Equality's Demands Are Reasonable

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What does egalitarianism require? The answer has to be, it all depends. Egalitarianism comes in different flavors. Different versions of the doctrine will impose different demands on institutions and policies and on choices of actions by individuals. I shall consider two starkly different families of egalitarian views, one an offshoot of the utilitarianism of J. S. Mill, the other drawing from the tradition of thought headed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant.[1] The first, egalitarian welfarism, holds that we should choose acts and institute policies and practices that properly balance the aims of maximizing well-being (good quality individual life) and fairly, equally distributing it across persons. The other, relational or freedom-oriented egalitarianism, holds that we should above all ensure that people are free to live as they choose and relate as equals, without social hierarchy.

This essay supports both egalitarianisms, mainly by characterizing them in a way that exhibits their appeal, and also works to exhibit egalitarian welfarism as the more appealing of the two doctrines. Along the way this essay tries to disarm seemingly powerful objections against egalitarianism, especially (1) it does not intrinsically morally matter how one person's condition compares with that of another, so a fortiori it does not matter whether or not people's condition compares to that of others in the particular way of being equal, and (2) any substantial egalitarianism is excessively demanding in the burdens it imposes on individuals and the costs the achievement of equality would exact in terms of lessened achievement of competing moral values.

Excessively demanding?

Objection (2) can be dealt with quickly. There is no substantial issue, at the level of fundamental moral theory, concerning overdemandingness. Moral demands made on individuals are overdemanding if they impose demands that are not justified according to correct principles, and by the same token, are underdemanding if they shrink back from imposing demands on individuals that are required according to correct principles.[2]

To illustrate, suppose Lockean libertarianism is morally correct. Just suppose. In some circumstances its requirements can be extremely demanding in the sense of being psychologically onerous and hard to obey. For example, when the cruise ship sinks in freezing water, and others have purchased entitlements to the available life preservers, the requirement to respect others' property rights requires me to give up my life, when I could bash you and steal your life preserver. Here libertarianism requires accepting immediate death when one has available courses of action that would be life-preserving. If Lockean libertarianism correctly balances people's possibly conflicting interests and specifies what morality permits and requires all things considered in any possible circumstances, its dictates, even if burdensome, are acceptable.

To complain that in this or that set of circumstances what any proposed moral view requires is overdemanding, or for that matter underdemanding, is to object that the proposed view is is actually not correct. "Morality rightly conceived and understood requires me to give up my marbles, but that is way too demanding," is a whine not a possible statement of an objection against morality rightly understood and conceived.

Demandingness might be regarded as an input into the deliberation that identifies fundamental moral principles. That a morality is too demanding or the reverse would be one consideration among many pointing us in the right direction in our search for principles. The "too demanding" objection could be that the candidate morality would be too difficult or onerous for human persons, with our psychology, to obey, or alternatively that obeying the candidate morality would leave us too little freedom to live as we choose. In this spirit Allen Wood recommends Kantian ethics as moderately demanding: "[a] Kantian theory of duties does not threaten to be inhumanly demanding on us, as consequentialist or utilitarian theories of moral duty threaten to be."[3] But as you lower the requirements of duty, imposing less pain or freedom restriction on those commanded, you increase the same requirements on those who would benefit from acts or omissions commanded. If Dick is not required to help Allen, Allen must accept not getting helped. If Dick is required to harm Allen to help others, morality is demanding that Allen suffer the harm, but if you require Dick here not to harm, morality is demanding that the others who would have been helped suffer the resulting disadvantage. Which to choose? The idea of morality is the idea of what due consideration for people including oneself requires, when the interests of people are at stake, and may conflict. Saying that we can make progress toward figuring out what morality requires of us by accepting it must not be "too demanding" just gestures at the thought that morality dictates requirements on conduct that inter alia fairly resolve conflicts of interests among persons. When Wood observes that consequentialist moralities are "inhumanly demanding," he is stating he believes these doctrines are incorrect not pointing to a distinct reason to regard them as incorrect.

The thought that being excessively burdensome or demanding in the behavioral requirements it places on those bound to comply with it is a substantial binding constraint on candidate moral principles can seem plausible if one fails to distinguish principles from rules and practices. A moral principle, if true, holds universally and necessarily. For human persons like us, with limited cognitive, volitional, and affective capacities, figuring out what moral principles require of us is hard, and we may lack motivation to conform to these requirements as we understand them. Hence there is a potential role for subordinate moral directives, socially imposed, that are easy to understand and administer and that in particular circumstances tend to elicit motivation to comply.[4] At this level of rules, overdemandingness is a substantial concern. According to multi-level theory, subordinate levels ideally serve as means to bringing about the greatest achievable fulfillment of the fundamental level principles. In this perspective, a rule at a subordinate level is overdemanding if the requirements imposed on individuals are such as to lessen overall greatest fulfillment of fundamental moral principles, compared to an alternative rule that imposes less demanding requirements or more generous permissions. And rules will be criticizable as underdemanding in a parallel way. If in the circumstances in which a proposed rule is to be applied, people will not be motivated to comply with it to a sufficient degree so that it functions less effectively than alternatives to bring about fulfillment of fundamental moral principles, the rule is defective. Rules in this way of thinking are means to an end, and might serve the end well or poorly, but fundamental moral principles are not means to some further end, which they might serve well or poorly.

Egalitarian welfarism and relational egalitarianism.

On the utilitarian offshoot track, egalitarianism might plausibly be construed as an axiological doctrine, a standard for assessing states of affairs, ways the world might go, in

impartial terms, as morally valuable. Utilitarianism simply ranks states of affairs according to the total of individual well-being summed across persons they contain.[5] The metric is better lives for people. The egalitarian welfarist objection to this is that we should care not only about boosting the total sum of good quality life but also just as much about its fair distribution across persons. A maximal obtainable sum of good consisting of cakes and ale for the aristocrats and bread and water for the peasants is morally inferior to a somewhat smaller amount of good spread more evenly across persons. Ranking possible states of affairs from best to worse is in itself neutral on all questions of morally right conduct and right choice of institutions, laws, and social practices.

