Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern

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Even in countries where average income and wealth are much greater than in the world at large, most people take themselves to have a duty to show much more concern for the needs of compatriots than for the needs of foreigners in their political choices concerning tax-financed aid. For example, in the United States, most reflective, generally humane people who take the alleviation of poverty to be an important task of government think they have a duty to support laws that are much more responsive to neediness in the South Bronx than to neediness in the slums of Dacca. This patriotic bias has come to play a central role in the debate over universalist moralities, moralities whose fundamental principles prescribe equal concern or respect for all individuals everywhere and lay down no independent, fundamental duty toward people in a special relation to the agent. Particularists, i.e., those who locate an independent principle of group loyalty in the foundations of morality, challenge universalists to justify the pervasive patriotic bias in tax-supported aid that is a deep-seated commitment of most of those who are, in general, attracted to universalism.1

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1. David Miller develops a detailed and powerful version of this particularist challenge in On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chapter 3. Other recent versions have been presented in criticisms of Martha Nussbaum’s cosmopolitan ethic (see especially George Fletcher, “Get Serious,” Boston Review, October/November 1994, p. 30; and Sissela Bok, “From Part to Whole,” in Martha Nussbaum, et al., For Love of Country (Bos-
So far, universalist justifications of patriotic bias in aid have not risen to the particularist challenge. Granted (as Goodin noted in an important contribution to this debate), if someone has equal concern for all humanity everywhere, she will take certain considerations of efficiency to favor a worldwide system of institutional responsibilities including special responsibilities toward compatriots, as opposed to similarly needy foreigners. People's tendency to be more sensitive to compatriots' deprivation than foreigners' concentrates the collective attention of an effective social group and facilitates the deliberative coordination of giving; on the whole, people have a better understanding of compatriots' needs, and can more easily provide aid to the needy within the nation's borders. However, the grim facts of international inequality override these considerations, when one assesses bias toward compatriots in a per-capita rich country as compared with the poor of the world at large from a perspective of equal concern for all. The neediness of people in countries such as Bangladesh is desperate enough, their local resources meager enough, their numbers great enough, and current transportation, information, and transnational institutions are effective enough, to put responsibility for the needy of per-capita poor foreign countries on a par with responsibility for needy compatriots in per-capita rich ones, when responsibilities are allocated in ways that most efficiently provide for worldwide needs.2

The other main universalist strategy for justifying special concern for compatriots has appealed to mutual benefit as the appropriate basis for unchosen terms of cooperation.3 Tax-financed giving to compatriots is more apt than tax-financed giving to foreigners to be part of an arrangement in which, over the long run, the contribution of each is compensated by proportionate benefits. For example, domestic giving often contributes to an insurance scheme that is in the long-run self-interest of current benefactors, or serves as a means by which the better-off compensate worse-off compatriots for otherwise unrewarded benefits of their participation in shared institutions. However, a rationale for aid

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that is solely based on long-term mutual benefit will hardly satisfy the vast majority of universalists, who think that those who contribute more to social output can have a duty to make sacrifices over the long run to help those who contribute less when the lesser contribution is due to unchosen disadvantages. Yet once the moral relevance of neediness is acknowledged, it is hard to see why it loses force across borders.

The particularist challenge has begun to seem so powerful that it forces a choice between abandoning universalism and abandoning the patriotic bias in tax-financed aid that is a deep commitment of the vast majority of reflective people who are otherwise strongly attracted to universalism. I will describe a way of avoiding this hard choice, a way of basing a special duty expressing this bias on a universalist morality. For reasons I sketched in connection with Goodin's proposal, I do not think this reconciling project can succeed on the basis of a universalist morality of equal concern for all. Instead, I will derive the patriotic bias from a morality of equal respect for all. A plausible comprehensive morality of universal respect produces a strongly biased duty of special concern for compatriots in matters of tax-financed aid, largely because it dictates a special interest in leading a social life based on mutual respect and trust and a special commitment to provide adequate incentives for compatriots to conform to the shared institutions that one helps to impose on them. (The required incentives are not proportionate to contribution.) In a moral discussion, guided by this perspective, between Kevin, a corporate lawyer living in a rich suburb of New York, and Khalid, who collects scrap metal in a slum of Dacca, Kevin could say, "In my political choices, I must give priority to helping my needy compatriots if my most important relations of interdependence are to be based on respect and trust, and if those compatriots are to have an incentive that their self-respect requires if they are to uphold political measures I help to force upon them." Khalid could accept this rationale even though he suffers from the worldwide consequences of Kevin's sort of patriotic bias, because his own moral responsibility leads him to accord a special importance to the kind of social and political relations Kevin seeks, an importance that entails allowing others to treat the pursuit of such relations in their own lives as a basis for choice among rules for giving.

According to this argument, special concern for those in certain unchosen relations to oneself, including relations of specially intense in-
terdependence and mutual subordination, *is* part of the foundations of morality, but it is not an independent part. Such special concern is entailed by a comprehensive universalist morality of equal respect for all.

