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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

Cosmopolitanism and Justice

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[These Gentlemen have formed a plan of Geographical morality, by which the duties of men in public and in private situations are not to be governed by their relations to the Great Governor of the Universe, or by their relations to men, but by climates, degrees of longitude and latitude, parallels not of life but of latitudes. As if, when you have crossed the equinoctial line all the virtues die... This Geographical morality we do protest against. (Edmund Burke, "Speech on Opening of Impeachment" (of Warren Hastings), February 16, 1788, in Burke 1788 [1999]: 221)]

I am
a Jew. Hath not a Jew
hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions?
fed with the same food, hurt with the
same weapons, subject to the same diseases,
healed by the same means, warmed and cooled
by the same winter and summer, as a Christian
is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? if you
tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us,
do we not die?
(Shylock, The Merchant of Venice, Act 3, Scene 1, lines 56–65)

The world is characterized by extensive global poverty and marked inequalities. In addition to this, the Earth's climate is undergoing profound changes and the rising sea-levels - increased temperatures and increase in unpredictable weather events will have dramatic effects on the basic interests of many. These phenomena prompt the question of whether there are global principles of distributive justice. It has traditionally been assumed that principles of distributive justice apply, if they apply at all, within a state. Debates about distributive justice have often taken it for granted that the scope of distributive justice is set by the borders of the state (or the nation)
and the focus has been more on what distributive principle is appropriate as well as on what should be distributed. The concept of international justice, in this context, referred not to any principles of distributive justice but to principles of non-intervention and just war theory (Rawls 1999a: 331-3). In recent years, however, a number of political philosophers have defended a “cosmopolitan” account of distributive justice. They have, that is, argued that there are global principles of distributive justice, which include all individuals within their scope. In this chapter I shall provide an analysis of some leading cosmopolitan perspectives on distributive justice and also provide some support for what I take to be a compelling version of it.

I: Three Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism

§1.

It is necessary to start with a further clarification and elaboration of the concept of cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism affirms that persons are “citizens of the world.” Such ideas have an ancient lineage. It is said of Diogenes the Cynic that when he was asked where he came from, he said, “I am a citizen of the world.” (Diogenes Laërtius 1931: 65). For Diogenes the Cynic, “[t]he only true commonwealth was, he said, that which is as wide as the universe” (ibid.: 75). These ideas were taken further by Stoic thinkers such as Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, Epictetus, and the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius. All of the latter affirmed the idea of being a citizen of the world. Persons, on this view, are not simply citizens of their city-state – rather their country is the whole world (indeed the cosmos).

Cosmopolitan ideals were also commonly invoked during the Enlightenment and political philosophers of very different hues identified themselves as cosmopolitans. Both Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant, for example, adopted a cosmopolitan perspective. Thus Bentham begins his essay on the “Objects of International Law” by asking what a citizen of the world would want: “If a citizen of the world had to prepare an universal international code, what would he propose to himself as his object? It would be the common and equal utility of all nations” (1843 [1786-9]: 537). Furthermore, Immanuel Kant invokes the cosmopolitan ideal and affirms some (minimal) principles of “cosmopolitan right” in his essay on “Perpetual Peace” (1989 [1795]: 105-8).

§2.

My focus is, however, on contemporary cosmopolitan theories which, though they share a commitment to the concept of world citizenship, provide different interpretations of this ideal to that offered by either ancient or Enlightenment cosmopolitan thinkers. Focusing now wholly on contemporary cosmopolitanism, it is important to draw attention to three distinct kinds of cosmopolitanism – what I shall term juridical cosmopolitanism, ethical cosmopolitanism, and political cosmopolitanism.

Jurdical cosmopolitanism is a claim about the scope and nature of distributive justice. It maintains that there are global principles of distributive justice that include all persons in their scope. Put slightly differently, what I have termed juridical cosmopolitanism (and what others like Samuel Scheffler call “cosmopolitanism about
justice" (Scheffler 2001: esp. 111)) avers that the scope of some principles of distributive justice should include all persons within their remit. We are all citizens of the world in the sense that we should all be included within a common scheme of distributive justice. This view stands opposed to those who maintain that distributive justice applies only among members of the same nation or state. This kind of cosmopolitanism is affirmed by a variety of different thinkers. In *Political Theory and International Relations* (1999) Charles Beitz draws on Rawls's theory of justice and argues that there should be a global difference principle. Furthermore, Henry Shue argues in *Basic Rights* (1996) that there is a human right to subsistence which entails negative duties on others not to deprive them and positive duties to provide such subsistence if it be necessary. To give a third example, Thomas Pogge's more recent *World Poverty and Human Rights* (2008) provides an argument for the existence of global principles of distributive justice.