Regarding the relation between axiology and doctrines of right, I shall consider views that accept a link between the two consisting in a significant moral duty of beneficence. This is a positive duty binding each person to some significant degree to bring about better rather than worse states of the world, impartially assessed. If beneficence is the entirety of morality, we have act consequentialism, the view that one morally ought always to do whatever would bring about an outcome no worse than the outcome of anything else one might instead have done. But a morality that includes a significant beneficence duty can consort with a deontological morality of constraints and options: There are some acts one could choose that would bring about the best reachable outcome in one's circumstances, that are nonetheless morally forbidden, on the ground that these maximizing acts would violate some moral constraint. Also, there are some acts one could choose, that would fail to bring about the best reachable outcome, but that nonetheless would be permissible, since morality leaves each person, in many circumstances, moral options to act as one chooses provided one's act would not violate any binding moral constraints and would lead to an outcome whose shortfall from the best one might instead have done would be within an acceptable range.

"Beneficence" might not be the ideal term for the omnibus moral requirement to improve the world that I have in mind. The term "beneficence" may suggest morally optional philanthropy, whereas I suppose beneficence duties are apt for coercive enforcement when such enforcement would be effective in securing compliance and any enforcement penalties applied would be no more than proportionate.[6]

Some moral doctrines worth taking seriously deny that there are any significant beneficence duties, at least if part of the idea of a duty rising to the level of being a significant duty is that prevention of some violations of it warrant the use of coercive force. The entire family of Lockean libertarian views falls into this bin.[7] A potential reader who embraces some view in this family is unlikely to find anything of interest in this essay. But the belief that there are no enforceable duties of beneficence is not for the morally squeamish. It implies, just to take one example, that it would be morally forbidden to threaten Arneson with a beating, when he could save others from drowning at small cost to himself, if he does not help out the others, no matter how many lives will be lost from drowning if the threat is withheld.

The link between egalitarianism and some enforceable moral requirement need not be by way of axiology and beneficence. One might hold egalitarian deontological views. I shall consider also a range of deontological moral views that hold that the fundamental moral requirement of egalitarianism is that we relate as equals—regard one another as basic equals and treat each other as basic equals. Relational egalitarianism is also a big tent housing a variety of positions. I take the core of the doctrine to be a prescription to refrain from

instituting or sustaining or participating in wrongful social hierarchy, wrongful relations of social inequality.

The upshot.

After this preliminary hemming and hawing, the reader is entitled to be informed as to what are the main claims that will be affirmed and supported in this essay. The main claim I shall urge is that a plausible substantial egalitarian moral commitment neither imposes unbearable burdens on individual choices of conduct nor dictates the establishment of tyrannical political institutions. Sensible egalitarianism does not press its followers toward some twenty-first century version of an Orwellian *1984.* Nor does egalitarianism vigorously pursued have any tendency to drive an egalitarian society toward a gray on gray culture lacking the bright colors of creativity, individuality, diversity, excellence, deviancy, and weirdness.[8]

I seek to reach this conclusion without cheating, that is, without watering down the content of egalitarianism so that in this diluted form its message is platitudinous. Egalitarianism as defended in this essay favors equality of condition, on the welfarist construal, and requires treating everyone the same in a certain respect, on the relational construal. The egalitarianism this essay defends is pretty much the egalitarianism conservatives abhor.

The defense offered does not amount to knockdown argument. On a terrain that has been fought over by philosophers and normative political theorists and for that matter ordinary people talking in coffee shops and pubs for a very long time, decisive proof and refutation are unlikely to be found. The appeal here is to intuitive considerations that may affect our considered judgments in extended reflective equilibrium, what we would believe after reflecting on relevant arguments while thinking straight and trying to find an overall set of consistent beliefs that hang together coherently. Such appeals can always be met with the rejoinder that what strikes you as intuitive strikes me as deeply counterintuitive.

Why care about equality anyway? Equality and priority.

Some will find a debunking message in the question, "What does egalitarianism require?" The message lurking in the question is that everyone's having the same or achieving the same or being treated the same is neither morally nor prudentially valuable. Hence any moral requirements of egalitarianism, even the tiniest requirements, thought to be warranted by securing the supposed value of equality, would be excessive. This sweeping conclusion would hold for candidate moral requirements on institutions and practices, and also for candidate moral requirements on individual choices of conduct.

Resisting this debunking message, I follow an ecumenical path. There are genuine enforceable moral requirements of egalitarianism, falling on institutions, laws, and social practices, and also on individual choices of conduct. There are at least two plausible views as to why equality matters, and grounds moral requirements. Both agree that it is among individual persons, beings with rational agency capacities at or above a threshold level, that equal consideration and concern (for their welfare) or equal respect (for their status and freedom) holds.[9] One view, to be described just below, sees intrinsic moral value in equality only if it is very thinly conceived, and in this way accommodates a large part of what the debunkers claim to discern. The other view insists on a robust conception of equality but urges its appeal. There are various candidate robust conceptions, so if any one of them has appeal, we find another way to defeat debunking skepticism. Or a combination of several might be attractive.

That said, and eschewing claims of reaching firm conclusions, I offer advice as to where to place one's bets, and I have a particular horse in this race. The contender is most easily located by borrowing an insight from Harry Frankfurt, a philosopher famous for repudiating economic egalitarianism and beyond that, the doctrine of egalitarianism across the board.[10] Frankfurt denies that any form of equality is valuable in itself, apart from any possible value it might in some circumstances have as a means to other goals. This position can be supported by a yet broader claim, that how well you are doing as compared to others is in itself insignificant. Consider this simple argument:

- 1. It does not matter in itself how one person's condition compares to the condition of any other.
- 2. If it does not matter in itself how one person's condition compares to the condition of any other, then it does not matter in itself how one person's condition compares to the condition of any other in one particular way, namely, whether one gets or achieves the same as any other.
- 3. So, it does not matter in itself how one person's condition compares to the condition of any other in one particular way, namely, whether one gets or achieves the same as any other.

This is Frankfurt's position. Having dispensed with egalitarianism, Frankfurt suggests that what does matter, for each person prudentially and also morally, as impersonally regarded, is having enough. Justice requires that each person have fair access to a good enough position, one sufficiently good.

However, 1-3 do not suffice for rejecting egalitarianism. There is a recognizable, sensible, nonparadoxical version of egalitarianism that places no value on everyone's having or achieving the same and also agrees with Frankfurt that it does not matter in itself how one person's condition compares to the position of another. The egalitarianism that rejects equality is prioritarianism as elaborated by Derek Parfit in a celebrated essay.[11] Interpreted as axiology, the priority view is a version of welfarism, the position that nothing in itself affects the value of any state of affairs other than the total of individual well-being that it contains and the degree to which it is fairly distributed across persons in that state of affairs. According to the priority view, to determine the fairness of a distribution of well-being across persons at a time, one needs to know the well-being of persons at other times. To determine the impartially assessed moral value of a state of affairs that will result if one carries out a certain action with a for-sure outcome, the information one needs consists of the well-being that each individual has in that state of affairs, and the lifetime well-being that individual will reach, compared to the lifetime well-being that each person would otherwise reach in alternative states of affairs in which an alternative action is chosen.