**The Bias**

The attempt to meet the particularist challenge requires a more detailed description of its terms, i.e., the terms of a bias toward compatriots in tax-supported aid that is plausibly ascribed to most reflective people who are otherwise strongly attracted to universalism. In defining this bias, I will construe “compatriot” broadly, as including all long-term, law-abiding fellow-residents of a country. Particularists are in no position to claim that there is a pervasive attachment to a substantial bias of narrower scope: as recent American controversies over denials of benefits to resident aliens imply, there is no broad consensus that mere law-abiding, long-term residents deserve much less concern than those with such further accoutrements as fellow-citizenship or fellow-membership in a cultural or ethnic community that predominates within the country’s borders. Still, it is probably common coin that fellow-citizenship strengthens duties of public aid to some degree and that cultural or ethnic ties can justify some special aid (for example, the special support that the Federal Republic of Germany has given ethnically German immigrants from eastern Europe). My arguments for the larger bias will also suggest how these smaller ones might be justified.

In addition, the proper appreciation of the particularist challenge depends on assessing the strength and depth of the pervasive patriotic bias. The broad consensus to which particularists appeal does not just dictate patriotic bias in most countries or in circumstances of approximate international equality. It entails a patriotic bias in tax-supported aid, despite the grim facts of international inequality, in all or virtually all of the most technologically advanced and materially productive countries, the ones that are, per-capita, relatively rich, as well as in all other countries. The “virtually all” is meant to allow for the possibility of a few countries in which deprivation is so rare that the project of government aid to the needy is, properly, concentrated on foreign aid. On a sufficiently rosy view of Liechtenstein, Liechtensteinian concentration on foreign aid would offend no widespread view of patriotic duty.
In addition to this strength, the prevalent bias is deep in the sense of being insensitive to the outcome of certain empirical controversies. In particular, the bias toward compatriots in per-capita rich countries does not depend on pessimism about the efficacy of helping foreigners in poor countries through foreign aid. Even if optimism on the Oxfam model is right, and, dollar for dollar, feasible varieties of foreign aid would be especially economical means of relieving suffering, the primary concern should be aid to compatriots. (This is not to deny that the pervasive patriotic bias is conditional on other empirical assumptions, which might reasonably be questioned. Rather than seeking to describe these presuppositions at the outset, I will use a morality of equal respect to reveal them, as the factual assumptions in a case for favoring compatriots which rests on this moral foundation.)

Finally, it will be useful to distinguish two kinds of bias that are both prevalent and both fall under the heading “patriotic bias in tax-supported aid.” The first is priority of attention to compatriots’ needs, i.e., a commitment to oppose policies seriously detracting from provision for relevant needs of compatriots. The second is budgetary bias toward compatriots, i.e., support for a total aid bill in which tax-supported aid to foreigners is a small proportion of tax-supported aid to compatriots. Both biases are prevalent, but they are not the same. If Americans were to satisfy the first priority, removing all relevant burdens from compatriots, they would live in a world in which many foreigners in per-capita poor countries still struggled with similar burdens. In principle, these needs could generate further moral duties so demanding that they require support for an aid budget mostly devoted to foreigners’ needs, violating the second, budgetary bias. (“Charity begins at home” does not exclude the possibility that discharging all duties to give will mostly require giving to strangers in the end.)

Given the facts of international inequality, an argument for budgetary bias in rich countries must be based on a prior case for some form of biased attention to compatriots’ needs. Observing this order, I shall begin by arguing that full and equal respect for all dictates priority of attention, and then I shall describe the additional considerations sustaining budgetary bias.

Although I have committed myself to defending a strong, deep form of patriotic bias in tax-supported aid, I have said nothing about bias in private, voluntary contributions. And it is a striking fact (which ought to
make particularists nervous) that there is no broad, deep-seated consensus that cosmopolitanism in individual charity is wrong. Americans who respond to appeals of the Save the Children program can check a box that indicates their desire to help a child who lives in the United States. Those who check the “Where the need is greatest” box instead (or the “Africa” or “Asia” box) are not widely held to have violated a duty. My argument from equal respect to patriotic bias in political choice will not, in fact, support the corresponding private duty. This helps to account for their different roles in the pervasive consensus, and so, helps to confirm the argument itself.

Cosmopolitan Respect

Any universalist morality worthy of the name will ground moral obligations on some fundamental standpoint in which everyone’s life is regarded as equally valuable. Because of the facts of international inequality, it seems impossible to ground duties of patriotic bias in tax-financed aid on a standpoint of equal concern for all. But, on the face of it, according equal value to different people’s lives does not entail equal concern for them. I certainly regard the life of the girl who lives across the street as no less valuable than the life of my own daughter. But I am not equally concerned for her. For example, I am not willing to do as much for her. The existence of obstacles to her enjoying the pursuit of her goals is a prima facie reason for me to help remove the obstacles, but my special concern for my own goals, including my wishes for my daughter, can provide a legitimate excuse for neglecting to help, without any of the disrespect involved in treating her life as less valuable than others’.

Three broad, interrelated themes in Kantian moral theory, which are well-connected with moral common sense, define one highly attractive approach to questions of right and wrong in the space that I have just created for universalisms not grounded on equal concern for all. First of all, rather than grounding obligation on equal concern, this approach makes equal respect fundamental. One avoids moral wrongness just in case one conforms to some set of rules for living by which one could express equal respect for all, as distinguished from equal concern for all.

