have sketched. Nakhnikian argues that love of another because of valuing something for its very nature is only a necessary condition of valuing it instrumentally or non-instrumentally: for some things are by their nature tools or instruments (see Sec. III.1 below).

his “admirable character traits,” is no less “transactional” or instrumental than love of another “because of his usefulness,” for both are “supposed to rebound to the satisfaction or benefit of the one who loves . . .” (p. 287). We love a person non-instrumentally, according to Nakhnikian, only when we love him for whatever he is, i.e., “undemandingly” or unconditionally. In such a love, there can be “no thought of expected returns and no requirement that the person loved be a good [or lovable] human being” (p. 294). To love him as a good to ourselves is necessarily to love him instrumentally. According to this line of thought, then, loving another non-instrumentally cannot imply loving him as a good to oneself, thus as a source of pleasure or happiness.

This exclusion of pleasure in the other from the phenomenon of love is, however, false to experience, at least so long as “love” is used in the usual emotional-practical sense, and not in Kant’s rarefied purely practical sense. One can admire a person’s admirable qualities without getting any pleasure from them: witness Salieri’s bitter, grudging admiration of Mozart’s genius in Amadeus. One can delight in a person’s accomplishments, without getting any pleasure from the person as the cause and bearer of these accomplishments: witness Salieri’s delight in Mozart’s music, coupled with his hate-filled resentment of Mozart for being the one “chosen” to produce such sublime sounds. And one can wish a person well, and even want to spend time with her to benefit her, without getting any pleasure from her company. But one cannot love a person without delighting in her under some aspect — in the end love of friendship, without delighting in her as being the person she is. Hence end love is also necessarily a good to the one who loves. But it is not thereby, I hold, instrumental. These conclusions are further supported in Section II by an analysis of what it means to love someone as an end.

Some people might be inclined to dismiss the view I am discussing — that the presence of pleasure or satisfaction necessarily makes love instrumental — as a simple-minded confusion between pleasure being the result of loving someone, and pleasure being its goal. But simple-minded confusions do not have the long and tenacious life that this view has had. Hence it is not surprising that it has not disappeared inspite of Bishop Butler’s exposure of a similar confusion at the heart of the argument for psychological egoism. For what Butler’s argument leaves untouched is the further possibility that even if self-benefit (satisfaction, pleasure, or whatever) is only an unintended result of a certain kind of activity, it may well be that the tacit expectation of self-benefit — based on past experience, or even just on the natural teleology of our biological constitution — is necessary for sustaining the activity. It is this worry that leads Kant to say that
we can never be sure that "the dear self" is not intruding even when we think our only motive is duty. And it is this possibility in personal love that is thought to make it instrumental, and to distinguish it from the unconditional love — agape — with which God is said to love us, and which in us is called neighborly love. This argument, however, will not concern me here, as I do not believe that the good to oneself that I have identified as delight in the other is only an unintended result of love. Nor do I believe that its presence distinguishes personal love from agape. Rather, I believe it is an essential element of end love, in agape — in so far as it is conceivable as a form of love — no less than in friendship and in other forms of personal love. So either loving another as a good to oneself does not necessarily make personal love instrumental, or else agape is also instrumental.

3) The Friend as the Unique, Irreplaceable Individual. Those who believe that only unconditional love makes it as non-instrumental love, but have not wanted to condemn friendship out of hand as mere instrumental love, might be attracted by Nakhnikian's suggestion that the best kinds of friendship be understood as a combination of unconditional and instrumental love. But can friendship love be accurately characterized as a combination of these, or in some way be explained by reference to these? If it cannot, then there is good reason to suppose that not all non-instrumental love is unconditional, and not all love of the other as a good to oneself is instrumental.

The main problem in trying to explain friendship in terms of unconditional and instrumental love, is that each, in its own way, does violence to the intuition that in end friendship the object of love is the unique, irreplaceable individual. If I love you unconditionally, I love you regardless of your individual qualities — your appearance, your temperament, your style, even your moral character. So you are no different from anyone else as the object of my love, and my love for you is no different from my love for anyone else. But then in what sense are you the object of my love? On the other hand, if I love you instrumentally, for the benefit I derive from certain of your qualities, then your value to me is entirely dependent on my needs or ends, and you are dispensable as soon as I have achieved them or relinquished them or found someone else who can better serve them. So again, in what sense is it you that I love? In the first you lose your qualitative identity, in the second your numerical or historical identity. Thus in agape, the exemplar of unconditional love, although the target of love —

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6 All instrumental love is not, of course, self-regarding — it can be a means to Utility, to the imperatives of Pure Practical Reason, to the Idea of Beauty. The logic of the objection, however, remains the same.
that which the love is directed to or at — is, indeed, the particular, numerical individual, the focus or object of love — that for which or as which the target is loved — is not that which makes him the unique person he is, but that which he shares with everyone else: his substantial, metaphysical identity as a human being. Every individual is loved equally and indifferently as a Speck of Humanity among other Specks in the Ocean of Humanity. Thus every individual is phenomenologically replaceable by any other as the object of love. On the Platonic view, the exemplar of instrumental love, although the target of love is only that individual who has the qualities beneficial to the lover, the object of love is not the person, not that individual with those qualities, but rather those qualities in any individual. The individual is loved for his qualitative identity as an instantiation of the abstract Idea of Beauty, and is a means to this ultimate object of love. Hence the individual is both phenomenologically and numerically replaceable in the lover’s journey to this ultimate object. Thus both agape and Platonic love have as their objects the universal and nonindividual in the individual target. Their difference is only that in one the individual target is regarded as an end, in the other, as a means. But in neither is the individual loved for the unique character or personality that make him the distinct person he is, as he must be in the end love of friendship.