Prioritarianism as axiology is the claim that a well-being gain for a person (or avoidance of a loss) is morally more valuable, the greater the amount of the gain, and greater, the worse off in absolute terms the person would otherwise be in lifetime well-being, absent this benefit. Attached to a beneficence duty as a component of a theory of morally right conduct, larger or smaller--at the limit, comprising the entirety of morality--prioritarianism says the greater the difference in priority-weighted well-being that would result from a beneficent act one could choose compared to what would result from refraining from doing it, the greater the moral reasons to choose and carry out the beneficent act.

Priority never asserts that any agent has any moral reason in any respect, let alone any pro tanto moral duty, to engage in leveling down.[12] This is bringing about a more equal distribution across persons by mowing down the tall grass—worsening the position of some better off person or better offs in a way that brings no gain to anyone else. Those who value equality of well-being across persons, in contrast, will say that in one respect, leveling down is morally valuable (it increases the degree to which equality of well-being obtains across persons) but it is bad in another respect (it reduces some people's well-being). In welfare economics terms, priority incorporates a commitment to person separability: the contribution that any one person's well-being gain (avoidance of loss) makes to the overall value of a state of affairs is not affected by the well-being position of any other person or persons.

But defending egalitarianism by defending prioritarianism may seem to be abandoning the fort. How can one be an egalitarian and care nothing for equality, everyone's having or achieving the same?

The priority view can be decomposed into separate elements, one of which is in a way straightforwardly equality-favoring. This is known as Pigou-Dalton. This says that a transfer of welfare without loss from a person with greater welfare to one with less, provided the transfer does not leave the person who gets the transfer at a higher welfare level than the other, and provided no one else's welfare is thereby changed, makes the resulting state of affairs an improvement.

There's no mystery here. Although according to the priority view, equalizing well-being is not in itself or noninstrumentally valuable, bringing about a more equal distribution of well-being across persons by simple arithmetic always brings about an increase in total priority-weighted well-being at least so long as the transfer is not accompanied by well-being loss. Picture shifting a non-drippy ice cream cone from one person who likes ice cream and is heading for a high lifetime well-being level to another person who likes ice cream at least as much as the first person and is heading for a lower well-being level. Transfer of well-being without loss from better offs to worse offs (without affecting anyone else's welfare condition) is necessarily instrumentally morally valuable according to priority.

The Pigou-Dalton norm explains why it makes sense to regard priority as an egalitarian moral principle. As just explicated, priority necessarily favors equality. However, the favoring required for acceptance of Pigou-Dalton is weak. It says nothing about what to do when a transfer from better offs to worse offs has to involve a leaky bucket, with some welfare loss. What moral weight should be given to the size of a welfare benefit that might be gained for one person or another as compared to the appropriate weight that should be given to how absolutely badly off in lifetime well-being will be the possible recipient, absent the benefit being considered? One seeks to identify a "Goldilocks" weighting, neither too much nor too little, but what is that? All we can do is consider a wide range of examples and seek weights that dictate judgments that are consistent and fit together as a set of considered judgments after reflective scrutiny.

A prioritarian "egalitarian" position will favor upward transfers from worse offs to better offs if the change harms better offs just a little and benefits better offs by a sufficiently large amount. The numbers of worse offs and better offs also matter. This result is an intuitive plus for the position not a counterintuitive implication. "Be reasonable," someone might say to me, if the pain pill in my possession will ease my slight headache slightly for a week but would

extinguish my neighbor's severe headache for six months, where my neighbor's life is already going much better than mine. The reasonable choice is for me to give up my pill so it will do so much more good.

But someone who affirms straight equality of condition can also affirm that same reasonable judgment, if she also favors, to some degree, more well-being rather than less. For any prioritarian position, that attaches weights to obtaining greater gains for people versus obtaining gains for people who are more worse off, one can formulate an egalitarian position that attaches weights to obtaining increases in the degree to which people become equally well off versus obtaining greater gains for people, such that the two positions will yield the same judgments as to what states of affairs that we could bring about for sure by choice of action would be morally better or worse.[13] This convergence in implications is not complete; there is divergence in some cases involving risky choice (where one does not know for sure the outcome that will would result from one or another choice one might make).

To be sure, as Larry Temkin has noted, "Equality describes a relation obtaining between people that is *essentially comparative.* People are more or less equal *relative to one another*. Extended humanitarianism [this is the same view that this essay calls "prioritarianism"] is concerned with how people fare, but not with how they fare relative to each other."[14] True enough. But if one must impose an indivisible good (or bad) on one of several people, and the benefit (harm) will be the same to the individual, whoever gets it, and there no further effects except on the person who gets the benefit, the extended humanitarian is logically committed to judging that shifting the benefit to a worse off person (or the bad to a better off person) results in a better state of affairs than shifting it to someone else better off (and the reverse for shifting bads). The extended humanitarian qualifies as egalitarian in a broad sense by virtue of being necessarily, not merely contingently committed to equalizing as instrumentally valuable in these circumstances. In light of Pigou-Dalton, and more broadly, prioritarianism, the idea of "non-relational egalitarianism" is odd but coherent.[15]

Person separability matters. For example, in a one person universe, consisting of a lone Robinson Crusoe on an island, the Temkin family of equality of condition values will cease to apply. Where there is only one, there is no relation to others, and so the value of equality does not come into play. But the priority view still can matter. If Robinson is choosing among risky actions that will affect his lifetime well-being, priority, extended to risky choice, will recommend somewhat risk-averse choice. But we should not rally to the barricades to defend person separability to the death against egalitarians who reject it. Egalitarians and prioritarians have an intramural dispute to settle, but in broad terms, should be viewed, and should view themselves, as close comrades.[16]

In short, there are at least two replies to objection (1) as stated in the first paragraph of this essay. The accommodating response insists that priority matters morally even if equality in any form does not. An alternative response stiff-arms the objection by insisting that if we describe people's condition in the right terms, we will see that equality in those terms is indeed morally valuable—be that welfare, or freedom, or some other mode of relationship.

What does priority require?