Of course, there are a variety of ways of specifying the demands of equal respect. A second common feature of the universalisms from which I will derive a patriotic bias is some version of Kant’s view that the
rules expressing equal respect for all are the rules that could be the joint, self-imposed, fully autonomous legislation of all. Kant’s emphasis on full autonomy is not essential, here. Within this tradition, Scanlon, for example, describes the relevantly unanimous legislation as any total system of shared rules that no one could reasonably reject, while Rawls, in his most Kantian phase, took the principles of justice to be shared premises for political discourse through which each could express her highest-order interests in fair terms of cooperation and the rational revision of final ends. Despite these differences, the various more specific Kantianisms can each be seen as specifying and defending, in its own way, a vaguer, more colloquial standard deploying the ordinary notion of self-respect whose rich moral implications Hill has explored. At least to a first approximation, broadly Kantian universalism affirms that a choice is wrong just in case it violates every set of shared rules of conduct to which everyone could be freely and rationally committed without anyone’s violating his or her own self-respect.

As Scanlon has emphasized, some such principle is a natural development of the extremely attractive thought that avoiding moral wrongness is a matter of avoiding actions that are not permitted by rules that are relevantly justifiable, as a shared code of conduct, to those burdened by the action. In this moral context, the irrelevant justifications are those depending on the burdened one’s fear or ignorance or her lack of self-respect. It may have been rational for the native peoples of nineteenth-century Rhodesia to accept the rule, “If black, give up your land when whites demand it,” since otherwise they would have been subjected to fierce repression, but this hardly shows that Cecil Rhodes and his henchmen did no wrong. Obviously, one does not justify rules in a morally relevant way by getting a victim to accept them out of misinformation or muddle. Finally, justifications that lead to acceptance because of the victim’s lack of self-respect (alternatively: her taking her life to be less valuable than others’) do not make the permitted conduct all right. If all slaves in the ante-bellum South had shown a lack of self-respect by freely accepting the rules that made them property of whites, support for slavery would still have been wrong.


A final common feature of broadly Kantian moralities is the distinction they draw between negative and positive duties. These universalisms condemn those who lie or initiate the use of force in pursuit of mere personal advantage, but they do not impose a duty to make every sacrifice that would improve the world on balance. It is enough to adopt policies through which one takes on one's fair share of world improvement. One must adopt policies toward giving that impose some significant life-long sacrifice. Otherwise, one could not claim to regard the lives of the needy as just as valuable as one's own. But grave self-sacrifice is not required, even if it is productive of great good.

Suppose I see a full-size adult fall, headfirst, out of a tenth-story window. No one else is nearby. Because of my deep knowledge of ballistics and anatomy, I know that if I rush to catch him, I will save his life, by cushioning his fall and keeping his head from striking the sidewalk. But if I cushion his fall, I am very likely to break some bones, which will heal, perhaps painfully and incompletely, in the course of several months. Even if there is no question that the cost of helping to me would be much less than the cost of not helping to the man hurtling toward the sidewalk, I can do my fair share in making the world a better place while turning down this chance for world-improvement.

The limits to burdensome giving derive from the fundamental view of moral impartiality. I do not show disrespect for the person falling out the window, do not express the attitude that his life is less valuable than my own, in saving my bones from breakage. Even if specially needy, one shows no lack of self-respect in letting others withhold aid when the cost to them is severe injury. (Thomson's violinist will be quite disturbed if you unplug him, but given the cost of continued connection, he will not take this as an expression of disrespect and will not display a lack of self-respect in permitting the unplugging.)

No doubt, my brief, relatively colloquial statements of the demands of equal respect have to be elaborated—for example, to cope with special problems of noncompliance posed by those who do not share in the fundamental moral attitude. No doubt, much more has to be said to justify this approach to morality. Still, I hope I have evoked a familiar strand of universalist thinking, which has been developed and defended for decades, indeed centuries. If, as I hope to show, the broadly shared features of this sort of universalism entail the routine patriotic biases,

this will, at least, rebut the particularist claim that no currently viable version of universalism has room for the duties of patriotic bias that express a strong conviction of most people who are otherwise attracted to universalism.

**Patriotic Priority**

The morality of equal respect for everyone that I have described creates a duty to give priority, in providing tax-financed aid, to the serious deprivations of compatriots. In particular, one must give priority to relieving serious burdens due to inferior life-prospects among compatriots, i.e., inferior chances of success in pursuing life-goals given equal willingness to make sacrifices. This priority does not totally exclude support for foreign aid in the presence of relevant domestic burdens. Still, until domestic political arrangements have done as much as they can (under the rule of law and while respecting civil and political liberty) to eliminate serious burdens of domestic inequality of life-prospects, there should be no significant sacrifice of this goal in order to help disadvantaged foreigners. Here, significant sacrifice consists of foreseeable costs to a disadvantaged compatriot so severe that she need not willingly accept them, even though she equally values everyone’s life and realizes that these costs to her are part of an arrangement helping even more disadvantaged others. For example, poor people in virtually all per-capita rich countries confront low prospects of interesting, valued work, effective political participation, and intellectually liberating education, and are at special risk of long-term ill-health, in the absence of extensive aid. These are the sorts of grave burdens that one can be unwilling to take on, as part of an arrangement that relieves even more serious burdens of others, even though one respects them and regards their lives as no less valuable than one’s own.

There are two main arguments for this duty of prior attention to compatriots. Both involve special concerns, specially attentive to domestic life-prospects, that are entailed by commitment to the outlook of equal respect that I have described. The first is an argument from excessive costs in lost social trust, the second an argument from the need to provide compatriots with adequate incentives to obey the laws one helps to create.