Can this double failure be compounded into a single success, as suggested by some? I suspect not. On the one hand, my love for you, who are my friend, is not love if it alters whenever it alteration finds. Hence it cannot be of qualities as such, qualities you happen to manifest — as it is in instrumental love. But neither is my love for you, the unique person, love for you if it remains unaltered through all alterations of your qualities (as if “you” = “bare particular”) — as it is in unconditional love. The object of my love must be you, the person, in your concrete individuality, not “Human Being” or “Instance of (some) F.” The question, then, is: What is essential to your being the person you are? When are you no longer you?

7 I borrow the distinction between target and object of love from Amélie Rorty, “Explaining Emotions,” in Explaining Emotions, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

8 Or for that matter, in anything — laws, institutions, theories et al. As Gregory Vlastos remarks in “The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,” “as objects of Platonic love, all these are not only as good as persons, but distinctly better,” Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 26. Vlastos goes on to state that “the cardinal flaw in Plato’s theory” is that it “does not provide for love of whole persons, but only for love of that abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of their best qualities” (p. 31). Vlastos equates love of the whole person with love of the individual but, typically, picks out Christian unconditional love as its exemplar (p. 33).
We need an analysis of the person or self in friendship that allows us to accommodate the idea that friendship love is dependent on the qualitative identity of the friend, yet not such as to make her numerically or phenomenologically replaceable by any individual with those qualities — that such love is of the numerically irreplaceable individual, yet not such as to persist independently of her qualitative identity. In other words, we need an analysis of the object of friendship love which preserves both the qualitative and the numerical identity of the individual.

Before proceeding, I want to make three points of clarification.

First, although I have used the words “historical identity” and “numerical identity” interchangeably, it is only generally true, not necessarily true, that numerically (spatiotemporally) different individuals have different histories. For instance, identical twins raised in the same environment will probably have the same histories in all essential respects: find the same events crucial, make essentially the same responses. Therefore they will probably also have essentially the same qualities, hence be essentially alike as persons. (It is also, of course, logically possible — though highly improbable — that genetically unrelated people, raised in different environments, turn out to have essentially the same histories and qualities as well.) What is necessarily true is that historically distinct individuals be distinct as persons. All of this further implies a qualification of my claim that in the end love of friendship, the object of love is the unique, irreplaceable person. For if in end love one loves the other for the person he is, then if one twin is loved for what he is, so must the other, and both be loved in exactly the same way. They remain numerically irreplaceable, not being means to an end, but not phenomenologically irreplaceable. Thus in Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night Olivia’s romantic love for the disguised Viola is automatically transferred to her twin Sebastian. But since most people are not personality twins, the thesis that in the end love of friendship, the object of love is the person for what he essentially is, will generally also mean that the object of love is irreplaceable both numerically and phenomenologically. It has sometimes been suggested that if friends are unique and irreplaceable, it is only by virtue of their incidental qualities, or of fortuitous differences in the circumstances of the friendship. But if I am right, for most of us, our differences are deeper and richer than that (see Sec. III below).

Secondly, my concern with that which is essential to a person has to do entirely with that constellation of fundamental, empirical, mental qualities — moral, psychological, aesthetic, intellectual — that constitutes an individual’s self or personality, and not with any Metaphysically Changeless and Simple Essence. What is empirically essential or fundamental to a
person is both dynamic and ambivalent. Most people change over their lifetimes in some of their fundamental qualities — in aspects of their selves — and an individual can change enough to have what Derek Parfit calls “later” and “earlier” selves. Thus it is possible to love an individual as an end, but not forever. Most people also harbour ambivalences in their fundamental qualities, and an individual can be ambivalent enough to have simultaneously more than one self. Thus it is possible to love an individual as an end, but not wholly. (These facts explain some of the tragic conflicts that beset friendships.) But even an individual with a single self may be loved as an end but not wholly. For the self is multi-faceted, and no one friend can love — or even evoke — every facet. (This explains, in part, why friendship is not a transitive relationship.) So which changes in the self are crucial to a friendship depends, in part, on what the friends in question find important in each other and in themselves.

Thirdly, as the central aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of the object of love in end friendship, I shall not address myself to the other elements of friendship, e.g., that of mutual and equal goodwill; nor to its “background conditions” — the psychological and social circumstances that explain why people make the friends they do.

In the following section, using agape as the paradigm of unconditional love, I shall argue that on one interpretation, unconditional love is conceptually impossible; on the other, possible but irrelevant to friendship. The first argument will show that the idea of loving someone for her intrinsic worth — and thus as a good to oneself — is necessary to the end love of friendship as well as to agape. Hence the difference between agape and the end love of friendship must lie elsewhere. The second argument will show that the difference between the two is that in friendship the worth in question is empirical, in agape, transcendental. But there is no transcendental worth. Again, since loving the friend for her intrinsic worth is necessary to end friendship, the difference between instrumental and end friendship cannot be that the former is based on valuable qualities, the latter not. In Sec. III I shall analyse the distinction already made between them in terms of incidental qualities (qualities that in one way or another fail to define the person) and essential qualities (qualities that do define the person). I will then show that essential qualities can neither be, nor be understood, apart from an individual’s numerical or historical identity. This will serve to distinguish my position from any position, Platonist or anti-Platonist, that identifies love of the person with love of his historical rather than qualitative identity.
II. Loving a Friend as an End vs. Unconditional Love

1) Agape as Completely Unmotivated. Agape is God's love for human beings and, through Him, our love for our neighbours.9 Anders Nygren points out that the life which is organised on the principle of agape is completely different from the life which is organised on the principle of eros, the principle that love is of the good or lovable: eros and agape are opposite "general attitudes to life."10 Thus agape has no direct bearing on the nature of friendship. But it does have an indirect bearing if it is an ideal that friendship ought to approach, or if it is an element in all forms of love, as Kierkegaard, Nakhnikian, and perhaps others, believe. According to Kierkegaard, Christian love "can lie at the base of and be present in every other expression of love . . . It is . . . [or] can be in all of them, but this love itself you cannot point out": it is like the "man" in all men.11

