

Introductory Handout Philosophy 160 Ethical Theory
Richard Arneson, instructor. Fall Quarter 2017

This class meets Tuesdays and Thursdays 5:00 to 6:20 p.m. in Solis 109..

The final exam for this class will be held on December 15 from 7:00 to 10:00 p.m.. If you enroll in this class, you must be free to take a regular final exam for this course at this scheduled date and time.

Course texts: All assigned reading, along with this syllabus (what you are reading right now), class notes and recommended readings, will be posted at a course web page accessible via TritonEd. Eventually the short paper assignments, the writing assignment, and advance information on the final exam will also be posted. Students should check this course TritonEd page regularly for updates.

To access course materials in TritonEd, go to the TritonEd course web page, from the left-hand side of page menu click on "Course Content." A list of 160 class materials will then show up on the screen.

Arneson's office hours: in 8057 HSS Bldg. Wednesdays 2-3, Fridays 3-4.

This is a course in normative ethical theory. People make moral claims on each other, and argue about the legitimacy of such claims. They disagree about what we ought to do, and about what is really good or choiceworthy in human life. We have these disagreements in ordinary life, not just in academic journals or philosophy classrooms. Normative ethical theories try to answer the questions, what makes right acts right and good things good. We look at important rival views on these questions.

1. Some say: morality is doing what best promotes your own interest. First, we examine the connection between egoism and morality. Egoism is the view that what one ought to do, the rational thing to do, is whatever is in one's own interest. Morality says one ought to give due consideration for others, show appropriate concern and respect for others when one acts. So it seems egoism says, one should pay no attention to morality in deciding what to do, except insofar as doing what's moral happens to advance our own interests. David Gauthier disagrees. Gauthier think it can be rational to obey certain moral constraints on the pursuit of your own interests, even though this leads yo to do acts that are really, not merely apparently, disadvantageous to yourself. In his words: "Duty overrides advantage, but the acceptance of duty is truly advantageous." Does this make sense? Whether or not it makes sense, is rationality tied to doing what is in one's interests as Gauthier supposes?

2. Rivals to egoism. Some say: morality requires one to do whatever would bring about the impartially best outcome. The next section of the course looks at two different views about the nature of morality. Both are rivals to egoism. Each says, it can be rational, and maybe rationally required, to act in ways that show due consideration for others, even when egoism condemns such acts. The two views differ about what it is to show due consideration for others.

Utilitarianism says that what is morally right is to maximize the total of good (good quality lives for people). To show due consideration for others is to give the interests of every person who might be affected by what you do equal weight in determining what you should do. (Utilitarianism is a member of a broader family of views known as consequentialism. Utilitarianism says (1) one always ought to do whatever would bring about the best possible outcome and (2) the best outcome is the one with largest aggregate good for people [and other animals]. Consequentialism asserts (1). Different versions of consequentialism propose different standards for assessing outcomes.)

3. Rivals to egoism. Some say: morality requires one to respect and honor everyone's moral rights. The next section of the course looks at an alternative to consequentialism. The alternative view is that morality requires one to respect the individual moral rights of those who might be affected by your actions. On this view, your individual moral right, for example, your ownership right over your car, consists in duties that others have directed toward you, for example, to refrain from stealing your car. The rights view differs from utilitarianism and consequentialism, because sometimes you could do any of many actions that would violate no one's rights, but which would not lead to the best possible outcome. According to the rights view you are at liberty to do any of these acts. Also, sometimes in order to do what would bring about the best possible outcome you would have to violate some individual's moral rights. The rights view says it is not

necessarily permissible to violate people's moral rights even to advance nice causes and even when doing so would be necessary to bring about the best outcome.

Different versions of rights theory propose different accounts of what rights we have. Different versions of rights theory also differ in their views about the nature of rights—about what they are and how a claim to have a right might be justified.

4. What's in one's interest? What is it for something to make one's life go better? The next section of the course examines the idea of something's being in one's interest. Here we seek to identify what is good in the sense of being prudent. Some things are good as means to getting other things, but what's good in itself? What makes a person's life go better for that very person? We look at four rival answers: (1) hedonism (what's good is feeling good, having enjoyable experience), (2) desire satisfaction (what's good is getting what you want), objective list (some things are good for you regardless of your attitudes or beliefs regarding those things), and (4) hybrid views (combining some elements of 1 to 3).

In this connection we examine the idea of death. What makes death bad, when it's bad? There are puzzles here. We look at discussions by Thomas Nagel, Shelly Kagan, Frances Kamm, and Ben Bradley.

5. What makes human beings morally considerable persons? Some hold the answer cannot be that any member of the human species is a person with the full moral status and dignity of persons. That one is born of one biological species or another does not seem the sort of thing that could confer special moral status. Think for example of fictional creatures from outer space. Couldn't an extra-terrestrial be a person, though not human? But if humanity does not make you a person, what does?