First of all, consider the cost in disrupted social trust of the failure to
provide tax-financed aid sufficient to relieve serious burdens of inferior life-prospects among compatriots, when this shortfall is due to provision for neediness abroad. As a consequence of this shortfall, disadvantaged compatriots would suffer from inferior life-prospects that better-off compatriots do not try to alleviate because their concern for the needy is diffused world-wide. Inevitably, this will reduce the extent to which the disadvantaged can be relied on to cooperate with advantaged compatriots on the basis of their rationally pursuing shared goals, as opposed to their merely acquiescing in the superior coercive power of the state, or deferring out of self-abnegation, or cooperating because they lack awareness of what is going on. For example, if this global even-handedness is well-entrenched, needy compatriots cannot be expected to take part in a trusting and respectful political practice of using principled persuasion to seek common ground. The avoidable burdens of seeking self-advancement under the nation's laws and policies make it psychologically insupportable to engage respectfully in the political process that ultimately enforces these rules. So, in response to a settled commitment to the worldwide diffusion of concern, the domestic disadvantaged will, inevitably, withdraw from politics or treat politics as a means of exerting pressure on others, with no special role for principled persuasion. For similar reasons, the worldwide diffusion of concern would be accompanied by less friendliness in the routine interactions with nonintimates that determine the overall tone of life. Rather than being based on mutual respect and trust, people's relations of interdependence with compatriots would often be based on resentful fear or servility, the horror from which Huck Finn and Jim made their lonely escape.

Admittedly, someone committed to the morality of equal respect will not be interested in receiving trust that depends on attitudes of disrespect for others. (Huck would have been a much worse person if he had not been reluctant to purchase social trust on this basis from his fellow-whites.) However, the limits to trust on the part of the domestic disad-


8. The milieu that is jeopardized includes the “friendly civic relations” whose nature and value Sybil Schwarzenbach describes, with illuminating reference to Aristotle’s account of politike philia, in “On Civic Friendship,” Ethics 107 (1996): 97–128.
vantaged do not reflect their lack of full and equal respect for disadvantaged foreigners. For patriotic priority of attention is violated only when they suffer losses sufficiently serious that they do not have to take them on, as part of provision for neediness elsewhere, in order to express full and equal respect for all.

Like the risk to one’s bones of cushioning the man hurtling toward the sidewalk, this cost in distrust of foreign aid violating patriotic priority is a legitimate excuse for not helping, an excuse that could be part of the code endorsed by someone who has full and equal respect for all. This assessment (which is, I hope, plausible at the outset) gains credibility when one reflects on the role of the interest in basing dependence on trust and respect in rationalizing the morality that I have described. The unconditional commitment to live by some code that all could freely, rationally, and self-respectfully share can require forsaking indefinitely great advantages, because they depend on exploitation or domination that such codes prohibit. Yet doing the right thing is always one rational option for a normal human being. What normal human interest could rationalize the life-practice of someone who forswears advantages violating those bases for general agreement, while otherwise pursuing the projects to which she is personally attached?

The answer would seem to be: an interest in having one’s relationships of dependence be relationships of mutual respect and trust. All of us have reason to want to be able to rely on others to act in ways that we expect to benefit us, acting in these ways despite tempting opportunities to benefit themselves by noncompliance. The morally responsible people among us, those who seek to avoid wrongdoing, do not want others’ dependability to be due to their fear, irrationality, or lack of self-respect, even if these sources of compliance are reliable. Their overriding preference, when they depend on others, is for dependability based on common concerns that each can willingly embrace even if everyone regards her life as no less valuable than anyone else’s. Such a person, if a middle-income U.S. citizen, would not really prefer to be Louis XIV, even after the Fronde has been suppressed and putting to one side the inferiority of seventeenth-century medicine. Using coercion and superstition to frustrate peasants’ interests in relaxed enjoyment, creative reflection, and meaningful work is, in the end, too disgusting a prospect.

Because this overriding preference that one’s relationships of de-
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...pendence be based on mutual respect and trust is what rationalizes an overriding commitment to self-regulation by rules expressing equal respect for all, one can express this commitment in choices giving special weight to the promotion of those trusting relationships in one's own life. (In much the same way, when a concern for another's well-being is motivated by love, one expresses that concern in choices giving special weight to continued loving interaction with the other. "I wish her well, and I don't care whether I ever see her again" is not an expression of loving parental concern.) So, in a morality based on rules expressing equal respect, the fact that aid to disadvantaged compatriots is specially important for one's engagement in trusting, respectful forms of interdependence provides a legitimate excuse for patriotic bias.

It might seem that the argument from social trust to patriotic bias underrates the bearing of foreign needs on respect and trust, in two different ways. First of all, this argument might seem to ignore the existence of international economic interdependence. But the argument is only meant to justify a bias, and only relies on the fact that interdependence among compatriots is specially intense and specially vulnerable to distrust and disrespect. This special vulnerability is, in part, a consequence of the political vulnerability implicit in the compatriot relation: politically active people support the coercive imposition of laws on their compatriots. (It is largely because of my location in a distinct network of political vulnerabilities that social distrust in Quebec does not taint my social life, even though I live much closer to Quebec than to most of the United States.)