What does egalitarianism require if the right interpretation of egalitarianism is prioritarianism? For simplicity, we might assume that requirements of equality apply country by country and not with the same reason-giving force across the globe as a whole. This

provisional assumption is very consequential, if the egalitarianism we should accept is prioritarian welfarism. Roughly speaking, if the requirements of priority apply country by country, its demands are comparatively modest. This is a simple consequence of the fact that, in the world today, within-country income inequality across persons is swamped by differences in countries' mean incomes. [17] Prioritizing (or equalizing) income per person within each country is prioritizing among persons whose incomes are far less divergent than the incomes among persons across the entire Earth. If selfishness takes the form of being motivated to hang onto what one possesses, and prompts more resistance to equalizing redistribution, the more of what one possesses one is called on to relinquish, there will be more selfish resistance to global than to within-country application of priority. This in turn will affect the prioritarian rules and norms and practices we should seek to enforce. Beyond some point, depending on circumstances, trying to press prioritarian redistribution in the face of self-interested resistance will be counterproductive.

But at the level of fundamental moral principles, things look different. There's no egalitarian welfarist reason to confine the scope of application of priority or equality within the borders of each political society taken separately.[18] The same priority for the worse off that justifies some redistribution from very well to somewhat well off within a wealthy country will justify greater redistribution from very well off and somewhat well off to badly off when the world's population of individuals is considered together. As a psychological matter, we can understand that people of similar ethnicity, culture, language, and ancestry, and living under common institutions, will be more prone to be generous to each other than will distant strangers different from each other these ways. [19] But psychological proclivity is not in itself morally reason-giving. People are people, be they near and homogeneous or distant and heterogeneous.

Nonetheless, if we provisionally accept the widely accepted idea that egalitarian distributive principles are limited in scope to individuals who share common state membership, one can make a plausible case that these principles are tolerably well fulfilled in some real-world institutional arrangements. Think of social democracy as exemplified in Scandinavian countries. Consider institutional arrangements, along the lines of what John Rawls called the "basic structure of society."[20]

Regarding institutional arrangements, we note that institutions cannot literally dispense individual well-being. On any plausible conception, the major components of a good life for a person almost all involve doings, activity, especially self-directed activity. Institutions can provide individuals resources, opportunities, and liberties. In broad terms, institutions can try to enable well-being achievement.

A second consequential fact about priority-boosting is that even if there is a very short list of fundamental human goods, the same for all, the array of ways in which individuals can fashion life plans that bring about good combinations of these goods is vast. Also, what life plans make sense for a given person depends on her particular circumstances, including her likely opportunities and the risks she faces, her talents and traits, proclivities, virtues and vices, and the basic bent of her personality. Many of these circumstances are such that the individual herself, although she can be mistaken, is usually better placed to detect them than other people. So society, and government as agent of society, seeking to boost individual well-being, cannot micromanage its production. It must provide general-purpose resources like education,

nurturing upbringing, access to productive employment and money, helps to good health, and sometimes highly individual-specific resources either that the individual chooses and seeks, or that it becomes glaringly obvious she needs, whether or not acknowledges the need.

A third consequential fact for this project is that low socio-economic status (SES) is a causal factor tending to lessen well-being and lessen it below the average. This is a crude generalization, part guesswork, and there are exceptions. The best things in life are free, as the saying goes, and there is surely something right about this. Wealthy and high-status people can spectacularly fail to attain these best things, and by luck and skill and savvy, poor and low-status people can attain them. But even if the best things are free, they have material prerequisites, which are costly in resource terms. And anyway if you get enough of the merely good things, you can fashion for yourself a good life. Low SES ends unavoidably to have stigma attached to it, stigma consisting in visible signs of low status. But if the absolute levels of poverty and disadvantage that anyone must suffer are lowered, low SES stigma tends to lessen, and what there is of it is to be less debilitating, especially in a culture in which a general disposition to be sympathetic ("There but for the grace of God go I") and to help the needy conveys a friendly atmosphere.

A fourth relevant fact is that a society can have only two of the following: low taxes, generous welfare benefits for the worst off members of society, and no perverse incentives. Social democracy opts for accepting high taxes in a market economy setting. This has proven to be an imperfect but reasonable successful strategy for improving people's well-being with special priority for the worse off. Perverse incentives are incentives to anti-social acts. If policing and more broadly, law enforcement are inadequately tax-funded, the temptation to steal or avoid paying taxes or strike out against those who irritate us becomes hard to resist; if we have generous welfare-state benefits going to the very worst off but a sharp income eligibility cutoff, people receiving benefits will have an incentive to stay unemployed or underemployed to avoid losing all benefits by hitting the cutoff.

None of this is rocket science; it's common lore. No doubt there are many ways to skin a cat, and many packages of policies that can serve prioritarian aims reasonably successfully. One should not make a fetish of the social democratic package. Its efficacy may erode. Still, if actual, then possible; that societies have sustained policies that arguably serve priority well indicates the feasibility of implementing this form of egalitarianism—on a national scale.

Nordic social democracy tempers capitalism with equality. There is a tradeoff here, between maximizing the total of individual well-being summed across persons and equalizing its distribution. And we seek to maximize the egalitarian social welfare function over the long run, so we seek policies that balance gains to presently living people and those to come.

Social democratic institutions seek to equalize not so much by having in place highly progressive tax rates, more by high tax rates generating large funds which are redistributed so that post-tax income becomes more equal. Public policies promote a high level of labor force participation and full employment, both to increase tax revenues and to bring about the gains in companionship and solidarity among work mates and the justified sense of self-worth that productive employment tends to spur. Family-friendly policies centering on public provision of high quality child care for working parents ease the strain of parenting and encourage women's labor force participation, though Scandinavian countries have not done as well as some countries at drawing women into desirable types of employment traditionally done mostly by

men. Public schools at primary and secondary levels secure good learning outcomes for children whose parents are in the lowest income deciles of the population. Compressed distribution of post-tax income is not matched by compressed wealth distribution.[21]

Market incentives might be deployed in either a socialist economy (in which productive resources are for the most part in public ownership, let's say managed by the state acting as agent of society), or in a capitalist economy (in which productive resources are for the most part privately owned by individuals and groups of individuals). The Nordic social democracy model opts for the latter. Very roughly, a capitalist structure is justified by priority just in case allowing productive wealth to be privately owned results in greater achievement of prioritarian principle over the long run.

Priority with global scope.

If we switch, as I have suggested we should, from regarding priority as applying to each political society in isolation from others to regarding priority as applying across all persons globally (and across time as well, to the extent we can foresee the future), its implications are unsettled. Creating social democracy in wealthy countries, for all we know, might be an impediment to achieving the best feasible attainment of priority with global scope.