Consider now a second kind of cosmopolitanism - what I have termed ethical cosmopolitanism. Whereas juridical cosmopolitanism is a claim (or set of claims) about the right, ethical cosmopolitanism is a claim (or set of claims) about the good. Ethical cosmopolitanism holds that persons are citizens of the world in the sense that to flourish one need not conform to the traditional ways of life of one's community. Flourishing may include (and, on some construals, should include) drawing on aspects of other cultures. A fine example of this is Jeremy Waldron's important essay on "Minority Cultures and The Cosmopolitan Alternative." In this Waldron celebrates the ideal of someone who draws on ideas and beliefs from a variety of different countries (Waldron 1992). Scheffler refers to a similar view and terms it "cosmopolitanism about culture" (Scheffler 2001: esp. 111). Although the kind of cosmopolitanism at stake undoubtably raises questions about culture I think that this title is rather misleading. It is worth distinguishing between two different aspects of any culture - those aspects which concern what makes life fulfilling (the views about the good life that are embedded in the culture) and those aspects which concern the functioning of the political system (what political scientists term "political culture"). Now Waldron and Scheffler's concerns are about the first kind (they are interested in the tenability of a cosmopolitan ideal of the good life) but, as the concept of "political culture" attests, not all cultural questions are concerned with the good life.

Consider now finally what is often called political cosmopolitanism. This holds that there should be supra-state political institutions. So this kind of cosmopolitanism maintains that persons are citizens of the world in the sense that there should be political institutions that encompass all. One version of political cosmopolitanism holds, for example, that there should be a system of multilevel governance, in which there are supra-state institutions, state-like institutions, and sub-state political structures (Pogge 2008: Ch. 7; cf. also Caney 2005a: Ch. 5, 2006).

§3.

With these three kinds of cosmopolitanism in hand, we should now note that each of them comes in a mild or a radical form. The mild version of juridical cosmopolitanism, for example, holds (i) that there are some universal principles of distributive justice which include all within their scope but it also (ii) allows that there might be some national-level or state-level principles of distributive justice. The radical form of
juridical cosmopolitanism, by contrast holds affirms (i) but denies (ii). The same distinction might be applied to political cosmopolitanism. The mild version (i) holds that there should be some global political institutions and (ii) allows that there might be some national-level or state-level political institutions. Again the radical version – encapsulated in the view that there should be a world state – affirms (i) but denies (ii). Finally, to complete the survey we can apply the same distinction to ethical cosmopolitanism. The mild version holds (i) that the “cosmopolitan” conception of the good is a fulfilling conception of the good and (ii) allows that more “local” conceptions of the good might also be fulfilling conception of the good. The radical version, by contrast, affirms (i) and denies (ii).

Some have argued that mild juridical cosmopolitanism is not a helpful category on the grounds that on this definition pretty much everyone is a cosmopolitan (Miller 2002: 975). I believe that this is mistaken. In the first place, we should note that the cosmopolitan claims not simply that there are global principles of distributive justice (which is compatible with states having duties of distributive justice to other states); it requires that they apply principles of distributive justice to all individuals. Given this, applying a mild cosmopolitanism would require a radical transformation in the way that powerful states act in the world and may (depending on what global principles are affirmed) require considerable changes to the power and role of international institutions. It also bears noting that this approach would be opposed by very many different schools of thought. It stands opposed to almost all “realist” thinking (perhaps the dominant approach among international relations scholars). It would be rejected by those who adhere to the ideal of a society of states. In addition to this it is incompatible with Michael Walzer’s account of the scope of justice (1983) and John Rawls’s treatment in The Law of Peoples (1999b). Mild cosmopolitanism is also denied by Thomas Nagel (2005). So the idea that mild cosmopolitanism is a commonplace is, regrettably, not the case. Perhaps the most important point is this, however. Whether the mild view is banal and overly inclusive depends on (a) its content and (b) its moral weight. If, for example, a mild cosmopolitanism affirms an ultra minimal content then it is more open to the charge that it is saying something that pretty much anyone can accept, whereas one that affirms, say, fairly egalitarian principles would not. Similarly, a mild cosmopolitan who affirms cosmopolitan principles that are very easily overridden is, again, failing to provide a distinctive viewpoint. Mild cosmopolitanism is only an uninteresting view if it is committed to rather weak and anodyne principles that no one disputes. It can take this form but there is no reason why it should.