In the second place, the argument so far might seem to ignore the socially disruptive effects of the poverty in poor countries that foreign aid could relieve. The violation of primary attention to compatriots' needs by people like Kevin would reduce social trust on the part of people like Carla, who lives in the South Bronx and makes a meager living cleaning other people's apartments. Nonetheless, the increased foreign aid might lead to strengthened bonds linking Khalid and his compatriots, as Khalid's situation becomes less desperate. Perhaps, because of the special desperation of the worst-off in the poorest countries and the cheapness of the measures that would relieve it, violation of patriotic priority in per-capita rich countries would be part of the most efficient means of promoting social trust worldwide. If so, wouldn't the special...
interest in social trust that is implicit in equal respect for all exclude, rather than support, patriotic bias, making consequent costs to oneself as irrelevant as costs of foregoing feasible theft or exploitation?

Since I am trying to justify a bias deep enough to be compatible with optimistic views of the efficacy of foreign aid, the supposition about the special effectiveness of foreign aid in the worldwide enhancement of social trust is certainly fair. But taking this efficacy to cancel the excuse for neglecting foreign needs would involve a misunderstanding of a morally responsible person’s special valuing of relationships of mutual respect and trust. It would be like the mistake of supposing that someone who specially values the relationship of parental nurturing must be willing to neglect his daughter if this is needed to save two other people’s daughters from parental neglect. Granted, if the special valuing of a relationship is a dictate of moral responsibility, then all instances of it, everywhere, are specially valuable. However, as Scheffler has recently emphasized, the special valuing of a relationship entails, not just a high appreciation of the value of its instances, but taking participation in this relationship with another to be a specially demanding reason for appropriate forms of concern for the other.9 I don’t specially value the relationship of parental nurturance if I willingly neglect my child just because this is part of a more effective way to promote nurturance in the world at large. Kevin does not specially value social trust if he jeopardizes his relationship with compatriots such as Carla so that foreigners such as Khalid may enjoy more trust on balance. By the same token, Khalid, as a morally responsible person, will take relations of respect and trust to be specially important and will all the more regret the social strains of Bangladeshi poverty. But, taking such relations to be specially valuable, he will take their maintenance to be a specially powerful rea-

9. See Samuel Scheffler, “Relationships and Responsibilities,” *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 26, no. 3 (summer 1997): 189-209, especially pp. 196, 206. However, in using a comprehensive morality of equal respect to balance special obligations to compatriots against obligations to the poor of the world, I am resisting Scheffler’s pessimism about the availability of a single moral outlook which gives adequate scope both to special responsibilities and relationship-independent duties to help the disadvantaged (see pp. 207f.). I agree that no single moral outlook can integrate the proper valuing of special relationships with the pursuit of overall distributive fairness if the latter must express equal or impartial concern for all. But here, as elsewhere, the identification of moral equality with equal respect is a basis for cautious optimism about the capacities of universalist moral theory.
son for action. This is why Khalid, despite his plight, can allow Kevin to favor needy compatriots, without showing a lack of self-respect.

So far, I have argued that a certain bias is all right, not that it is morally obligatory: the better-off in per-capita rich countries have a legitimate excuse for giving priority to compatriots’ needs in their political choices. However, because the topic is the political choice to support laws forcing some to help others and the patriotic bias is based on an interest that all morally responsible people share, this lemma is a short step removed from the theorem asserting a duty of priority in attention to compatriots’ needs in tax-financed aid. It shows a lack of respect for another to force her to do more than she must to do her fair share in the task of world-improvement. Because of the cost in social trust, someone would be forced to do more than her fair share if she were taxed according to laws violating patriotic priority. So support for such laws is wrong. On the other hand, such laws as are needed to sustain domestic social trust would be supported by every compatriot committed to equal respect for all: the better-off because of the social interest implicit in that commitment, the worst-off for material reasons, as well. If a political arrangement would be supported by every morally responsible participant, i.e., every participant committed to equal respect for all, then each has a moral duty to support it.

Like Rawls’s discussions of “excusable envy,” this first argument for patriotic bias appeals to a psychologically inevitable limit on trust and respect. Even if the domestic disadvantaged could overcome this limit, engaging in trusting, respectful political activity and avoiding both resentment and servility despite worldwide diffusion of concern, there would be a second basis for patriotic priority of attention, the need to give priority to compatriots’ needs in order to avoid unjust domination.

Anyone engaged in political choice is engaged in projects which, if they succeed, will result in laws that all compatriots are forced to obey. Equal respect for all is incompatible with supporting the coercive enforcement of terms of self-advancement under which some are seriously burdened, regardless of their choices, in ways that could be alleviated at relatively little cost to the advantaged. More specifically, suppose that current laws enforce rules of peaceful private self-advancement that guarantee that some compatriots will be seriously burdened by inferior life-prospects unless their advantaged compatriots help to lift
these burdens: losers in competition in one generation convey seriously inferior capacities to get ahead to their children. Suppose that there are measures through which suffering from inferior life-prospects could be alleviated without imposing losses on the advantaged, through taxation, that are at all as great as the alleviation. (The taxation used to improve the education of Carla's child will lower the life-prospects of Kevin's child, but the cost to the one is much less than the gain to the other.) In this situation, support for the status quo would show disrespect for the disadvantaged. After all, someone whose life-prospects are burdened by such laws could not willingly uphold a shared social standard allowing these burdens to be imposed in spite of the small costs of change, unless that sufferer lacked self-respect.

