CHAPTER 14

GLOBAL JUSTICE

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1. THINKING ABOUT JUSTICE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

Justice generates especially stringent claims.¹ In Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*, Shylock makes his demand to a pound of his delinquent debtor's flesh in terms of justice. Until the clever Portia finds a device for voiding the contract, the presumption is that it must be granted. Conceptually, demands of justice are the hardest to outweigh or suspend. Kant goes too far insisting that there is no point for us to continue to live on earth unless justice prevails (1996, 473). Still, justice plays a central role in human affairs precisely because it enables persons to present claims of such stringency. A theory of *distributive justice* explains why certain individuals have particularly stringent claims to certain relative or absolute shares, quantities, or amounts of something whose distribution over certain people must be justifiable to them. Alongside distributive justice there is also *rectificatory justice*, and perhaps other kinds. Yet because our concern in all but Sections VIII and IX is with distributive justice, *justice* here refers to distributive justice unless otherwise noted.

Increasing political and economic interconnectedness draws much philosophical attention to the question of the conditions under which such stringent claims arise. Do claims of justice arise only among those who share membership in a state? Alternatively, do they arise among all those who are jointly subject to the global political and economic order? Or do they apply among all human beings simply because they are human? Inquiries into *global justice* differ from those into *international justice* precisely by not limiting inquiry to what states should do. They may also question the very moral acceptability of states and explore alternative arrangements.
When Hobbes devoted *De Cive* to exploring the rights of the state and the duties of its subjects, he did something fundamentally new. Focusing on the confrontation between individual and state, after all, meant *not* to focus on the relationship of the individual with particular rulers or multiple authorities. It meant to assess a person’s relationship with an enduring institution that made exclusive claims to the exercise of certain powers within a domain. Centuries later, Kavka could write that “the relationship between the individual and the state forms the core of Western political philosophy,” just as “the relationship between morality and prudence lies at the center of Western ethics” (1986, 21). Due to its focus on the state (a reflection of the political realities of the age), until recently, modern political philosophy has done comparatively little to theorize justice outside of states or to assess political and economic structures other than states in light of such inquiries.

Now, however, we must ask with some urgency about the conditions under which principles of justice apply. That inquiry is central to the burgeoning field of global justice. This question about the applicability of principles of justice also generates (renewed or new) interest in political structures such as a world state, a world with federative structures stronger than the United Nations, with a more comprehensive system of collective security, in which jurisdictions are disaggregated, or in which border control is collectively administered or abandoned entirely. Reflection on such structures is of great interest in an increasingly politically and economically interconnected world where enormous differences in life prospects nonetheless persist. Depending on what one thinks about the conditions under which demands of justice apply, one may favor one or other of these structures. Even if one thinks that subverting the state system is practically impossible, one may still explore *moral* objections to it, specifically from a standpoint of justice. Such inquiries naturally assume the shape of determining the conditions under which principles of justice apply.

Fleischacker (2004) shows that the modern conception of *domestic justice* incorporates several premises. First, each individual has a good that deserves respect, and individuals are due rights and protections to that end. Justice is not (merely) a matter of realizing, say, a divine order. Second, some share of material goods is among the rights and protections everyone deserves. Third, the fact that each person deserves such rights and protections is rationally and secularly justifiable. Fourth, the distribution of these goods is practical: It is neither a fool’s project nor self-undermining, like attempts to enforce friendship. Fifth, it is for the state (and conceivably other political entities) to achieve justice. These commitments about how the fates of individuals are tied together are strikingly unusual by historical standards. It is such an understanding of domestic justice that also generates the debate about *global justice*. If each individual has a good that deserves respect, we must ask if corresponding duties expire at the borders; if shares of material goods are among the rights and protections everyone deserves, we must ask if this depends on where people live. If protections require rational justification, we must ask if such justification is available for (what I call) the normative peculiarity of the state. If the distribution of these goods is practical, we must note that today a network of organizations seeks to make this true globally. Plausibly, entities other than states should also strive for justice.
The "global (political and economic) order" and an "increasingly interconnected world" have particular meanings in this context. Our current global society has emerged from developments that began in the fifteenth century through the spread of European control, continuing with the formation of new states through independence or decolonization. While this order has no government, it comprises treaty-and convention-based norms regulating territorial sovereignty, security and trade, some property rights, human rights, and the environment. Politically, the United Nations Charter codifies the most significant rules governing this system. Economically, the Bretton Woods institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank, later also the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs/World Trade Organization [WTO]) form a network intended to prevent war and foster worldwide betterment. Jointly with more powerful states, these institutions shape the economic order.