What, then, is the nature of agape? Following Luther’s interpretation, Anders Nygren summarizes its main features thus: agape is spontaneous and "unmotivated"; it is "indifferent to value"; and it is creative.12 It stands "in contrast to all activity with a eudaemonistic motive," and "in contrast to all legalism."13 Agape gives with no thought of gain. Being "indifferent to value," it needs no encouragement from, or justification by, the perceived value of the target of love. To love someone for his worth is to love him acquisitively, not agapeistically.14 Christian love is "a lost love," "the direct opposite of rational calculation" (p. 514). In Kierkegaard's words, "love to one's neighbour makes a man blind in the deepest and noblest and holiest sense, so that he blindly loves every man . . ." (p. 80).

9 See A. Nygren, Agape and Eros, Part II, Vol. II, trans. P. S. Watson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939). Agape, he says, is "primarily God's own love." "In faith he [the Christian] receives God's love, in love he passes it on to his neighbour. . . . The love which he can give is only that which he has received from God" (p. 516).


13 Nygren, Agape and Eros, pp. 508, 509. All further references to Nygren are from this book.

14 Nygren notes disapprovingly of Augustine that "when he speaks of God's love for the sinner, he is anxious to explain that it is not strictly love for the sinner himself, but for the good which, in spite of sin, still remains in him, and for the perfection which he can still attain. The idea that love has still something to hope for, something to gain, in the sinner, thus supplies the final motive when all other motives have disappeared. Luther, on the other hand, is anxious to eliminate even this last motive" (pp. 513-14).
Can such a love be the foundation of friendship? or perhaps the mortar that holds it together? It is hard to see how a love which is in principle blind can be the foundation of a relationship which is in principle cognitive, a response to the perceived value of the other. But perhaps it is agape under its positive, creative aspect which serves this function. Agape’s indifference to value has as a corollary its creativeness: it creates value by loving. In Luther’s words, agape is “an overflowing love . . . which says: I love thee, not because thou art good . . . for I draw my love not from thy goodness (Frommigkeit) as from an alien spring; but from mine own well-spring . . .” (in Nygren, p. 512, n. 1).

Now it may seem that agape under this creative aspect enters into friendship as the generosity and abundance which are characteristic of friendship: I forgive your faults, or shower you with gifts, not because you deserve any of this, but as an expression of my love. But the semblance is misleading. For the love which motivates such generosity is itself a response to the friend’s value, whereas agape on this strictly unconditional interpretation cannot be linked to any recognition of value. Whatever it means, then, to love a friend as an end, it cannot mean to love him with the unconditionality of agape. Indeed, on this Lutheran interpretation, the denial that the worth or lovability of the individual has anything to do with the love, is precisely the denial that the individual is loved for “himself.” So while agape is non-instrumental love, it is not, so far, end love. But this radical interpretation of agape renders it mysterious why agape is selectively directed at human beings, given that it is not motivated by them.15 To dispel the mystery, the Christian must at least concede that human beings are loved qua human beings, hence that humanity as such — the good or God in each individual, in Augustine’s words — is worth loving.16 Agape can, consistently, be unconditional in the sense of being independent of the individual’s personal nature and worth — of that which distinguishes him from other persons — but not of his human nature and worth — of that which distinguishes him from non-humans.

15 This question is raised by any noncognitivist view of love, the view that love is not motivated by the other’s lovable qualities, but rather that it bestows these qualities on him. With respect to God’s love for humans, we can, perhaps, answer the question — if we are willing to ignore the problems it raises for the Christian concept of God. Imagine the following scenario (and ignore the problems). God, lonely and needing to love, creates human beings. He could have loved anything at all, for love is part of His nature. But in a playful mood he creates human beings and, according to plan, loves them. His love, then, is completely unmotivated, but nevertheless, explicably selective.

16 Even if this worth or lovability is only a consequence of God’s arbitrary choice to love them — despite my scenario, a moot point ever since the Euthyphro’s “Do the gods love the pious because they are pious, or are they pious because the gods love them?”
Agape also, in other words, must be of the individual for what he is, even though only qua human being, and not qua person. At least God’s agape for us must, then, be a form of end love.17 But now, if loving someone for his worth is logically necessary for loving him as an end, then loving someone as a means cannot be explicated in terms of loving him for his worth, simpliciter. Both end love and instrumental love are directed at the other as lovable or worthy.

2) Happiness as Goal of Love and Happiness as Intrinsic to Love. It may still be argued, following Nygren, that in loving something as lovable or good we must love it only as a means, even if the love aims only at the possession and contemplation18 of the loved object, and not at any further advantage. And this because in such possession and contemplation we attain happiness, so that the love remains but a means [conscious or unconscious] to our happiness.19 If Nygren is right, we are caught in a contradiction: to love x as an end is necessarily to love him for his worth; to love him for his worth is necessarily to love him as a means; hence to love x as an end is to love him as a means. But Nygren’s view depends upon his distinction between the love of x, and the happiness we gain from the attainment and contemplation of x. Is this a viable distinction? Must love be a separable means to the happiness contained in the attainment and contemplation of the loved object? It would have to be construed thus if it were such as to come to an end on the attainment of the happiness,20 as the desire at a particular time for, say, the sight of green valleys, comes

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17 Agape between humans may or may not be an end love. According to Augustine, our love for all things except God ought to be an “uti” or instrumental love.