Working out what maximizing some determinate function of priority-weighted well-being world wide would require in given circumstances is a task beyond this essay. How far we could equalize wealth without reducing long-term growth in prosperity is uncertain. If we imagine that all people on Earth were willing to do whatever priority required, a first pass guess would be that rich countries should transfer a lot of theiir wealth to members of poor countries, period.

If a poor country is unstable, with a weak government, the country will be unlikely to benefit from large resource transfers from wealthy countries, A sudden infusion of wealth will spur greater civil conflict and ruinous instability.

But a society with a well functioning state can absorb sudden infusion of wealth. Consider the discovery of large oil deposits underneath sea are over which Norway claims jurisdiction. The large natural resource windfall has not destabilized the country; the new wealth is available to benefit Norwegians now and in future.

This suggests that large resource transfers to poor countries that are stable and ruled by well functioning states need not threaten instability and destructive disharmony. So it would be theoretically possible for wealthy Norway to transfer ownership of its North Sea oil deposits to a poor countries with a stable state, perhaps by way of direct ownership transfers to individual poor persons in the country. Any rich country could do the same. To understate the point, this is not a scenario that will likely actually unfold, but our question is, what would egalitarianism require. The suggested answer is that large resource transfers from rich to poor countries would be feasible if there were political will to carry them out and according to prioritarianism, given the transfers would be feasible, they would be required, and the political will ought to be forthcoming.

We could also imagine concerted efforts by coalitions of nations to strive to bring about agreements between states around the globe sufficient to avert ruinous climate change. Rich countries interested in securing agreement on greenhouse gas emission reductions in poor countries while helping them develop economic wealth could show good faith by offering large

resource transfers in return for agreement by the beneficiary country to use the provided resources for green low-emission economic development.

There are also other possible mechanisms whereby rich countries could share wealth with poor countries. A rich country could open its borders to greatly expanded immigration from people in poor regions who seek to move and resettle permanently. Absent a political will in the potential host country to open its borders in this way, a society could provide expanded temporary employment opportunities to guestworkers from poor nations.[22]

From claims about what we all together ought to do, nothing immediately follows about what you or I ought to do, and a massive commitment of people to implementing global priority requirements is not in the cards. But our unwillingness to comply with priority requirements does not tend to show that the requirements are unreasonable and not binding on us collectively. Progress toward satisfying global priority would require large resource sacrifices from better-offs, but the gains, given the huge global income and wealth disparities, would be substantial benefits accruing people far worse off, so this would not be a case of throwing resources down the drain for little or no benefit. And scaling down, you or I could individually sacrifice for similar proportionate gain. When t=t=you bor I balk at the sacrifice, this looks disquieting like a situation in which coercing us to act as priority demands would be justified, if a coercing agent were ready to hand.

Welfare versus liberty?

One might protest that there is no limit to the magnitude of restrictions of any amount of liberty that might be inflicted on people just so long as the priority-weighted well-being totals thereby achieved are sufficiently large. In fact, imposing any amount of freedom restriction on people just to get a marginal increase in the priority-weighted well being total suffices to justify the squashing of liberty. This holds even if the freedom restriction is imposed on everyone or almost everyone. Stuffing everyone in railroad cars headed for the Gulag, with no chance of ever escaping concentration camp level unfreedom once one arrives at this destination, is perfectly fine, so long as whatever well-being losses the freedom deprivation imposes is offset by sufficient well-being.[23]

These nightmare scenarios should not stampede us into abandoning egalitarian welfarism. One general observation is that the degree to which freedom deprivation is oppressive and reasonably experienced and judged by people as oppressive depends on the extent to which the freedom deprivation is justified by good moral reasons. What is oppressive is not imposition of unfreedom but imposition of unjustified unfreedom. Traffic safety laws can serve to illustrate the point. They enormously restrict one's freedom to drive as one chooses at whatever speed one prefers on highways and roadways. This is done just to force the traffic flow into a particular pattern, namely moving at reasonable speed without traffic jams or vehicular crashes and resultant harms. Since the immense freedom restriction by and large helps get us to chosen destinations at a reasonable cost of time and inconvenience and with safety for all, we're content. Enormous freedom restriction can sit light as a feather on those restricted if the freedom restriction is manifestly worth its cost in terms of values, including fair distribution values, we have good reason to uphold.

You might object that the example does not suit the dialectical use to which it is being put, because traffic safety rules restrict freedom in order to expand freedom. Their point is to

facilitate people traveling to wherever they want to go, regardless of whether or not getting to where they want to go really makes their lives go better.

The objection fails to deflect the force of the example. First, traffic safety rules aim to promote traffic safety, which certainly restricts people's desires to drive as they wish, foot to the pedal, consequences be damned. Some people on reflection would prefer a traffic regime offering far more freedom to do as one likes and less safety. Second, you would have to be very cynical in your assessment of the extent to which the satisfaction of people's ordinary desires to get where they want to go really serves their true interests to deny that there is a strong welfarist case for traffic safety on any plausible conception of welfare. So the point stands: restriction of freedom that advances people's well-being fairly distributed is a good deal from the moral standpoint.

Another example illustrating the point is conscription to fight a just war. We should understand a just war as one that morally must be waged, not merely one that is morally permissible to wage. In such a case, a fair conscription brings about a fair distribution of the total individual sacrifice that is required to carry on the war effort to which all members of society have a duty to assist. In the circumstances, compliance with the coercive orders of the state is a required means of effectively fulfilling a moral duty one has anyway, to assist the war effort, prior to the state's issuing any commands. Being forced to join an army for the duration of a war effort enormously restricts one's freedom to live as one chooses, to put it mildly. The sacrifice imposed may involve one's suffering violent death at a young age. Given the huge costs that waging war imposes on those asked to fight the war and on those fought against and on innocent bystanders as well, the expected gains of the war, measured in the currency of justice, must be huge.

A third example is global redistribution on the scale that global application of priority would require. The real (effective) freedom of people in wealthy nations to live as they choose decreases and the real freedom of people in poor nations increases. As an affluent individual in a wealthy nation, I would anticipate valuable options decreasing, but this loss is morally more than offset by increased valuable options to those now just scraping by, by comparison with the outcomes of any alternative policies. If this isn't the case, priority doesn't approve the transfers. If the morally best transfers aren't politically feasible, due to political attitudes of affluent voters (or whoever are pivotal deciders), priority favors the feasible best.