From the perspective of equal respect that I have described, the appropriate assessments of benefits and burdens would, surely, rule out support for laissez-faire capitalism in virtually all per-capita rich countries and require aid exceeding current measures, on any hypothesis about the efficacy of domestic aid that coheres with optimism about the efficacy of foreign aid. For, assuming such efficacy, there will be gains to the disadvantaged from wideranging policies requiring taxation of the rich that will be much more important than the costs in luxuries and comforts lost through such taxation. Someone rationally committed to foregoing all advantages depending on violation of rules that others could rationally, self-respectfully share must accord special importance to the prerequisites for participation in a social life regulated by rules rationally shared by self-respecting cooperators. Such a willing cooperator will regard it as extremely important to have resources for informed and rational reflection over how to live and what laws to support, to have an influence on a par with the influence of others' on laws and, more generally, on one's social environment, to have work that is valuable to oneself, under one's own intelligent control in important ways, and recognized as valuable by others, and to have opportunities for the leisure, affection, and whimsy that are needed for self-expressive living. These are all human requirements for taking part in a social life in which one's self-respect is displayed and supported. Because her commitment to rules sustaining such a social life is unconditional and because she regards everyone's life as equally valuable, a morally responsible person will express her special commitment to these values in comparing gains for some and losses for others. So she will take the burdens on people
like Carla to be specially severe and costs for people like Kevin of relieving them to be relatively moderate.

Note that the domestic aid required by the broadly Kantian perspective is more demanding than relief required by considerations of mutual benefit. The standard of mutual benefit would legitimate a situation in which Kevin's and Carla's different life-expectations are proportional to expected differences in contribution, due to advantages of Kevin's that are not traceable to their choices. But Carla would display a lack of self-respect in accepting burdens due to these unchosen differences (such as the difficulties of growing up in a crime-ridden neighborhood, brought up by a single tired, distracted, ill-educated parent and taught by weary, cynical teachers). She would be like a slave who accepts the distribution of income between slaves and plantation-owners if it reflects the greater economic importance of plantation-owners' coordination of production and exchange, giving no weight to the facts that slaves are denied literacy and large networks of acquaintance and that major economic agents refuse to deal directly with them.

The sticking point in using this argument about unjust subordination to support patriotic bias is the resemblance between Kevin's relationship to Carla and Kevin's relationship to Khalid: the inferiority of Khalid's life-prospects is at least as stark, its burdens at least as severe, and, on optimistic views of the efficacy of foreign aid, it would be even easier to alleviate the burden at little cost to Kevin. However, because of two further differences, Kevin can favor Carla without showing disrespect for Khalid and Khalid can willingly accept such bias without showing a lack of self-respect.

First, Kevin takes part in a political process resulting in the coercive enforcement of laws governing compatriots, not foreigners. Because morally responsible people specially value relationships of mutual respect and trust, they regard it as specially important not to take part in the coercive imposition of arrangements that participants could not rationally, self-respectfully uphold. After all, in specially valuing a relationship, one both regards participation in it as providing a special reason for appropriate forms of concern and regards its opposites as relationships one has special reason to avoid—the more powerful the opposition, the stronger the reason. If I specially value friendship, I must be specially concerned not to tyrannize others—even more concerned than I must be to avoid benefiting from others' tyrannizing. Sim-
ilarly, if I specially value relationships of mutual respect and trust, I must be specially concerned to avoid coercively dominating others in ways that they could not self-respectfully uphold, and this concern should take priority over my interest in alleviating inferior life-prospects due to rules for self-advancement in whose creation and coercive enforcement I do not participate. Kevin, then, expresses his commitment to equal respect for all, not his disrespect for Khalid, in Kevin's special concern for life-prospects determined by rules he helps to impose. And Khalid, for his part, shows no lack of self-respect in accepting a moral code requiring such special concern of the likes of Kevin. The endorsement of rules reflecting an attitude that makes it rational to have equal respect for all can entail no loss of self-respect.

In the second place, the different baselines appropriate to assessing the impact on life-prospects of domestic and of international interactions make the moral pressure to supplement transnational interactions with foreign aid much less than the pressure to add policies of aid to domestic economic arrangements. We can attribute domestic inequalities in life-prospects on the scale of those separating Kevin and Carla to their domestic institutions because, in the absence of enduring, effectively enforced domestic institutions, everyone's life-prospects would be virtually nil, as compared with their actual life-prospects. International inequalities in life-prospects are not attributable to transnational institutions to the same extent, since rich and poor economies would differ quite substantially in prosperity in the absence of interaction between them. Indeed, the miserable record of per-capita poor countries that have pursued autarky suggests that the benefit of current interaction to those affected in poor countries is an improvement in life-prospects on the scale of corresponding improvements in rich countries. In some cases, there is, no doubt, an exploitive inequality. Still, the difference in the relevant baselines makes it much easier for Khalid than for Carla to accept advantages of Kevin's without loss of self-respect.