18 In the Greek and medieval traditions “contemplation” refers to a state of awareness distinguished from other states of awareness by having no end beyond itself: one contemplates not for the sake of clarification or information or action or production — although contemplation may indirectly aid us in all these — but for its own value. It is a state of receptive awareness, of “listening to the essence of things,” as Heraclitus put it (v. Joseph Pieper, Leisure the Basis of Culture [New York: Random House, 1963], p. 26), which takes as its object that which is similarly self-sufficient, serving no end beyond itself. Such an object is obviously God. But such are also all objects that are valuable by their very nature.

19 Thus Nygren says of Augustine’s view of our love for God: the love of the summum bonum is a means to the happiness and blessedness we derive from its possession, “the blessedness does not consist in loving — that is, desiring and longing for the highest good — but in possessing it” (pp. 292-93).

20 This is, in fact, Nygren’s interpretation of Augustine’s view of our love for God: “We have reached our goal; eternal rest (quies) is here; and the very meaning of this quies is that desire is for ever quenched: man no longer needs to seek his ‘bonum,’ but possesses it. Perfect fruitio Dei means in principle the cessation of love” (p. 293).
to an end on seeing them. But love is not quenched by the happiness we get from the contemplation of the loved object. Rather, if love is a response to the perceived value of the other, then its contemplation must further evoke the love, not extinguish it; and because the happiness afforded by this is itself a value, the happiness must serve to perpetuate the love of the other who is its source. The relationship of loving to the happiness we get from loving is not, then, modelled by the relationship of the desire to see to the pleasure of seeing.

This in itself, however, is not enough to show that end love and happiness are not related as means to goal. For even if y’s love for x is not extinguished by happiness, it may yet be the case that it is wholly conditional on the happiness y gets from the satisfaction of her goals by x: anyone with x’s ability could take his place. To show that in end love, love is not a means to happiness, it must be the case that here the happiness cannot be adequately specified independently of the love, such that in loving you as an end, my happiness is to the love, not as the desire to see x to seeing x, but as the pleasure of seeing x to seeing x.

We have seen that essential to loving someone as an end is perceiving and responding to her as lovable by her very nature, however this is to be defined. Hence pleasure or delight is intrinsic to perceiving and responding to someone as lovable by her very nature — to contemplating the

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11 One can, of course, desire to keep seeing them. More generally, as Socrates’s question to Agathon shows, desire can be for keeping what we already have, not only for what we lack at the time of the desire: “[W]hen you say, I desire that which I have and nothing else, is not your meaning that you want to have what you now have in the future?” Symposium, 200d, trans. M. Joyce in The Collected Works of Plato, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

Nevertheless, a desire for keeping something we already have is purely future-directed: in any given moment it is satisfied — quenched — for that moment. But love does not get “satisfied.” So love cannot be mere desire, not even an on-going desire for keeping what we have.

12 As Augustine, who seems to hold two opposing views, points out: the better we know God, the better we must love him, hence it is precisely when we have obtained the sumnum bonum that our love grows (v. Nygren, p. 293).

13 To illustrate by means of an analogy: I love this knife only because it enables me to slice onions quickly and easily, even though in so doing, it further evokes my love for it.

14 To be lovable is to be valuable, but to be valuable is not necessarily to be lovable. Hence there is no necessary connection between taking pleasure in something and valuing it, simpliciter. E.g., someone who accepts the Kantian view of morality as categorically commanded, as an “end in itself” in the special Kantian sense of “serving no empirical end,” may well derive no joy from his success in performing his duty, from achieving “the right.” But he may still value this success. On the other hand, if one does not have joy in the attainment of something regarded as an end in itself, then the awareness of it is not contemplation, and it is not an object of love. For between happiness and the value-re-
person loved. Happiness is related to end love not as goal to means, but rather, as element to complex whole. So when x is loved as an end, the happiness cannot, logically, exist apart from the love: different end loves bring different forms of happiness. By contrast, when x is loved as a means, the happiness is a further goal of the love, and can, logically, exist without it: different means loves can bring the same form of happiness. For it is in the satisfaction of her own ends that y takes pleasure and delight, and only derivatively, i.e., by virtue of x’s ability to fulfill these ends, in x.

It is important to remember that the happiness that is intrinsic to end love, whether in agape or in friendship, is not the only kind of happiness afforded by such love. Happiness comprehends different kinds of pleasures and satisfactions, and the happiness which consists in loving x may cause the happiness which consists in, say, philosophizing well. It is a common enough experience for happiness in one area of one’s life to spread into other areas by motivating one to do well — act successfully, hence pleasurably — in those other areas. Besides, as I remarked earlier, end friendships usually are useful in many ways, and friends must at least aim to be useful in certain ways if they are to be real friends. They remain end friendships, however, because what is central to them is the happiness that is intrinsic to the love, and not the happiness that results from the satisfaction of one’s goals.

Someone may object to making happiness intrinsic to the end love of friendship on the grounds that one may regard the other not with pleasure and delight but with pain and frustration as, for instance, when his life is fraught with pain and disappointment; and this precisely because in loving him one shares in his pain. This is obviously true. I would still maintain, however, that insofar as the love is a response to the other’s worth, one cannot fail to regard him with pleasure, even if the pleasure is out-

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53 As Amélie Rorty writes, “... in contemplating our friends’ lives, we become aware of them as forming a unity,” and by “such reflection, we take pleasure in their existence, in their life as the unimpeded exercise of an activity,” “The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 379, 390. In a similar vein, Ortega y Gasset states: “Love . . . is involved in the affirmation of its object . . . it is like recognizing and confirming at each moment that they [its objects] are worthy of existence. . . . To hate someone is to feel irritated by his mere existence,” On Love: Aspects of a Single Theme (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), p. 17. But some have contrasted contemplation with pleasure. Thus Harold Osborne, who contrasts aesthetic contemplation as “a mode of awareness in which a thing is apprehended for its own sake,” with aesthetic pleasure, Aesthetics, ed. H. Osborne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 14. If this contrast is well-made, then pleasure cannot be intrinsic to love. But it is hard to see what aesthetic pleasure is, if it is not pleasure in an object apprehended as an end in itself.
weighed by the pain. If he changes in a way which destroys the possibility of such a response, as when the frustrations of his life not only make him unhappy and "not much fun to be with" but also, say, self-pitying and self-centred, one may indeed keep up "friendly relations" out of a sense of loyalty, one may even feel a kind of love out of pity, but the emotion is no longer the value response necessary to end love.