Egalitarianism is disparaged on the grounds that equalizing people's condition will in practice unavoidably press toward substantial sameness of condition, everyone sharing the same way of life. Also, coercive state policies to promote substantial movement to equality will provoke wide dissent and opposition, the crushing of which will squash civil liberties. In reply: equalizing people's resource holdings by way of increasing the resources available to the worse off, even if it takes from the rich, gives resources to those more in need of them. There's no reason to expect this movement to lessen many-sided individual development overall. Civil liberties would be threatened by protracted civil war, but there's no reason to expect substantial priority justice advance to be feasible unless the vast bulk of people internalized the ideal and supported its fulfillment.

Regarding basic civil liberties, we should notice that, beyond their instrumental value for maximizing the right balance of individual welfare fairly distributed, they have another instrumental value: being fallible, we should acknowledge the possibility that our current best

judgments as to what candidate fundamental moral principles are correct might be wrong and we want to sustain conditions that will help us in future arrive at better views (maybe priority is wrong and "schmiority" correct) if such there be. Freedom of speech and thought and associated freedom of association ought to be sustained, in part, as means to future progress in moral knowledge.

What Rawlsian relational equality requires.

There is a deep divide is roughly between egalitarian welfarist doctines and views that see the fundamental egalitarian justice imperative to be establishing and sustaining a society of social equality, avoiding bad social hierarchies of wealth and power, or in another interpretation achieving equal freedom as nondomination, or in yet another, equalizing the secure enjoyment of basic liberties for all, including political liberties construed as requiring equal opportunity for political influence.

In the ringing first paragraph of *A Theory of Justice,* John Rawls states, "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override." This seems to promise an uncompromising stand for the worst off, but it turns out, when you read the fine print, that each person possesses rights to liberties that even the welfare of the very worst off person cannot override. Moreover, the "welfare" of the worst off members of society recognized in Rawlsian principles is not actually welfare but rather an index of the social and economic primary social goods exclusive of the equal basic liberties whose protection takes strict priority that allows no tradeoffs. Individual well-being as such is not a justice value at all, not even a minor one. And achieving greater resources such as income and wealth for the worst off should be a factor affecting the design and operation of basic institutions only after we have done all that we can do, as a first priority, to secure and protect the equal basic liberties, according to Rawls.

There is another strict lexical priority nested in Rawls's principles that limits the concern to boost the resource shares of the worst off. One value has lexical priority over another when one should accept any loss, however tiny, in degree of fulfillment of the superior value to achieve any gain, however huge, for however many people, in degree of fulfillment of the inferior value. Rawls's equal liberties principle, which has lexical priority over his second principle, requires that "Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value." The equal basic rights and liberties of persons are those needed for the development and exercise of their fundamental powers to play fair with others and to develop, assess and perhaps revise, and pursue a conception of their good. The second principle rounding out this theory of justice requires that "Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society."[24]

There are two strong equality of opportunity principles lodged in this doctrine. The fair value of the political liberties (FVPL) requires that all citizens with equal political talent and ambition have the same chances of being politically influential, of being elected to public office and of affecting political decisions. Fair equality of opportunity (FEO) requires that all those with the same native talent and the same ambition for competitive success have the same

chances of competitive success, of attaining positions that accord one greater social and economic primary social goods. Again, primary social goods are general-purpose resources and liberties necessary, or at least specially strategically useful, for developing and exercising the two fundamental moral powers. FVLP is lodged in the first-priority equal liberties principle and within the second principle FEO has lexical priority over the difference principle.

In Rawls's later writings the moral revulsion from anything that smacks of utilitarianism goes further. Rawls notes that any inequalities in access to social and economic primary goods across persons (1) must be attached to positions that satisfy FEO and as a second priority (2) must work to the maximal advantage of the worst off. But a society can fully satisfy the second principle simply by not allowing any social and economic inequalities at all, within the constraint that some such inequalities might be byproducts of complete fulfillment of equal basic liberties. The Rawlsian just society is not bound by any moral requirement to introduce policies that will bring about inequalities that will increase the social and economic primary goods holdings of the worst off under conditions in which FEO obtains. Provided the opportunity for development and exercise of the two moral powers is fully secured, beyond that point the pursuit of greater economic growth and prosperity is morally optional. Provided that a big enough economic pie is baked at some time, then from then on, for each succeeding generation, there is no moral reason, much less requirement, to make the economic pie bigger.

OK, this is a mouthful. Many questions of interpretation remain to be settled. For purposes of this essay I simply want to mark the stark contrast between the family of egalitarian welfarist views and Rawlsian egalitarianism, which is entirely an egalitarianism of freedom not of welfare. It's not that equality of welfare and larger rather than smaller totals of individual welfare are not high-priority justice values in Rawls's scheme. These welfare values do not register at all even as small potatoes justice values. Moreover, whereas you might regard equal opportunity for welfare or real freedom to achieve individual well-being as justice values in the register of freedom, these welfarist freedom norms do not have any place at all, not even a low place under the table, in the ideal of Rawlsian justice. Rawlsian justice is profoundly Kantian. Its egalitarianism does not represent a compromise between the liberalism of Kant and Rousseau and the liberalism of Mill. Rather the Rawlsian ideal encapsulates the entire squashing of the John Stuart Mill ideal of the just society to make room for the social-equality vision of freedom.

This shows up, for example, in the fact that the full development and exercise of the fundamental moral powers requires development and exercise of the moral power to develop and critically assess and pursue one's conception of the good but no requirement that one attain any degree at all of fulfillment of it. In principle, the fullest flourishing of equal Kantian freedom can coexist with zero welfare or negative well-being for some or all. For the Kantian, this is not a bug but rather a feature of the doctrine.

Now turn to the question, what does Rawlsian egalitarianism require? What institutions must we build and what policies must we institute, according to this conception of justice?

As we did with egalitarian welfarism, we consider first the requirements of Rawlsian egalitarianism for a single political society regarded in isolation and then for a planet in which people are ruled by many different political societies controlling different territories and resources. The contrast between the requirements of egalitarianism applied country by country and applied to the world as a whole is less consequential for the Rawlsian than for the

welfarist egalitarian. Justice for the Rawlsian very likely requires less by way of income and wealth equalizing across the members of separate political societies than for the welfarist egalitarian (or prioritarian).

The Rawlsian equal basic liberties, Rawls suggests, will be familiar liberal freedoms of freedom of speech and thought and association, along with the right to a rule of law and freedom from assault and harm, and the freedom to own personal property and use it as one sees fit without imposing certain external costs on others, along with the right to an equal democratic say over political policy formation. The last we can also describe as the equal political liberties, which incorporate free speech and association and assembly as needed for political democracy as well as institutions of representative democracy and democratic accountability. FVPL requires that with respect to these political liberties, each citizen has equal opportunity to be politically influential as specified above.