The term *globalization* describes processes that erode the political and economic importance of national boundaries and increasingly affect life chances through the system of rules that is constitutive of the global order. "Globalization" is not new. It traces back to the spread of European control, a process accompanied by the emergence of a state system whose central features were reflected in the doctrine of "sovereignty." Political philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, such as Grotius, Locke, Hobbes, Wolff, Vattel, and Kant, explored questions about that stage of globalization. They developed the doctrine of sovereignty, explored under what conditions one could acquire non-European territories, and considered what kind of ownership there could be of the seas. The spread of European control was complete by the end of the nineteenth century. By that time, political philosophers such as Tocqueville and Mill had already been busy justifying why non-Europeans should endure political dependence. A period of devising rules for the spread of an "empire" gave way to a period of justifying its persistence.

After World War II "global governance" came into its own, in the form of the international institutions mentioned previously. Political philosophers at this stage of globalization worry about normative issues that such governance raises. Among these issues is the question of whether principles of justice indeed apply only within states. Perhaps such principles apply to the global order as well. Or, again, they might apply independently of political and economic structures and instead hold because of common humanity and thus apply to all human beings. By "positions on global justice" I mean views about the conditions under which principles of justice hold.

### 2. The Grounds of Justice

We can formulate positions on global (distributive) justice in terms of the distinction between *relationalism* and *nonrelationalism*. That distinction captures some of the most important debates in contemporary political philosophy. "Relationists" think principles of justice hold only among persons who stand in some essentially
practice-mediated relation to each other. "Nonrelationists" think such principles may apply among those who stand in no such relation.

A reference to practices keeps nonrelationism from collapsing into relationism. The relation of "being within 100,000 km of each other" is not essentially practice mediated, nor is, more relevantly, that of "being a fellow-human." I say "essentially" practice-mediated relations because there may be practices associated especially with this latter relation that are dispensable to understanding its content. Paradigmatic nonrelationists base the applicability of principles of justice on common humanity and relationists on shared political structures. Relationists and nonrelationists disagree about the grounds of justice, the norm-generating conditions or considerations that render demands of justice applicable among persons for whom these conditions and considerations hold. I use the term "grounds" to remain neutral between relationists and nonrelationists and thus arrive at a rather abstract formulation in terms of "conditions or considerations." I use the term "relationship" sufficiently broadly for relationists and nonrelationists to register as offering different accounts of what one might call the "justice relationship."

Relationists may hold a range of views about the nature of the relevant relation. They may disagree about the scope of justice, or the range of people in the justice relationship. Globalists think the relevant relation holds among all human beings in virtue of the existence of practices that relate all humans to each other within a single global order. Statists think the relevant relation holds (only) among individuals who share membership in a state. They owe an account of what it is (exclusively) about shared membership in states that generates demands of justice. Globalists owe an account of what it is about involvement with, or subjection to, the global order that generates demands of justice. Those who accept duties of justice that hold (only) among people who share a state endorse "the normative peculiarity of the state"; those who do not, reject it. Statists endorse the normative peculiarity of the state; globalists and nonrelationists do not. So whereas globalists and statists are united by being relationists, globalists and nonrelationists are united by rejecting the normative peculiarity of the state.

Relevant versions of nonrelationism take the scope of justice to be global, including all of (and only) humanity. Yet nonrelationists may determine the scope differently. One could limit justice to a subset of humanity by insisting on the normative importance of, say, sex or race. Or one may insist that justice must have all sentient beings in its scope, at least higher animals and conceivably rational Martians. Yet the former possibility is implausible, and the latter I set aside. Nonrelationists owe an account of how common humanity generates demands of justice. Relationists think of principles of justice as regulating practices that some persons share with each other. This implies two things. First, for relationists, principles of justice apply only to those who respectively share the practices. Relationists are motivated by the moral relevance of practices in which certain individuals stand. Such practices may include not only those that individuals chose to adopt but also those of which they have never chosen to partake. Second, relationists think of principles of justice as regulating only those practices rather than every aspect of the lives of those who share them.
3. Rawlsian Relationism