3) Irreplaceability as Criterion of End Love in Friendship. I stated earlier that it is irreplaceability that most obviously marks off end friendship from means friendship. A friend who is loved as an end is numerically irreplaceable in the sense that she is not a means to a happiness which can be better or as well served by another. It can now be stated more clearly how and why she is also phenomenologically irreplaceable. She is thus irreplaceable in the precise sense that loving and delighting in her are not completely commensurate with loving and delighting in another, not even when this other is loved as an end. This is confirmed by the fact that if the happiness we got from different friends were completely commensurate, there would be no qualitative differences among our friendships, and we would not, e.g., desire to spend an evening with x rather than with y, but rather only "with a friend." Again, when someone who is loved as an end ceases to be loved, the loss cannot be completely made up by acquiring a new friend — the loss of the old friend is a distinct loss, the gain of the new friend, a distinct gain. Even when one ceases to feel the loss, because of the passage of time, and the presence of other enriching activities and experiences in one's life, it remains true that different end friendships engender different forms of love and happiness. In instrumental friendships, on the other hand, anyone who fulfills my goals as well as x, is a potential replacement for x: different friendships engender the same love and happiness. The friend may, indeed, turn out be numerically irreplaceable, but only for contingent reasons, as when circumstances conspire to make her uniquely qualified to promote my ends.16 Thus there can be a lifelong friendship which is enacted entirely in pubs over shared beers — but which would have ended on one of the friend's going off beer. This is why mere permanence is not sufficient for end friendship.17 Neither is it necessary. For if the essential qualities of one of the friends change, such that

16 Just as the knife of the example in n. 23 above may turn out to be uniquely qualified to slice my onions.

17 It is true, of course, that an instrumental friendship is less likely to be permanent than an end friendship. For circumstances and incidental qualities are more variable than essential qualities; and the love and concern based on these, being relatively narrow in focus, are far sooner and easier undermined by the wear and tear of friendship than a love and concern based on a person's essential qualities.
either you are no longer the person who evoked my love, or I am no longer the person who loved you—then, barring the happy possibility that the other one of us undergoes a parallel or complementary change, the love must disappear because its object or its subject have disappeared.28

My account might give rise to the objection that the person who is loved as an end cannot, contrary to my claim, be irreplaceable. For when someone who affords greater happiness than x comes along, she must displace x. But this criticism is either misleading or not an objection at all. It is misleading insofar as it suggests that x’s intrinsic value to me is displaced by the new friend. For this is not possible: the pleasure I get from x is different from the pleasure I get from the new friend, even if the latter is greater.29 Given that time is finite, the greater friendship will certainly limit and change my practical relations with x. In particular, it will displace x’s instrumental value; for instance, x will no longer be my primary support in times of trouble. But this is hardly an objection to my account of end love.

To summarize this part of the discussion: loving x as an end in himself requires explication in terms of x’s worth or lovability, whether the loveable object be x the unique and irreplaceable person, as in friendship, or x the human being, as in agape. Insofar as happiness is intrinsic to such love, and not its goal, one necessarily loves x as a good to oneself without loving him as a means. So if x ceases to be such a good, he ceases to be loved as an end. The attempt to interpret end love as an unconditional love which is completely independent of the other’s worth or lovability, and of its relation to one’s own happiness, thus fails. There is no such love.

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28 Frederic C. Young has objected to this view as implying that friendship cannot even survive a fundamental change in the other which is due to unhappy chance, such as, e.g., Alzheimer’s disease; an implication that is clearly false, since love and acts of friendship can and do survive such tragedies. My response is that the continuing love in such a case is like the love for a dead friend—a love based on the memory of the person loved, and a homage to that memory; and likewise, the continuing acts of friendship—the help, the care and so on. But clearly such one-sided love and acts of friendship do not constitute friendship in the full sense of the word, whether the friend is dead, or alive but bereft of the powers that make mutual delight and caring possible.

29 This implies, contrary to the usual thought on the matter, that there is a sense in which even unique, irreplaceable values, including pleasures, may be comparable. What makes them irreplaceable is that they have a different meaning to the valuer, are experienced differently. Thus x has a value to me for being the person he is that is different, phenomenologically, from the value of y: there is no deeper, neutral pleasure or other mental state to which these values can be reduced, and made exchangeable. Yet x’s value to me may be comparatively greater, insofar as x’s character or personality answers to more facets of my own. So at least some irreplaceable values can be compared on the scale of one’s overall happiness or well-being.
4) *Agape as Motivated by a Necessary Human Worth.* When agape is interpreted as a love which is motivated by the good in each individual, then it is compatible with end love in friendship. Is it, however, in any way *relevant* to it? It is often thought so. Erich Fromm states: “In essence, all human beings are identical. We are all part of One; we are One. This being so, it should not make any difference whom we love.”

All human beings qua human beings are equally worthy of love.