To put it mildly, this is an extremely demanding requirement.

Rawls is describing an ideal case, a well-ordered society in which all accept the same correct principles of justice, the basic structure of institutions fulfills the principles, all are disposed to support the just institutions and fully comply with their requirements, and all of this is common knowledge. Rawls says this is not a pie in the sky ideal, rather a "realistic utopia," but don't hold your breath waiting for its arrival. Rawls is just saying that the laws of nature, and the truths about human nature, do not rule out attaining that ideal. Given where we are, there may be no way to get from here to there, and getting there might be a transitory achievement, nothing like permanent. I will assume a simple view about what Rawls's principles of justice require of us in actual conditions. This is that we take effective steps, without trampling on anyone's basic rights, to achieve over the long run the greatest degree of fulfillment of Rawls's principles in our political society. Here the lexical priorities provide clear guidance. We should seek as a nonnegotiable first priority to do all we can to bring about the greatest possible fulfillment of the equal basic liberties principle including its FVPL component, and to keep pouring resources into this aim up to the point at which further expenditure of resources however large would produce not even a marginal gain. Only at that point should we switch gears and put any resources at all into attempts to bring about fulfillment of the lesser priority fair equality of opportunity principle. And at that point, we must keep pouring more and more of our remaining resources into boosting the degree to which FEO is fulfilled, until further expenditure of resources would deliver no extra degree of fulfillment however small. Only then should we channel remaining resources available for bringing about justice fulfillment into attempts to boost fulfillment of the difference principle.

How this would play out in actual and likely circumstances depends on the degree to which the lexical priorities prove to be binding constraints. There is reason to think that they would be strongly binding constraints. That is to say, if we relaxed the priority of equal basic liberties so it requires only tolerably good degree of fulfillment, we could then have available substantial resources that deployed efficiently would bring about substantial fulfillment of FEO. And if the priority for FEO over the difference principle were similarly relaxed, we could then perhaps still have available substantial resources that deployed efficiently would bring about large boosts in the degree to which social primary goods holdings of resources accessible to the worst off social group could be enlarged.

This may be too abstract to wrap one's mind around, so consider this thought in slightly more detail. Suppose FEO cannot be fulfilled. Then we must stick with equality in people's access to money and other primary social and economic goods even though everyone would be better off, and the worst off made as well off as possible, and great gains for all achieved, if we allowed inequalities that work to make the worst off as well off as possible., and then next the second worst off, and so on, up to best off. We must all live in tents rather than houses, perhaps, and travel on foot rather than in cars and trains, and forego all access to great music and investments in technology development that would improve the future for all, and so on.

On the next level, we must to gain ever tinier increments in degree of attainment of FVPL give up any degree of fulfillment of fair equality of opportunity however huge. These foregone gains might involve greatly increased accessibility of higher education to people whose parents are of low socio-economic status, for example, or improvements in the egalitarian socialization of men and women so that FEO is better fulfilled because men are less able to pass positions of advantage along to men via an old boys' network. Rawls might surmise that it is likely that improvements in degree of fulfillment of his two equal opportunity norms rise and fall together in lockstep so tradeoff issues do not arise. But that's as may be. I'm focusing on possible and for all we know likely cases in which tradeoff issues are sharp.

Lexical priorities are only implausible where on reflection the good deemed superior is not so much superior to the lesser ranked good as to render the implications of lexical priority unacceptable. So we might ask what is involved in greater attainment of equal opportunity for political influence as Rawls conceives it.

Equal opportunity for influence is compatible with wide disparities in people's ambitions to be influential and hence in people's actual participation in political deliberation and activity. Suppose that FVPL is achieved by changes in economic organization, tax law, and inheritance law that equalizes people's wealth and income, and that in this setting, perhaps surprisingly, this equality brings it about that people become lethargic and apathetic in relation to political issues, and the moral quality of political decisions reached deteriorates. Society becomes less just along several fronts, but the lexically prior equal liberties including FVPL are better fulfilled. The moral quality of political decisions reached does not register as a value that might warrant some sacrifice of equal basic liberties fulfillment, perhaps by accepting lesser fulfillment of FVPL.

In contrast, an egalitarian welfarist view should say, regarding equal opportunity for political influence, that we should seek whatever political arrangements would best promote fulfillment of egalitarian welfarist justice values over the long term. Such promotion might come about by improving the quality of political decisions reached but might come about in other ways as well. Greater FVPL fulfillment might stimulate public-spiritedness and greater disposition of citizens on the whole to cooperate with other in fair ways including ways that result in more fair distribution of well-being or well-being prospects across persons. In some circumstances, egalitarian welfarism would favor greater fulfillment of FVPL than would Rawlsian principles. This could happen if greater fulfillment if FVPL boosted the fulfillment of the egalitarian welfarist principles but did so at cost to fulfillment overall of the equal basic liberties principle. Perhaps protection of free speech becomes slightly more lax, and there is lesser secure fulfillment of free speech, but from an egalitarian welfarist perspective, this loss is outweighed by gains in FVPL fulfillment, which in turn boosts egalitarian welfarist fulfillment.

In other cases , the egalitarian welfarist judgment would go the other way. For example, it could happen that equal opportunity for political influence is increased, and in this setting those who are more politically talented and ambitious than others are induced to exercise this opportunity robustly, so that the politically talented and ambitious now wield far greater influence than they would have done had their opportunities for influence been less. Again, the upshot might be that choices of public policies become more unfair, skewed to the interest of the politically talented and ambitious. From an egalitarian welfarist standpoint, the upshot of increased equal opportunity for political influence could be lesser achievement of social justice.

Another consideration is that in populous democracies, individuals' opportunities to be politically influential will be very slight, so that differences in the degree to which equal opportunity for political influence prevails may involve moving most people's chances of being politically influential from something like one in a billion to two in a billion. This difference may reasonably not register as important in any citizen's overall set of values.[25]

There may be many devices and strategies that in our present and likely future circumstances would help to increase the degree to which equal opportunity for political influence prevails in a political society.

But there may be sharp limits to the degree to which, when inequality of wealth exists, it can be blocked from issuing in unequal opportunity for political influence. So it may be, as many political theorists including adherents of Rawlsian principles surmise, that substantial progress toward fulfillment of equal opportunity for political influence (FVPL) cannot be made without substantially equalizing people's wealth holdings. In this case, provided that equalizing wealth will have some positive effect in boosting equal opportunity for political influence, and provided there are no unintended consequence that diminish fulfillment of equal basic liberties overall, Rawlsian justice will require equalizing wealth.