6. Another view of rationality and morality. Thomas Scanlon's theory. T. Scanlon advances what he calls a "contractualist" theory of morality. According to contractualism, an act is morally wrong just in case it would be forbidden by principles that no one has reason to reject. We might consider Scanlon to be a rights theorist, with a particular account of what rights are and what makes it the case that someone has a particular right. He certainly opposes egoism and consequentialism.

Scanlon's theory advances connected views on what it is to have a reason, the nature of moral reasons, the place of individual well-being in ethics, responsibility and the content of what we owe to one another. We examine Scanlon's views to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of one version of nonconsequentialist morality, the type of moral view most people probably implicitly hold.

7. What must be true of us, to make us praiseworthy or blameworthy for our choices and actions, depending on their quality? Given that what I have done is morally wrong, some might deny I am responsible for this, apt for blame and punishment, either because I am not the sort of being who can reasonably be held responsible (e.g., feeble-minded or insane or a child), or because I have a good excuse (e.g., ignorance or coercion or duress). Skeptics about responsibility hold that given that human choices are caused events, the conditions for holding people responsible never obtain. Revisionists about responsibility hold that the sensible basis of our responsibility practices is that holding people responsible for what they do by praising and blaming them sometimes causes the future behavior of those people and others to be better than it would be if we scrapped these practices. Another view says, we can be responsible for what we do and omit doing, even if these acts and omissions are caused events.

8. Can actions be harmful and wrong, even if they don't make a difference to what comes about? Can actions be beneficial and right, even if they don't make a difference to what comes about? We look at two opposed views on this knotty issue. One view is that whether an act is forbidden, permissible, or required depends on the difference it would make to the outcome, if one did the act or not. Another view is that when we act together with others, we can be responsible for harmful wrongdoing, and acting wrongly, even if our acts make no difference to the outcome. Notice that this is an issue for nonconsequentialists as well as for consequentialists. A nonconsequentialist might hold, for example, that it is not wrong to fail to vote in elections if one's vote would make no difference to the outcome.

9. Relativism and skepticism. Moral codes concerning what is right and good vary from society to society and change over time within any single society. Is what is right and wrong relative to a society or culture and time? Also, are there objectively right answers to evaluative questions, or is there no correct and

incorrect in this domain? We look at John Mackie versus Ronald Dworkin and Michael Huemer on the issue, whether there are objective moral values.

COURSE GOALS: The goals of the class are to improve our skills at reading and criticizing challenging readings and to reflect on our own moral views in the light of the philosophical theories we survey. A secondary aim is to sharpen our analytical writing skills.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS: (1) regular participation in class discussion, (2) two short papers, each about three pages in length (double-spaced, normal 11 or 12 point font), on topics to be assigned in class, (3) a longer writing assignment, six to eight pages in length, topics to be assigned in class, and (4) a regular comprehensive final examination. You will have some choice of topic on the longer writing assignment. On your papers, writing assignment, and final exam you will be graded according to the clarity of your prose, the cogency of your arguments, and the soundness of the understanding of course materials that you exhibit. The final examination will comprehend all course materials including required readings, lectures, and handouts distributed in class. (This means that merely recommended readings will **NOT** be covered on exams.)

To encourage keeping up with the reading class by class and week by week, there will be a class participation component of your grade. At each class meeting, there will be class discussion for half or more of the class, always on questions posed in advance of class (and relating to the readings assigned for that class). This class discussion usually will take place at the start of class, before the instructor's lecture starts, but sometimes will occur at the mid-way point. During lectures, you are always encouraged to interject questions and comment. I will take notes after every class on the class discussion, and the quality and frequency of your contributions to discussion will be the basis of your class participation grade.

GRADING: Each of the short paper assignments counts for 10 percent of your final grade. The writing assignment counts for 30 percent, the final exam for 40 percent, and class participation for 10 percent.

GRADING FOR THE PASS/NOT PASS OPTION: If you are taking the course on a PASS/NOT PASS basis, you must get (1) a C- or better on the final examination as well as (2) an overall C- average on all course work in order to achieve a PASS grade, with one exception: If you have an A- or better average on the short papers and writing assignment, and adequate participation in class discussion and are enrolled on a PASS/NOT PASS basis, you need not take the final exam in order to earn a PASS grade.

Schedule of lecture/discussion topics and readings.

All readings are available at the course Triton-Ed page.

Week 0. September 25-October 1.

THUR: Introduction to moral theory. **What is rational morality (if there is such a thing)? One view: Egoism. Rational morality tells us to conform to constraints on the pursuit of one's self-interest that advance one's self-interest.** Reading: Gregory Kavka, "The Reconciliation Project."