To illustrate what is at stake, note that John Rawls is a relationist. He famously calls justice “the first virtue of institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” and talks about “justice in social cooperation” (1999a, 3; also see the chapter on Rawls by Leif Wenar in this volume). Justice here is a characteristic of institutions, which are practices. Rawls’s principles regulate the practices constitutive of the basic structure of society (the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages from cooperation). “Distributive justice,” says Freeman by way of expounding this approach, “poses the general problem of fairly designing the system of basic legal institutions and social norms that make production, exchange, distribution, and consumption possible among free and equal persons” (2007, 305). Many aspects of advantage and its distribution are natural facts, but “what is just and unjust,” says Rawls are not these facts, but “the way that institutions deal with these facts” (1999a, 87).

Relationists can recognize duties to those with whom they do not stand in the justice relationship. Alas, those duties would either differ relevantly from duties of justice or else in some other way differ from those duties of justice that hold among individuals who share the relevant relation. Nagel (2005) adopts the former approach, insisting that justice only holds within states. Rawls (1999b) adopts the latter and implicitly acknowledges a distinction between duties of distributive justice that hold within states and other duties of justice that may hold otherwise. The duty of assistance to “burdened societies” in The Law of Peoples is not one of distributive justice (Rawls 1999b, 106, 113–20; see also Freeman 2007, ch. 9). Duties of distributive justice are duties with regard to shares in a system of economic production and exchange, which Rawls thinks presuppose a basic structure.

Rawls is a statist. His main goal is to offer principles of domestic justice. The Law of Peoples adds an approach to international justice by way of sketching the foreign policy of a society within which his domestic principles of justice apply. Methodologically in the background is Rawls’s political constructivism. Rawls begins with domestic justice and works “outward” from there to The Law of Peoples, and “inward” to local justice (2001, 11). These other subjects presuppose domestic justice. As Freeman says:

The principles that appropriately regulate social and political relations depend upon the kinds of institutions or practices to be regulated, and these principles are to be “constructed” on the basis of ideas that are central to the functioning of those institutions or practices and people’s awareness of them. (2007, 270)

Freeman sees this political constructivism—a view on justification—as integral to Rawls’s rejection of global principles of distributive justice. The convictions and intuitions that must be in reflective equilibrium to obtain a theory of justice concern the practices and institutions in which we lead our lives. These convictions are less developed outside of the domestic setting.
Wenar (2006) offers a plausible reading of Rawls that responds to critics, such as Caney (2002), who think *The Law of Peoples* is incoherent with Rawls's earlier work. Crucially, both in the domestic and in the global case, Rawls draws on ideas implicit in the public political culture. Rawls believes "that humans should be coerced only according to a self-image that is acceptable to them," which means that "[s]ince 'global citizens' cannot be presumed to view themselves as free and equal individuals who should relate fairly to each other across national boundaries, we cannot legitimately build coercive social institutions that assume that they do" (Wenar 2006, 103). Wenar rightly uses this observation to explain why Rawls did not advocate global egalitarian ideals of a sort that Beitz (1999) and Pogge (1989) found a natural extension of his principles. Global public political culture is of a different (much thinner) nature than that of a constitutional democracy.

4. THE GROUNDS OF JUSTICE: SOME FURTHER CLARIFICATIONS

Nonrelationists object that by making justice practice-mediated relationists either tie justice to properties of individuals that omit too much of moral importance (for practices individuals have not selected) or overemphasize some morally important aspects at the expense of others (for practices in which individuals chose to participate). Parallel to what I said about relationists, nonrelationism implies two things: Nonrelationists seek to avoid the alleged arbitrariness of restricting justice to the regulation of certain practices, and because nonrelationists do not limit justice in this way, they will plausibly apply principles of justice to the whole range of advantageous and disadvantageous events in a life. (Regarding the use of "will plausibly": Recall that there is logical space for nonrelationists to proceed differently.) For nonrelationists, justice is a property of the distribution of advantage, broadly understood. Whereas for relationists individuals stand in the justice relationship if they have special claims within particular practices, for nonrelationists that relationship is distinguished by the absence of special claims.