II: Two Kinds of Juridical Cosmopolitanism

Let us turn now to juridical cosmopolitanism. A number of different kinds of cosmopolitanism have been proposed. It is worth distinguishing, in particular, between two approaches to cosmopolitan distributive justice.

First, some argue that principles of distributive justice apply to persons who belong to a common “scheme”, where I use the word “scheme” as a catch-all phrase to refer to some kind of systematic interaction and interdependence. Proponents of this approach then argue that there is a global scheme and hence, there are global principles of
distributive justice that include all persons in their jurisdiction. On this approach, one may have humanitarian duties to non-members but one does not have duties of distributive justice to them. Put otherwise: this view maintains that the scope of principles of distributive justice is defined in terms of who belong to which schemes. Let us term this the "interdependence-based" conception. Sophisticated versions of this kind of argument have been advanced by Charles Beitz (1999) and Thomas Pogge (1989, 2008) and we shall turn to their arguments shortly.

Prior to doing so we should introduce a second kind of approach. This second kind holds that principles of distributive justice should apply globally irrespective of whether a global scheme exists. It simply holds that all persons, qua human beings, should be included within the scope of justice. It is motivated by a commitment to the dignity of persons and the sentiments eloquently expressed by Shylock in the quotation at the start of this chapter. Let us term this the "humanity-based" conception. On this account, one might have a natural duty of justice to aid others, regardless of whether they are in one's scheme or not (Buchanan 1990, 2004; cf. also Caney 2005a, 2007). One has obligations of justice to others because they are fellow human beings - with human needs and failings, and human capacities for, and interests in autonomy and well-being - and facts about interdependence do not, in themselves, determine the scope of distributive justice. One early statement of this view comes from David Richards. He reasoned that all persons, in virtue of their humanity, should be included in a global original position (Richards 1982). Of course, consequentialist theories also fit into this mold. Since they maintain that utility should be maximized they attribute no fundamental moral importance to national or state boundaries (Singer 2002).4

The two kinds of cosmopolitanism differ, then, in the concepts of "moral personality" that they employ. Whereas the second maintains that persons have entitlements simply qua human persons and in virtue of their humanity, the first maintains that persons have entitlements qua members of a socioeconomic scheme. Since they differ in their account of moral personality they will sometimes differ in their account of the scope of distributive justice. If there is a truly global "scheme" (however that term is defined) then they will converge, but if there is not then their conclusions about the scope of distributive justice will diverge.

III: Beitz on Cosmopolitan Justice

With these two accounts in mind, let us consider two eminent versions of the first approach. The first major attempt to argue in this way was developed by Charles Beitz in Political Theory and International Relations (1999) - originally published in 1979. Beitz sought to argue that Rawls's theory of justice should lead us to embrace a global difference principle. Beitz thus accepts, like Rawls, that principles of distributive justice apply to what Rawls terms the "basic structure" (Rawls 1999a: 6-10). He then argues, however, that such is the extent of global interaction and interdependence that there is in fact a global basic structure. Drawing on a large empirical literature, Beitz claims that Rawls's assumption that societies were self-contained is false. The extent of trade and communication and the growth of transnational regimes and institutions is such that we can now say that we are living in a global basic
structure. In the light of this, Rawls’s approach should commit us to adopting a global original position, and, given Rawls’s argument, it would follow that there should be a global difference principle (1999: 143–53).