But what is the evidence for this common humanity, this equal potential for worth or virtue that we all, supposedly, share? There seems to be no *empirical* evidence. Experience indicates that there are people who are completely lacking in moral capacities — the criminally insane, the thoroughly wicked, the psychopathically amoral. Hence the only way to sustain belief in a universal potential for goodness is by means of a transcendental metaphysics of the person (in the religious version, the idea of man as created in the image of God; in a well-known secular version, the idea of man qua moral agent as a noumenal being). Without this transcendental assurance of a necessary potential for goodness in all human beings, the goodwill we bear to those we are unacquainted with can be based only on the fact that most human beings do have some actual or potential moral worth. Now such a goodwill or “love of humanity” is related to friendship. It is, in Aristotle’s words, “a beginning of friendship [philia], as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love [eros]” (NE 1167α3-4).

But since the assumption on which the goodwill is based is defeasible with respect to any given individual, so is the goodwill itself. Thus the goodwill presupposed by friendship is not unconditional love. We may conclude, therefore, that unconditional love is neither an element of, nor an ideal for, friendship love. The object of the former is Humanity, the “God in the neighbour,” that of the latter, the person, the qualitatively and numerically unique individual.

### III. Loving a Friend as an End vs. Instrumental Love

It is time now to discuss the difference between the objects of love in end and means friendships. In Sec. I I stated that instrumental friendships are based on incidental qualities, qualities that in one way or another fail to define the person, whereas end friendships are based on essential qualities, qualities that do define the person. Further, in end friendships the friend

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10 Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), p. 47. In the case of erotic love he acknowledges that it does make a difference whom we love for, although “[w]e are all One — yet every one of us is a unique, unduplicable entity. . . .” and erotic love requires certain specific, highly individual elements which exist between some people but not between all” (pp. 47-48).
is, and is regarded as, an end in himself. How do we pick out the qualities that define a person? And what does it mean for someone to be an end in himself?

1) The Object of Love in End Friendship. Defining is a process of selecting the qualities we regard as essential: the qualities we think are ontologically fundamental in, and best explain, the constitution and behaviour of the thing defined.\(^{31}\) But in trying to define a person, our selection of fundamental qualities is complicated not only by their dynamism and ambivalence (see pp. 7-8 above), but also by the feature of reflexiveness. For unlike other things, our individual nature is given not just in what we are, as expressed in the goals, values, and abilities we act upon, but may or may not endorse as good or important; but also in what we would be, as expressed in our still-born ideals and aspirations — those we merely endorse, but do not act upon.\(^{32}\) For even in merely endorsing something we exercise our discrimination and judgment, and express this endorsement, however inconsistently, in the pattern of our evaluations.\(^{33}\) In defining ourselves we may pick out as fundamental only the values and abilities we merely endorse, leaving out entirely those we act upon. Then our self-definition shows that we have a false self-image. Nevertheless, since this very selection expresses a higher-order value-judgment ("This is what I most value, and want to be valued for [and to emulate]"), our self-definition necessarily constitutes and reveals something of our value-scheme and standards, hence of our identity. Or it can go the other way: we may pick out as fundamental in ourselves only the values and abilities which explain our actual goals and actions, leaving out entirely the ideals and aspirations we do not act upon, either because we are unable to articulate them accurately or because we disavow them and are, to that extent, living in bad faith. Nevertheless, insofar as our self-definition is a true statement of the values we actually live by, it necessarily reveals something of our value-scheme and standards, hence of our identity. In

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\(^{31}\) See R. Harre and E. Madden, "Natural Powers and Powerful Natures," Philosophy 48 (1973), and C. McGinn, "A Note on the Essence of Natural Kinds," Analysis 35 (June 1975), for a discussion of the concept of the nature or fundamental properties of a thing as that which explains that thing's other properties and behavior. This analysis is compatible with the view that a thing's nature or essence is, in part, relative to our epistemological interests. Cf. R. de Sousa's criticism of the contrary, absolutist view in "The Natural Shiftiness of Natural Kinds," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (Dec. 1984).

\(^{32}\) And conversely, our individual nature is also given in what we would not be, as expressed in our disavowals of the values and powers we act upon.

\(^{33}\) Cf. H. Frankfurter, "Identification and Externality," The Identities of Persons, ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), especially pp. 247-51, on the role of attitude and decision in establishing that some desire or passion that a person has is his.
The Doll’s House, Nora defines herself in terms of her husband’s needs as part amusing plaything, part obedient wife, disavowing her aspirations to autonomy. Her self-definition, as shown by her subsequent development, is inadequate. Yet it does reveal something of her identity.

Is it logically possible for just anyone to be loved non-instrumentally? A paradox lurks within any analysis of end friendship that allows this possibility. Consider the case of someone who lives and defines himself as an instrument of another’s ends, not because he is ignorant or self-deceived about any contrary aspirations, but because he is simply lacking in them. The goals he pursues are his neither in the sense that he endorses them, nor even in the sense that his desires select them. What he desires and endorses — if he endorses anything — is his own instrumentality, and it is this instrumentality that is his fundamental trait. The paradox in allowing that even such a person can be loved as an end is this. In an end friendship, the friends love and wish each other well non-instrumentally, and by virtue of what they essentially are, and thus irreplaceably. But if someone is essentially an instrument of another’s ends, then loving him for what he essentially is, must entail loving him as an instrument of those ends,34 and thus as replaceable by anyone who can fill that role. It follows that such a person cannot be loved as an end.