Week 1. October 2-8

TUES: Another view of rationality and morality: **Rational morality tells us to advance the common good (everyone's self-interest). Utilitarianism & consequentialism.** Reading: Russ Shafer-Landau, "Consequentialism: Its Nature and Attractions" (chapter 9 of his *The Methods of Ethics*).

THUR: Utilitarianism and consequentialism: Objections and replies. Reading: Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality"; also R. M. Hare; "The Archangel and the Prole."

Recommended reading: Russ Shafer-Landau, "Consequentialism: Its Difficulties."

Week 2. October 9-15.

TUES: Another view of rationality and morality: **Moral rights. Rational morality tells us to respect each person's moral rights.** Reading: Robert Nozick, chapter 3 of his *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*, with emphasis on pages 28-51.; also Judith Thomson, "Tradeoffs," from her *The Realm of Rights*.

Recommended reading: Judith Thomson, "Duties," from her *The Realm of Rights*.

THUR: Constraints and options. Reading: Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect."

Week 3. October 16-22.

TUES: **Short paper #1 due in class.**

What is self-interest? What is the good life for a person? Three views: hedonism, desire satisfaction, and objective list. Reading: Derek Parfit, "What Makes Someone's Life Go Best?," appendix to Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*. Also Robert Nozick, "The Experience Machine." Also Roger Crisp, "Hedonism Reconsidered."

THUR: Desire satisfaction and human good. Reading: Wayne Sumner, "Welfare and Happiness"; also Chris Heathwood, "Desire-Fulfillment Theory." Recommended reading: Peter Railton: "Facts and Values."

Week 4. October 23-29.

TUES: Objective list accounts of human good and perfectionism. Hybrid views. Reading: Thomas Hurka, "Objective List Theories" (sections 1 & 2 only—pages 1-12); also Robert Adams, "Well-Being and Excellence." Recommended reading: Richard Arneson, "BOL! Defending the Bare Objective List Account of well-Being"

THUR: Death. Reading: Shelly Kagan, "*Death*, chapters 10, 11, & 13; also T. Nagel, "Death."

Week 5. October 30-November 5.

TUES: **Short paper #2 due in class.**

More on death. Frances Kamm, "The Purpose of My Death: Death, Dying, and Meaning."

THUR: Yet more on death. Reading: Ben Bradley, *Well-Being and Death*, chapters 2 and 3.

Week 6. November 6-12.

TUES: More on moral rights. The nature of persons; what makes a being a possessor of moral rights.

Reading: Richard Arneson, "Basic Equality: Neither Acceptable Nor Rejectable." Peter Singer, "Speciesism and Moral Status."

THUR: Contractualism. **Rational morality requires conformity to rules that no one has reason to reject.** Scanlon: Well-being is not so important. Reading: Thomas Scanlon, *What We Owe To Each Other*, chapter 3. {Note: The entire book is at the course TritonEd page, under required readings, week 6. Today's reading is only chapter 3.}

Week 7. November 13-19.

TUES: Contractualism. Scanlon's view. Reading: Scanlon, chapters 5. Recommended reading: Alastair Norcross: Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. Further recommended reading: Scanlon, chapter 4. Note: Chapter 4 is not required reading.

THUR: Aggregation. Reading: John Taurek, "Should the Numbers Count?";. Johann Frick, "Contractualism and Social Risk"; also Michael Otsuka, "Risking Life and Limb."

Week 8. November 20-26.

TUES: **Writing assignment due in class. Responsibility. What makes us blameworthy or praiseworthy?** Reading: J. Smart, "Free Will, Praise and Blame," P. F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment."

THUR: **No class. Thanksgiving holiday.**

Week 9. November 27-December 3.

TUE: Moral worth; moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Reading: Thomas Nagel, "Moral Luck"; also Nomy Arpaly, "Moral Worth."

THUR: Responsibility as substantive obligation. What are my obligations when I don't make a difference to what comes about? Reading: Shelly Kagan, "Do I Make a Difference?"; also Christopher Kutz, chapter 4 of his *Complicity*. Merely recommended reading: Kutz, ch. 5 of *Complicity*; also Jonathan Glover, "It Makes No Difference Whether or Not I Do It."

{Note: The Glover reading is attached to another essay that is neither required nor recommended; our recommended reading is on pages 171-190.}

Week 10. December 4-10.

THUR: Relativism and skepticism. **Is there a rational morality?** Reading: Scanlon, chapter 8; also John Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values."

THUR: The same topic continued. Moral objectivity and moral skepticism. "Ronald Dworkin, "Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It." Recommended reading: Michael Huemer, "Revisionary Intuitionism."