Beitz’s argument raises several questions. The first concerns the extent of interdependence at the global level. As Beitz points out, it would be implausible to think that a tiny bit of trade is sufficient to make the difference principle applicable. As he notes, it would be implausible to think that one country selling some apples to another country in exchange for some pears suffices to establish that there should be a transnational difference principle (Beitz 1999: 165). Beitz infers from this that a global difference principle is applicable only if the volume and intensity of interdependence reaches a certain level. He suggests that there is “a threshold of interdependence above which distributive requirements like a global difference principle are valid, but below which significantly weaker principles hold” (1999: 165, 166–7). This raises two further questions. First, what degree of global integration must exist for a global difference principle to come into play? This is not simply a practical problem but a philosophical one. We lack any criteria as to where to draw the line and it is not clear how we would go about deriving such criteria. But we need such a criterion if Beitz’s derivation of a global difference principle is to succeed. Second, what principle applies at the sub-threshold level of integration? How could we ascertain such a principle? Again we appear to lack any method for deriving that principle or principles. Beitz’s account of the relationship between the level of economic integration and the content of global distributive justice is inherently problematic for it cannot tell us when a global difference principle or any other principle is appropriate.

Second, and even more fundamentally, one might ask why principles of distributive justice should apply to the members of a basic structure. Why does the scope of distributive justice depend in this way on whether there is a global or non-global basic structure? Beitz’s answer is an orthodox Rawlsian one. The basic structure matters because of its impact on people’s lives. It affects the extent to which people can realize their interests (Rawls 1999a: 7; Beitz 1999: 166, 201). However, to say this is to ascribe importance as to whether people can enjoy their interests. It is to be concerned with realizing certain outcomes. Now if this is the case then we have a moral reason to assist in the furtherance of these interests whether or not we are in the same scheme as them. If we ascribe importance to whether persons can engage in the activities in which they have an interest then this should surely bear not simply on how the basic structure is organized but also on the behavior of those who are external to it but who may be able to have a considerable effect on those interests (Caney 2007: 283).7

IV: Pogge on Cosmopolitan Justice

Given these problems let us turn to a second interdependence-based account of cosmopolitanism – that advanced by Thomas Pogge. Pogge has developed his arguments in many articles and in the last part of Realizing Rawls (1989: Part III). His most systematic exposition of his arguments is, however, in his book justly influential book World Poverty and Human Rights (first published in 2002 and then published in an
expanded version in 2008). In the latter Pogge makes the following three claims. First, he maintains (very plausibly) that agents have a negative duty of justice not to participate in unjust social practices or institutions. Pogge sometimes presents this as a negative duty not to harm others. This requires an analysis of "harm". This leads us to the second component of Pogge's argument. Second, Pogge argues that we should think of harm as follows. Harm is defined in terms of (i) those impacts on human rights that (ii) are produced by social institutions. Furthermore, Pogge's focus is on (iii) the duty of those who create and uphold these social institutions. Finally, Pogge maintains than an institution is harmful only if its malign effects on human rights are (iv) "foreseeable", (v) "reasonably avoidable" and (vi) the creators/upholders of the institutions know that these institutions can be designed to avoid these malign effects. Now, if we put Pogge's claim that there is a negative duty not to harm with this account of harm we reach the conclusion that agents are under a negative duty of justice not to create or uphold institutions which foreseeably and avoidably result in a "human rights deficit" (2008: 26).

Pogge's third step is an empirical one. He argues that we are living in a "global institutional order" (2008: 15). Global practices and rules have an enormous effect on people's lives and the security of their rights. Many, of course, resist such a claim, arguing that human rights abuses stem from "local" variables - such as corrupt elites and despotic rulers. However, Pogge makes a good case for thinking that global rules often encourage such unjust forms of governance. He persuasively argues, for example, that the assumption that the government of a country is entitled to take out loans ("the international borrowing privilege") and that it is entitled to sell the resources within its jurisdiction ("the international resource privilege") fuel unjust regimes (2008: 118-21).

Now if we combine these three tenets, then we reach the conclusion that agents have a negative duty of justice not to uphold a global order which foreseeably and avoidably fails to secure human rights. Agents have a duty to eradicate global poverty - not because they have a positive duty of justice to aid the needy - but because there is a negative duty of justice not to impose such unjust rules on the rest of the world.

Pogge's work is rich and rewarding and merits more analysis than I can give it here. The negative duty of justice that he postulates is a compelling one. In addition to this his analysis of the ways in which international practices contribute to poverty is persuasive. Furthermore, since we often ascribe greater moral importance to honoring negative duties than to positive duties, Pogge's use of negative duties of justice gives it an important motivational advantage over other arguments.