A person can fail to be an end in himself even if he does not live or define himself as an instrument of others’ ends. Consider the case of someone who acquires his goals and values, including his friendships, through imitation of significant others, although he does not live or define himself as an instrument of their ends. Such a person also pursues goals that are his neither in the sense that he endorses them, nor even in the sense that his desires select them: his self is engaged at neither level of discrimination and judgment. All he desires and endorses is the safety and acceptability he expects through imitation — this is what is essential to his self. As an imitator of others, he is eminently duplicable and replaceable by those others. This captures some of the content of the intuitive idea that a person can be an end in himself only if the goals and values he pursues are his in some substantive sense, the products of his own encounters with the world. Only then do they express his sense of himself as someone worthy of living quite apart from his utility to others’ ends, and able to live by his own judgment and effort. To be loved for being the person he is, he must be a person in his own right, neither an instrument of others, nor their imitator: someone who is essentially a means to another’s ends, or who is incapable of living by his own judgment, encounters the world and

34 Just as loving the aforementioned knife for what it is, entails loving it as a means to slicing onions quickly and easily.
acquires a self through the goals and judgments of others.\textsuperscript{35} (What exactly it means, in concrete terms, to view oneself as worthy and able to live, what restrictions this imposes on the content of one’s goals, can probably be adequately specified only with the help of a literary narrative, and not by a philosophical analysis alone. For our present purposes it is enough to note that we do distinguish between those who live by their own judgment and values, and those who live second-hand, whether as devotees of some one individual or, in the words of the poet, as “the epitome of all mankind.”)

2) \textit{The Essential and the Accidental: Two Views}. My characterization of the object of end love in friendship has still to meet an indirect metaphysical challenge. I have talked about end love in terms of essential qualities. But as is well known, at the third step of the Platonic ladder of love, the other is loved for what at least \textit{seem} to be his essential qualities, his “fair and noble and well-nurtured soul,”\textsuperscript{36} even though he is, at the same time, loved only as a means to the \textit{proton philon}, the abstract Form of Beauty. \textit{The paradigm of instrumental love turns out to be based on essential qualities}. I shall show that this comes about only because of Plato’s peculiar conception of qualities and their relation to the individual. On the conception I am defending, a person’s essential qualities are inseparable from his numerical or historical identity, both in fact and as object of cognition and love. In trying to see why Platonic love of essential qualities is instrumental, we can also take a deeper look into what is involved in love of essential qualities in end friendship.

Recall, first, that a person’s goals and aspirations, thus his fundamental qualities, are the result of his encounters with the world, whether at first-hand, or in imitation of others. Thus his fundamental qualities are inevitably colored by his particular, historical, existence. Conversely, his goals and aspirations are expressed in, and contour, his particular existence. A personal essence is not a set of qualities detached from one’s particular existence, but qualities which express, and are expressed in, this existence. Thus a person’s essence, that which makes him what he is, includes the \textit{way} his fundamental qualities are expressed, i.e., his \textit{style}: as Buffon noted, the style is the man. Thus, for example, Cyrano de Bergerac would not be the person he is without his poetic wit and physical daring.\textsuperscript{37} His wit and daring constitute \textit{his} particular stylization of his quali-

\textsuperscript{35} Putting it thus allows one to say both that a person can freely and independently choose to live as an instrument of another, and that by doing so she surrenders her own self or identity.

\textsuperscript{36} Plato, \textit{Symposium}, 210c.

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ties: his independence of mind, his courage and loyalty, his passion for the “white plume of freedom . . .” — as well as his tragic conviction that he is too ugly for a woman’s love. What makes these qualities uniquely his, is the style of their expression. Equally, what makes his poetic wit and physical daring uniquely his, is the qualities they express. The distinction between qualities and style, however, is only a relative one: the style in which one expresses certain qualities can itself be described as a set of qualities, and the qualities expressed can be described as a style of facing life. Those who love Cyrano for one or the other do not love him for what he essentially is. Thus the hangers-on in Ragueneau’s bakery, delighting in Cyrano’s wit, fail to see it as an expression of his deepest moral passions; and we can imagine some earnest devotee of Cyrano who loves him for his “moral nobility,” while failing to see his wit as an essential expression of this nobility.

In Plato’s conception of essential qualities, of course, the earnest devotee would be right. The proper object of love is the qualities of soul as abstracted from their mode of expression in the individual’s life. For the fairness and nobility of the well-nurtured soul are reflections of “beauty

38 Such descriptions, of course, are not enough to uniquely pick out Cyrano: no description, other than an ostensive one, can individuate a person — only a presentation in drama or narrative, with its setting and incident. The point of my descriptions is only to illustrate the claim that a person’s essence consists of both qualities and their style of expression. It is the two together that explain, e.g., why Cyrano decides to defend Lignière (out of admiration for Lignière’s having “once in his life . . . done one lovely thing,” p. 39), singlehandedly against a hundred men.
39 Thus Cyrano’s wit and daring and poetic genius are expressed perfectly in his victorious duel with Valvert, in the course of which he composes a Ballade perfectly timed to the action. Likewise, Cyrano’s independence and courage and loyalty constitute his style of facing life, his determination to “carry . . . [his] adornments on . . . [his] soul” (p. 27), to “make [himself] . . . in all things admirable!” (p. 34).
40 Even among those who love Cyrano for what he is, only Le Bret, Christian, and Roxane know him — from differing perspectives — as the passionate and tragic lover. One can, of course, have a true view of someone even in the absence of a full view: if one knows someone in his fundamental aspects, then what one might discover about him fits in, makes sense, in terms of what one already knows. So those who don’t know about Cyrano’s love for Roxane are not necessarily in the same position as Torvald with respect to Nora.
41 They love him, as Aristotle would put it, only incidentally, and “not as being the man he is . . .” (1156a18). For the wit without the qualities it expresses would be a superficial thing, varying independently of Cyrano’s essential qualities. (It is important to note that there is no one invariable set of properties which can be marked off as incidental, as Aristotle seems to think when he states that those who love their friends for their ready-wit, love them only incidentally. Any property which varies, or can vary, independently of a person’s essential qualities is, under that description, incidental.)