Moreover, Rawlsian justice will require equalization of wealth even when this produces only an increase in FVPL and no knock-on increases in other justice values and when lesser-priority justice values suffer lessened fulfillment. Not to mention lesser fulfillment of the egalitarian welfarist candidate justice values that do not get on the table at all in the Rawlsian social justice bargaining framework.

Welfarist and nonwelfarist egalitarianisms.

The discussion in the previous section emphasizes criticism of Rawls, and by implication other nonwelfarist egalitarianisms, for bending the twig too far away from utilitarianism. But in an ecumenical spirit, I note that you can be attracted to this bent while staying within the egalitarian fold. The relational egalitarian opposes social hierarchy and seeks a society in which none has power or authority over others that is neither voluntarily accepted nor democratically regulated. Her ideal of social justice is not well-being promotion, rather protection of each person's freedom to set her own ends and pursue them with adequate means. With a fair framework for interaction in place, how well your life goes for you, from the relational egalitarian perspective, is your own business and not the proper concern of society or of government as its agent. In contrast, the welfarist egalitarian looks beyond people's resource shares and opportunities to register the quality of the lives people end up living, the resources and opportunities being regarded as means to bringing about what ultimately matters—good quality lives with good fairly distributed across persons. There's a Grand Canyon divide in

normative commitments here, to be sure, but an egalitarianism, with appeal, on both sides of the divide.

Conclusion.

In a roundabout way, this essay has argued that the requirements of plausible versions of egalitarianism for public policy and individual conduct are reasonable. Painting a picture of a society that fulfills egalitarian ideals describes a society you would reasonably want to inhabit. Hugo Chavez's Venezuela or Mao's China, it's not.

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[1] . On Mill, see utilitarianism.com/mill1htm; also David Brink, *Mill's Progressive Principles* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; also Roger Crisp, *Mill on Utilitarianism* (London: Rourledge, 1997). . On Rousseau, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on inequality,* in Victor Gourevitch, trans., *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 111-222; also Frederic Neuhouser, *Rousseau's Critique of Inequality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

[2] . On this issue see Liam Murphy, *Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 34-73.

[3] . Allen Wood, *Kant* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 148.

[4] . R.M. Hare, *Moral Thinking: Its levels, Method, and Point* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 44-64.

[5] . In this essay "well-being" is a placeholder. Ultimately an account must be supplied of what in itself makes someone's life go better rather than worse for her. Accounts abound. To be a suitable module for egalitarian welfarist social justice principles, the account must vouchsafe some degree of interpersonal comparability. To give egalitarian welfarism a fair run for its money, it must be yoked to the most plausible conception of individual well-being that can be identified. .

[6] . A point made by Allen Buchanan in "Justice and Charity," *Ethic* 97*s* (1987), 558-575.

[7] The canonical statement of Lockean libertarianism is Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).

[8] . Notice that egalitarian welfarism can take on board the utilitarian arguments for wide freedom of thought and expression and for encouragement of individuality and abstinence from restricting any individual's freedom, against her will, for her own good as advanced by J. S. Mill, *On Liberty* ed. Elizabeth Rapaport, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978). Originally published 1859.)

[9] . On what makes a being a full person, see Nozick, 48-51.

[10] . Harry Frankfurt, *On Inequality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

[11] . Derek Parfit, *The Lindley Lecture 1991, Equality or Priority?* (Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1991). On priority, see also Matthew Adler, *Well-Being and Fair Distribution: Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; also Matthew Adler and Nils Holtug, "Prioritarianism: A Response to Critics," *Philosophy, Politics, and Economics 18* (2019), 101-144.

[12] . The leveling down objection is emphasized in Nils Holtug, *Persons, Interests, and Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), section 8.3.

[13] . For this result, see Marc Fleurbaey, "Equality Versus Priority: How Relevant Is the Distinction?," *Economics and Philosophy* 31 (2015), 203-217. See also Fleurbaey, "Assessing Risky Social Situations," *Journal of Political Economy* 118 (2010), 649-680.

[14] . Larry Temkin, *Inequality* (Oxford University Press, 1993).

[15] See Dennis McKerlie, *Justice Between the Young and the Old* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, the chapters 4 and 5.

[16] . For defense of equality versus priority, see Michael Otsuka and Alexander Voorhoeve, Why It Matters that Some Are Worse Off than Others: An Argument against the Priority View," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 37 (2009), 171-1999; also Otsuka and Voorhoeve, "Equality versus Priority," in Serena Olsaretti, *The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 65-85. For response, see Adler and Holtug, as cited in endnote 6; also Richard Arneson, *Prioritarianism,* forthcoming; also several essays in the X 2012 issue of *Utilitas.*

[17] . Branko Milanovic and John Roemer, "Interaction of Global and National Income Inequalities," *Journal of Globalization and Development* 7 (2016), 109-116; see also Branko Milanovic, *The Haves and Have-Nots* (New York, Basic Books, 2011), 149-164.

[18] . For some defense of this controversial claim, see Richard Arneson, "Extreme Cosmopolitanisms Defended," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 19, (2016), 555-573.

[19] . On the importance of attitudes of racial and ethnic solidarity to attitudes toward redistributive policies, see Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 133-181.

[20] . John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6-7.

[21] . See discussion of social democratic institutional arrangements in Lane Kenworthy, *Egalitarian Capitalism: Jobs, Incomes, and Growth in Affluent Countries* (New York: Russell Sage, 2004; Kenworthy, *Social Democratic America* (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2014); Kenworthy, *Social Democratic Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020); also Kenworthy, *Would Socialism Be Better?,* forthcoming.

[22] . Richard Arneson, "Guest Worker Programs and Reasonable, Feasible Cosmopolitanism," *Journal of Legal Studies* , 47, no. 1 (2018), 169-194.

[23] . There are two worries here. One is that maximizing priority-weighted well-being might require driving some to the wall. This concern could be alleviated by flanking beneficence with constraints and options in a pluralistic morality. The other is that policies that boost everyone's welfare might unduly restrict everyone's individual liberty.

[24] . John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

[25] Niko Kolodny argues that opportunity for political influence should be sharply distinguished from opportunity to have any share of control over political outcomes. Opportunity for influence is opportunity to contribute one's input into unmanipulated political deliberation in which participants pay heed according to their individual assessments of it. See his "Rule Over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42, No. 4 (2014), 287-336.