Two clarifications are important here. First, "grounds" differ from "circumstances" of justice. "[T]he circumstances of justice obtain," explains Rawls, following Hume, "whenever persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity" (1999a, 110). Both circumstances and grounds tell us "when demands of justice apply," but they do so in different senses. "Circumstances of justice" specify those living conditions of human beings under which any principles of justice apply in the first place. Unless we live under such circumstances, no principles of justice apply to begin with. If we live under these circumstances, the grounds specify which principles of justice apply to which people.
Second, consider Pogge's widely quoted definition of "cosmopolitanism":

Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions: First, individualism: the ultimate unit of concern are human beings, or persons . . . . Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human being equally—not merely to some sub-set, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. (1994, 89)

None of the positions I discuss (statism, globalism, nonrelationism) denies the moral equality of persons. Each of these positions has capacities to makes sense of individualism, universality, and generality. A crucial issue for each of these positions is how rich a notion of moral equality its advocates wish to endorse and how the relevant notion of moral equality relates to ideas of political and distributive equality. In any event, one needs additional arguments to derive distributive equality of anything from ideas of moral or political equality. Statists deny a close link between moral and political equality: All human beings are morally equal, but it is only in the presence of certain practices (those of shared citizenship in a state) that ideas of political equality even apply. Statists may or may not find inequality among individuals in one country (in terms of outcomes, resources, or opportunities) morally problematic, but they do not find inequality among countries as such morally problematic. Globalists and nonrelationists may endorse a global maximin, sufficiency criterion, or other criteria. A range of views on inequality is open to them, but none depend on shared membership in states.

We have learned the basic cosmopolitan lesson: Moral equality is an essential part of any credible theory of global justice. In the domain of distributive justice, the term cosmopolitan has become the victim of its own success. Therefore, we should conduct the philosophical debate in the terms discussed in this chapter rather than in a way that thinks of cosmopolitanism as a distinctive position on global justice. We live on a "cosmopolitan plateau" in the way in which Kymlicka (2002) (following a suggestion by Ronald Dworkin) claims that plausible political theories populate an "egalitarian plateau." All plausible theories of domestic justice define "the social, economic and political conditions under which the members of the community are treated as equals" (Kymlicka 2002, 4). Similarly, all plausible theories of global justice ascribe significance to moral equality.

5. Nonrelationism

Nonrelationists insist that relations in which particular individuals stand with each other cannot have the kind of moral importance that would imply that moral obligations (or a broad range of obligations) apply only among those who do so. Caney (2005) suggests a version of this approach. He offers the following thought regarding the relevance of economic interaction and a similar thought would apply to all practices:
Consider a world with two separate systems of interaction that have no contact but are aware of each other and suppose that one of them is prosperous whereas the other is extremely impoverished. Compare, now, two individuals—one from the prosperous system and the other from the impoverished system—who are identical in their abilities and needs. The member of the prosperous system receives more. But it is difficult to see why—concentrating on any possible and reasonable criteria for entitlement—this is fair. *Ex hypothesi*, she is not more hard-working or more gifted or more needy. In all respects they are identical (bar one, namely that one is lucky to live in the prosperous society and one is not) and yet an institutionalist approach confers on one more benefits. (2005, 110)

To develop his case, Caney’s strategy is to identify a moral argument of sorts and then to argue that that argument appeals to properties that everyone has. Limiting such arguments to particular groups means to commit what Caney, following Black (1991), calls the "fallacy of restricted universalism": "A distributive theory, that ascribes rights and claims on the basis of certain universal attributes of persons, cannot at the same time restrict the grounds for those claims to a person’s membership or status within a given society" (2005, 357). Attempts to derive principles of justice from universal attributes that nevertheless are supposed to be limited to certain groups (e.g., compatriots) commit this fallacy. Consider the way in which Caney applies this strategy to civil and political liberties. He argues for the "scope, claim": "the standard justifications of rights to civil and political liberties entail that there are human rights to these same civil and political liberties" (2005, 66), according to the scope,

because the standard arguments for civil and political rights invoke a universalist “moral personality.” That is, the relevant aspect of persons is the right to be subject to principles to which they can reasonably consent (for contractarians), or their use of moral language (for Habermas), or their humanity and status as persons (for deontologists), or their ability to lead a fulfilling life (for perfectionists). As such, it would be incoherent to adopt any of these lines of reasoning for a particular right and then ascribe that right only to other members of one’s community. (2005, 77)

Arguments of this sort at the very least pose a challenge for relationists to explain just what it is about their preferred relation that, in the case that interests us, generates demands of justice that would apply only among those who share that relation. Whether they succeed at this task and so can respond to nonrelationists such as Caney is the subject of the next section.