One potential problem with Pogge's account concerns how much global poverty it can address. Though Pogge has made a good case for thinking that affluent states and international rules play a major role in causing global poverty, there are other relevant causal variables - including (a) the nature and policies of states in developing countries and (b) geographical factors. To start with (a): as Pogge would recognize, some global poverty stems, in part, from corrupt or misconceived policies adopted by states in developing countries and their corruption or incompetence is not wholly explicable by global variables. So local actors must bear some responsibility. Turning now to (b), Jeffrey Sachs and Paul Collier have both argued that geographical factors play a causal role in the production of global poverty (Collier 2007: Ch. 4; Sachs 2005: 57-9; Sachs 2008: 212-17; Gallup et al. 1999). Two causal
factors, in particular, are emphasized. First, both argue that whether a country is landlocked or not makes a significant contribution to whether it is impoverished or not (Collier 2007, Chapter 4; Gallup et al. 1999, esp. p. 184). Second, Sachs has argued that malaria contributes to economic underdevelopment and so those who live in malaria-prone areas are disadvantaged by that fact (Sachs 2005: 196–9; Sachs 2008: 216–17; Gallup and Sachs 2001: 85–96).

This has the upshot that even if affluent states honor their negative duty of justice there are like to be some, perhaps many, living in grinding and degrading poverty (Caney 2007: 291ff.)—people impoverished because of government corruption or incompetence or because of an inhospitable climate or their geographical location. Pogge's theory cannot, therefore, eradicate global poverty. To do that it needs to be supplemented by positive duties. Furthermore, it is not clear why Pogge eschews positive duties of justice and whether he can consistently do so. To see whether he can we need to know what rationale he has for adhering to his negative duty of justice not to impose an order on others. If, for example, the argument is that persons have vital needs which would be unmet if people imposed an unjust order on them the obvious response is that if we attribute fundamental significance to people having their needs met then we should also accept some positive duties of justice (Buchanan 2004: 89–92).

V: Cosmopolitanism and Humanity

§1.

Let us turn now to a second kind of juridical cosmopolitanism—what I termed earlier a "humanity-centered" conception. Why adopt this approach? The best argument in favor of this humanity-centered conception of cosmopolitan justice starts from the observation that there is a strong conviction that persons should not fare worse in life because of morally arbitrary characteristics such as their ethnicity or their religion or their regional identity. Distributive justice, we hold, should be blind to such features of persons. This is evident in our understanding of equality of opportunity. Here we hold that certain factors—someone's class or ethnicity—should not bear on their opportunities. Now humanity-centered cosmopolitanism adopts the same intuition and concludes that persons should not also face worse opportunities because of their nationality or their citizenship. To do so would also be to penalize people for morally arbitrary reasons.

Thus far this argument is in agreement with those cosmopolitans who hold that principles of distributive justice only apply within economic schemes. Pogge, for example, has famously argued that national boundaries are morally arbitrary. In an oft-quoted passage he writes that "[n]ationality is just one further deep contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class)" (1989: 247). In a similar spirit Darrel Moellendorf writes that "[s]ince one's place of birth is morally arbitrary, it should not affect one's life prospects or one's access to opportunities" (2002: 55). On this humanity-based cosmopolitans and interdependence-based cosmopolitans are agreed.

However, humanity-centered cosmopolitanism then argues that the reasoning that both types of cosmopolitanism employ to criticize the moral relevance of national
boundaries also shows that the boundaries of economic schemes are also morally arbitrary. If one's "place of birth is morally arbitrary" (Moellendorf) then surely one's birth into one institutional scheme rather than another is also arbitrary and thus should also not "affect one's life prospects" (Moellendorf). To ascribe differential entitlements to people because of their membership of different schemes is to penalize some for morally arbitrary reasons. Isn't one's membership of a scheme "just one further deep contingency" (Pogge)?

This argument might be presented in a different way. Theories of justice comprise, at least, two components - an entitlement-bearer component (that specifies who is entitled to what) and a duty-bearer component (that specifies who is duty-bound to do what). Let us focus first on the entitlement-bearer component. Judged from an entitlement-bearer perspective, it is hard to see why membership of a "scheme" has any fundamental moral relevance. Compare two people - one in scheme A and one in scheme B. Suppose then that they are equally talented, equally needy, equally industrious, and so on. Judged from the entitlement-bearer perspective there is no reason why one should receive more or less than their counterpart. "Membership of a scheme" is a morally irrelevant factor (Barry 1989: 239). No one is entitled to more because of it for it does not correlate with any normal distributive criterion.