Even though these arguments for patriotic bias have turned on the need to avoid certain negative phenomena of resentment and unjust domination, the underlying perspective of equal respect makes adequate provision for needy compatriots a legitimate source of pride. One should be all the prouder of improving the world because one has avoided insensitivity to morally relevant differences, in the process of world-improvement. In addition, a morality of equal respect for all has
room for a positive appreciation of someone's supporting aid advancing patriotic goals because of her loyalty to her compatriots. A well-integrated person who is committed to the morality of equal respect will have a noninstrumental desire to play an active role in a community in which people care for one another and contribute to the flourishing of common projects whose success is important to the success in life of each. After all, it would not be rational to be so concerned to live by rules that others willingly share, if one were perfectly content to be a harmless isolate or to interact with others on the basis of utterly self-centered goals. This general aspiration to community can certainly be satisfied by international cooperation. Some of us have life-projects and resources permitting us to cooperate in cosmopolitan communities of university intellectuals, social democrats, music lovers, or whatever. However, for most people, the broadest form of communal interaction corresponding to their desires and resources is participation in a national community in which the enhancement of compatriots’ well-being and the flourishing of a shared way of life are a source of collective pride. So proud engagement in a national community is a centrally important way of realizing an aspiration of anyone fully committed to the universalist morality of equal respect.

**Budgetary Bias**

Suppose that a broadly Kantian morality of equal respect for all does require priority of attention to compatriots’ needs. The remaining task is to compare the domestic aid and foreign aid columns in the ideal budgets of virtually all per-capita rich countries, to see whether the respective sums express the budgetary bias, according to which the total aid bill that morally responsible citizens must support is very largely devoted to compatriots.

In these ideal ledgers, two general considerations magnify the domestic sum or discount the foreign sum. The magnification is due to the special expensiveness of helping a poor person in a per-capita rich country successfully pursue interests that a morally responsible person will regard as centrally important. For example, in a per-capita rich country, making a valued contribution through interesting work in which one is not bossed around requires a relatively expensive education. Interactions in which one expresses one's personality in ways that
are recognized and appreciated require relatively expensive housing and clothing. In a morality of equal concern for all, this higher cost of living decently would tend to reduce the amount of provision for the worst-off of per-capita rich countries, since provision for the poor in per-capita poor countries more efficiently satisfies needs. But the same cause has an opposite effect if priority must be given to sustaining social trust and providing incentives for supporting domestic institutions among poor compatriots.

The other general consideration, which systematically reduces the sum in the foreign column, is the sharing of responsibilities for worldwide needs. The arguments so far combine with Goodin's considerations of efficiency to sustain a conclusion that is, in any case, more or less obvious: the better-off people in per-capita rich countries have the only major responsibility to pay taxes to aid their needy compatriots. On the other hand, if there is no difference in benefit from international exploitation and no difference in the proportion of relevantly deprived compatriots, there will be no difference in the extent to which people in different per-capita rich countries have a duty to make sacrifices to help the poor in poor countries. This responsibility is shared among people in rich countries, while their domestic responsibilities are not.

In addition, the perspective of full and equal respect for all ascribes a substantial responsibility for poor compatriots to people in per-capita poor countries, a responsibility quite out of proportion to local resources, based on the moral importance of local autonomy. A self-respecting person will seek participation in control over her government, the coercive apparatus that dominates her life, and (if she would protect the self-respect of others) she will want this control to reflect the ongoing achievement of agreement based on appeals to shared principles. This preference for shared deliberation is served by substantial local responsibility for the poor of poor countries. Dependence on the benevolent will of others who are not bound by shared political deliberations is not to be avoided at all cost, even the cost of starving to death, but it is a form of dependence that a self-respecting person will seek to avoid at serious cost.

Against the background of these general factors magnifying the aid budget for domestic needs and reducing the budget for foreign needs, we must now assess the specific reasons why tax-financed aid to the poor in poor countries might be part of the fair share of world-improve-
ment of people in a rich country. First, the international economic regime might give rise to inequalities in life-prospects that are burdensome to people in poor countries, burdensome in ways that beneficiaries in rich countries could alleviate at much less cost than the alleviation produced. This would be similar enough to the domestic situations dictating tax-financed aid to the disadvantaged to provide a reason for international aid if it entails no significant sacrifice of the domestic projects. However, because of the previously noted differences in baselines of noninteraction, the impact of the international economic regime does not seem dramatically unequal in its effects on life-prospects.

Because the distribution of natural resources is so clearly morally arbitrary and the imposition of barriers to access to natural resources is so obviously in need of justification, those who call for increased foreign aid (a proposal that I am not opposing) often emphasize the need to compensate for inequalities in the international division of control over natural resources. However, this specific inequality seems to add little to a case for foreign aid based on unequal benefit from international economic interactions as a whole. Materially based well-being in the world at large is almost entirely the consequence of what is done to work up raw materials, which are otherwise usually as valueless as a cup of crude oil in a kitchen. So a case for transfer based on inequality should largely depend on unequal net benefits of whole systems of production and exchange, the argument from exploitive interaction that I have been mitigating. Through this deemphasis on inequalities in natural resources as such, one avoids the embarrassment of rating the pressure to give on resource-poor Japan as less than the pressure on resource-rich Canada, and one puts no pressure at all on the resource-rich Republic of the Congo.

10. Thus, in “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” Thomas Pogge’s central proposal to reduce international inequality is a global resources tax, because this is “an institutional proposal that virtually any plausible egalitarian conception of global justice would judge to be at least a step in the right direction” (Philosophy & Public Affairs 23, no. 3 [summer 1994]: 199). Charles Beitz begins his pioneering argument for a global original position by noting that the unequal distribution of natural resources would create a Rawlsian reason to reduce international inequality regardless of the status of international interactions (“Justice and International Relations,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 4, no. 4 [summer 1975]: 288–95).