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absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting . . .” (Symposium, 211b), the true and ultimate object of love, whose instantiation in the individual’s life is but an unfortunate entanglement. It is this kind of detachment of an individual’s qualities from their concrete manifestation in his life that makes the Platonic ladder of love a metaphor for instrumental love. The individual as a numerical particular becomes a mere vehicle for these qualities, the concrete events of his life which give them shape and expression mere accidents. That which is essential in an individual is universal; that which is unique and personal in him, is accidental: there are no individual essences, no truly personal natures. Thus the noble character of one individual is identical with the noble characters of other individuals, and love of a given individual for what he essentially is, implies love of all instantiations of this universal essence. Such a love is therefore not only compatible with, but requires, regarding him as replaceable with like others, and with regarding his particular existence as but a means to a further goal. To regard him as irreplaceable, as an end rather than a means, is to lose sight of the true object of love, to distort reality.

Thus in Plato’s theory this abstraction of qualities from their concrete manifestation is a moral recommendation to the lover which comes backed by an elaborate metaphysics. The qualities of the individual — the what he is — can and should be divorced from their expression in his life — from the bow he is what he is — because doing so brings one closer to seeing them as they are in themselves, to seeing them as they are in their original and pure form. But this belief (in certain of) the individual’s qualities as essential, and the style in which they are manifested as accidental, is neither required nor possible on a non-transcendental metaphysics. For here, particulars — material objects as well as individuals — are not instantiations of abstract, preexisting qualities; rather, qualities come into being, persist and change in particulars, and can be abstracted from them only mentally or conceptually. An individual’s history, as such, is no more accidental than his qualities: the essential-accidental distinction is a distinction within the individual’s historical-qualitative identity. Thus an individual cannot be known or loved as an end if he is seen as a set of qualities divorced from their expression in his life.

Plato’s metaphysical fiction yields a psychological and moral truth. It shows that a love which is motivated primarily by a need to fulfill a deficiency must be a means love. Even when it purports to be directed to the other’s fundamental qualities, its view lacks the richness and depth necessary to capture the essential person.
3) *The Historical Dimension of Love*. The attempt to defend personal love against the Platonistic impulse sometimes takes the form of contrasting love of the *person* with love of his *characteristics*. But in this form the defence implicitly accepts the Platonic premise of the separability of the two. To quote Robert Nozick:

An adult may come to love another because of the other’s characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to someone else with the same characteristics, even to one who “scores” higher for these characteristics. . . .

One loves the particular person one actually encountered. Why love is historical, attaching to persons in this way and not to characteristics, is an interesting and puzzling question.\(^4\)

But on a non-transcendental metaphysics, this puzzle cannot even be legitimately formulated. The characteristics that motivate the love are not the type of which various individuals are tokens, so that love’s non-transferability should generate a puzzle. No description of an individual’s characteristics which abstracts from their style of expression in his particular existence can capture the *person*. And neither can any explanation of love as historical which excludes reference to the characteristics that are revealed in, and shape, this history. Insofar as love is historical, it is also of the individual’s characteristics as expressed in this history. Love may, indeed, endure “through changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it” (Nozick, p. 168). But this in itself does not imply that characteristics are irrelevant to the continuation of love. After all, love may *not* endure through such changes — indeed, a “love” that endures through a loss of *all* valued characteristics is not love, but obsession or routine. For then its object is not the *person*, but a “bare particular,” the numerical individual who happened to be the one initially encountered and loved. When love does endure through changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it, it could be either because the subject of love has also changed in a complementary way, or because he comes to love the other for *other* characteristics initially unperceived.

The value of a shared history — of the historical dimension of love — lies chiefly in its epistemic and creative functions, both of which have to do with characteristics. A shared history is usually required for *knowledge* of each others’ characteristics, and knowledge is essential to love. When a shared history reveals characteristics that make people lovable to each other, then it leads to or strengthens love. A shared history can also contribute to the mutual creation of characteristics. And when it is “shared”

\(^4\) Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 168. See also Susan Mendus, “Marital Faithfulness,” *Philosophy* 59 (1984), p. 246: “the person who promises to love and to honour only on condition that there be no such [i.e., radical] change in character . . . was never committed in the appropriate way at all.”
emotionally and cognitively, a shared history contributes to the creation of the very object of love. Under this creative aspect, a shared history is a source of the uniqueness and irreplaceability of the object of love. A shared history, in short, both reveals and, in part, constitutes, the object of love. In neither case is it a dimension of love independently of characteristics.

IV. Conclusion

I have argued that to love a friend as an end is to love her for her intrinsic worth, for the worth that is hers by virtue of her personal nature, and not unconditionally. For the object of unconditional love is the universal and non-individual, that of end love in friendship, the unique and irreplaceable. I have also argued that in instrumental love, the object of love is qualities which fail to define the person, or which define her as essentially an instrument of others’ ends, whereas in the end love of friendship, the love is necessarily based on qualities which do define the person, and define her as an end in herself. Finally, I have argued that these qualities can neither be, nor be understood, apart from a person’s historical and numerical identity.

The fact that loving someone as an end implies loving her as a good to oneself points to the possibility that morality can likewise be regarded as an end which is also a good to oneself. This possibility challenges the canonical distinction between teleological and deontological moralities, according to which morality is either related to human good, or is an end in itself.43

43 I have benefited from Ronald de Sousa’s many and detailed comments on this paper, and from Alan Soble’s commentary at the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love. I also received helpful criticisms from Tom Hurka, Raymond Martin, and Wayne Sumner; from members of the Philosophy Departments at Rice University and Texas Tech University; and from the audiences at the American Association for the Philosophic Study of Society, the Canadian Philosophical Association and the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy. The Institute of Humane Studies, Virginia, generously paid for my travel expenses to the meeting of the American Association for the Philosophic Study of Society.