§2.

We gain a better understanding of this argument if we consider a recent criticism of it developed by David Miller. Miller argues that arguments to the effect that nationality is "moral arbitrary" rely on an ambiguity between two distinct notions of moral arbitrariness (Miller 2007: 32–3). On the one hand, moral arbitrariness is used as a premise. Under this reading a feature is said to be morally arbitrary if it is one "for which people cannot be held morally responsible" (ibid.: 32). Let us call this version 1. Miller then says that sometimes referring to a property as morally arbitrary is to "signal the conclusion of the argument as opposed to its premise" (ibid.: 32). Calling a property morally arbitrary is to say that persons should not treat people differently on the basis of this property (ibid.: 32). Let us call this version 2. Miller's claim is that one cannot simply affirm version 2: we need an argument for it. But he also claims that version 1 does not support version 2.

He adds that it would if one introduced a new premiss (premiss 2 below) and reasoned as follows:

Argument A:
premiss 1: a person's nationality is a property for which she cannot be held morally responsible (version 1 arbitrariness)
premiss 2: if a property is one for which a person is not morally responsible then it is wrong to treat them differently because of this property (new premiss)
Therefore:
Conclusion: it is wrong to treat persons differently because of their nationality (version 2 arbitrariness). (Miller 2007: 33)

However, as Miller points out, premiss 2 in this argument is obviously false. Consider someone who is in need. This is a property for which (let us stipulate) someone cannot be held morally responsible but at the same time it is not true that it is wrong.
to treat them differently to an able-bodied person because of this property (Miller: 33). We ought to treat people differentially here. Premiss 2 is therefore incorrect. And the claim that that people are not morally responsible for their nationality does not show that it is a morally arbitrary fact about them.

I believe that this argument is unsuccessful for three reasons. First, and crucially, the cosmopolitans Miller has in mind do not, contra Miller, affirm Miller’s second conception of moral arbitrariness. They do not hold that it is wrong to treat people differently because of morally irrelevant differences. What they hold is that it is wrong that people face worse opportunities because of morally irrelevant differences (what we might call version 3). So the (radical) cosmopolitan claim is that it is wrong that people face worse opportunities because of their nationality. That X is a member of one nation should not inform what entitlements they receive. Cosmopolitans are thus not seeking to establish the Conclusion as it is described in Argument A above.

This is crucial and if we bear this in mind we can see that the arbitrariness-inspired reasoning for cosmopolitanism sidesteps Miller’s objection. For rather than offering Argument A, they will offer Argument B below, which reformulates the Conclusion and premiss 2 of Argument A in light of the point I have just made above. This argument reads as follows:

**Argument B:**

Premiss 1: a person’s nationality is a property for which she cannot be held morally responsible (version 1 arbitrariness)

Premiss 2*: if a property is one for which a person is not morally responsible then it is wrong that they possess different entitlements because of this property (new premiss)

Therefore:

Conclusion*: it is wrong that persons possess different entitlements because of their nationality (version 3 arbitrariness)

Now if a humanity-centered cosmopolitan makes this argument, they can easily accommodate Miller’s point about need. They can agree that neediness is (with the possible exception of some self-imposed harms) a property for which persons cannot be held responsible. However, and this is the crucial point, they can also agree with Miller’s claim that the state should treat people differently because of this morally arbitrary property. Premiss 2* does not deny this. In fact premiss 2* emphatically affirms this point, calling for differential treatment so that no one is worse off because of morally arbitrary factors. Thus Argument B provides a valid argument that moves from the fact that people are not responsible for their nationality to the conclusion that nationality should not affect what opportunities they face in life.

This is sufficient to undermine Miller’s argument. However, a second point is also worth noting. Miller’s critique of cosmopolitan invocations of the morally arbitrary nature of nationality assumes that cosmopolitans must affirm his version 1 conception of moral arbitrariness. It is therefore worth noting that this is not the case. A cosmopolitan might eschew version 1 and affirm instead a fourth notion of moral arbitrariness where this fourth conception holds that a property is morally arbitrary if it does not track any morally relevant properties.11 Employing this conception of “moral arbitrariness”, someone may hold that nationality is morally arbitrary - not