11. Neither Pogge nor Beitz, I should add, regards the unequal distribution of natural resources as the centrally important aspect of international inequality in the final analysis, given the actual nature of worldwide economic activity.
Another consideration, especially salient from a perspective of equal respect, is the impact of closed borders. Poor foreigners who want to take advantage of the better opportunities for honest self-advancement in rich countries are usually kept out. This creates a duty of concern for consequent increased burdens. But the concern should be shared among rich countries restricting immigration. Moreover, it does not attend to the poor whose local ties and lesser resources make emigration an unattractive option. And it must be balanced against both losses to the home country due to emigration and losses the poor who currently live in per-capita rich countries can suffer when poor immigrants become their compatriots, subjects of patriotic priority.

These are the main reasons for aid to the foreign poor that might be based on specific kinds of interactions with them. With domestic magnification and foreign discounting on the bases previously described, would they create a total aid budget in which foreign aid was more than a small proportion of domestic aid, in any remotely typical per-capita rich country? I have offered reasons to suppose that the answer is no. There are factual presuppositions in this case for budgetary bias—above all, in the assessment of exploitive international benefits—which cannot be justified quickly, perhaps cannot be justified in the final analysis. But note that a conclusive empirical argument for these presuppositions is not needed to meet the particularist challenge. Many thoughtful people committed to substantial domestic aid have a patriotic budgetary bias that is, itself, conditional on these factual assumptions. For example, if they were to conclude that an unbiased budget could provide the domestic basis for social trust and the adequate political incentive that I have described and that such a budget would be needed to return their nation's proportionate share of benefits of interaction with people in poor countries that are exploitive in the sense that I described, then they would not take support for such a budget to violate a moral duty. Their patriotic convictions do not conflict with a universalist morality that makes budgetary bias conditional on their plausible view that the actual extent of international exploitation is not that enormous.

In addition to duties to help the foreign poor that depend on the nature of relationships and interactions with them, there is certainly a prima facie duty to help others just because they are suffering. But the

net impact on an ideal budget of this prima facie duty to relieve world suffering is severely constrained, in any remotely typical per-capita rich country, by the combination of the domestic burdens of disadvantage and the limits of the sacrifice that moral responsibility requires as a means to aid the needy to whom one is not bound by morally significant relationships and interactions.

Given the patriotic priority of attention established in previous sections, provision for foreign poverty must not involve a significant departure from the project of relieving serious burdens of domestic inequality. With the possible exception of a few small and specially favored societies, all advanced industrial societies seem to require market-based economic arrangements generating burdensome inequalities, on pain of inefficiency that would make life even worse for the worst-off. On views of the efficacy of domestic aid that cohere with reasonably optimistic views of the efficacy of foreign aid, the totality of laws and policies that could relieve such burdens is diverse, extensive, and financially demanding.

Suppose that all that could be done to help the domestic disadvantaged was done. At that point, in virtually all per-capita rich countries, the burdens of domestic aid would have pushed many of the better-off to a margin at which further transfer on the same scale involves losses not required by equal respect for all (hence, losses that should not be coercively imposed). No doubt, the consequent marginal costs in fatigue, detachment, and nonfulfillment on the part of the better-off would, still, be less important than the associated gains for poor foreigners, on the scale of values of a morally responsible person. Giving up interesting vacations, teaching another class each semester, and moving to a smaller house on a noisy street would be a loss on my part smaller than the gain for someone in Mali benefiting from the improved sanitation that my sacrifices finance. Still, such a loss, willingly endured just to help the needy, is serious enough to exceed the demands of equal respect for all. Neither the refusal to cushion the falling man at the cost of a broken arm that takes three months to heal, nor the refusal to invite a very charming waif to join one’s household for a year when he will otherwise starve, is an expression of the view that the needy one’s life is less valuable than one’s own. These are expressions of self-concern falling well short of contempt for others. The losses imposed on the better-off when the project of worldwide aid is pursued well beyond
relief of the burdens of domestic disadvantage are as substantial. For example, a rational, responsible, self-respecting professor could choose to endure discomfort as great as suffering from a broken arm that takes three months to heal, or choose to take in a boarder for a year, in exchange for avoiding the losses I have described, losses of a sort that seem inevitable if the overall project of aid is pushed so far beyond its patriotic stage that there is no patriotic budgetary bias, overall.

I do not claim that it is certain that domestic needs are as hard to relieve as these arguments for budgetary priority suppose. But, again, this is not necessary to justify the patriotic bias that most humane people otherwise attracted to universalism actually share. If it were to turn out that the elimination of burdensome domestic life-prospects in per-capita rich countries would leave the better-off free to make a similar, additional sacrifice for the sake of foreign needs while still doing no more than equal respect for all demands, many of those now committed to budgetary bias would abandon this bias, with great joy. The pervasive bias is conditional on a plausible hypothesis about the daunting requirements of domestic aid.

Still, because of her special interest in social trust and in adequate incentives for political cooperation, someone who respects everyone, worldwide, will adopt this plausible pessimism as her working hypothesis. She will insist on budgetary bias until helping her poor compatriots proves to be easier than she fears.