6. STATISM AND GLOBALISM

Statists and globalists disagree about what relation is relevant for the applicability of principles of justice. Nonetheless, they are both relationists, resting claims of justice on nationally or globally shared practices, respectively, and thus to some extent use similar arguments to defend their views. Defenses of relationism may enlist two strategies.
The first strategy draws on the fact that it is (conceptually) difficult for us successfully to press demands on each other at all, especially the stringent demands of justice. Relationists are well equipped to deal with this difficulty. They can help themselves to considerations that arise from within the practices they consider central to the applicability of justice. They need not deny that there can be natural rights and duties of justice at all. But arguments in their support can enlist only features of shared humanity. Crucially, derivations of transactional and associational duties (the kind of arguments relationists offer) can enlist a larger set of considerations. They can use claims about persons having undergone certain transactions under specific conditions (e.g., promises, contracts) or about them living in certain human-made arrangements that often assume different shapes and that put demands on those involved in them. Claims of justice cannot succeed merely based on references to the significance of something for the claimant. We need reasons why others ought to provide what is significant. Nonrelationists can most readily meet that challenge if they restrict themselves to establishing rights and duties pertaining to elementary human concerns, such as basic-needs satisfaction. Relationists are better equipped to make such a case. In particular, duties pertaining to relative, rather than absolute, economic status are (at the very least) easier to establish, and are more demanding, if we can resort to shared practices to make that case.

To illustrate, consider Scanlon’s (2005) influential discussion of objections to inequality and hence to differences in relative economic status. Scanlon identifies five reasons to pursue greater equality: (a) to relieve suffering or severe deprivation, (b) to prevent stigmatizing differences in status, (c) to avoid unacceptable forms of power or domination, (d) to preserve the equality of starting places that is required by procedural fairness, and (e) because procedural fairness sometimes supports a case for equality of outcomes. Statements (b) and (e) are the clearest expressions of egalitarianism; (d) is consistent with considerable inequalities and so is only weakly egalitarian, whereas (a) and (c) are not egalitarian at all. Scanlon argues that Rawls uses (b) through (e), and perhaps (a) as well, to argue in support of his principles of justice. So those principles are supported by reasons that are distinctly egalitarian but also by reasons that are distinctly not.

Crucially, however, even the force of (c) and (d) depends on the practices (if any) that the relevant individuals share. For instance, to explain what counts as unacceptable forms of power, it helps to explore how individuals respectively contribute to the maintenance of an economic system and hence also what the economic ties among them are to begin with. Undoubtedly, some exercises of power are unacceptable regardless of what relations individuals stand in. But the more ties there are among individuals, the more possibilities there will be for them to contribute to the maintenance of relations, which in turn generate rationales for them to complain about certain exercises of power. Similarly, to assess how much reason there is to preserve the equality of starting places on behalf of procedural fairness, it is essential to assess to what kinds, and range, of procedures the individuals are jointly subject. Thus if we seek to argue for obligations pertaining to relative standing without making use of relations, there is little we can say. We can derive more demanding obligations if we can resort to relations.
The second strategy in defense of relationism appears in Scheffler's (2001) account of the link between special relations and responsibilities. Relations create responsibilities because having reason to value relations noninstrumentally just is to have reasons to see oneself under, and actually have, special obligations. As Scheffler puts it, to attach noninstrumental value to a relationship with someone means "to be disposed, in contexts which vary depending on the nature of the relationship, to see that person's needs, interests, and desires as, in themselves, providing me with presumptively decisive reasons for action, reasons that I would not have had in the absence of the relationship" (2001, 100; note that to call reasons "presumptively decisive" means to grant that, in principle, they could be outweighed, although they present themselves as reasons on which agents must act). Skepticism about such responsibilities succeeds only if we have no reasons at all to value our relations noninstrumentally. The case is clearest for family ties and friendships but less clear for political relations, and presumably statisticians can more readily make the case than globalists. Beitz (1999, 212), for instance, does not use such reasoning to support his globalism but wonders instead about the relevance of such arguments even for shared membership in a state.

Statists must develop their version of relationism in a way that supports the normative peculiarity of the state. They could first use the two strategies in support of relationism to rebut nonrelationism and then offer an account of the normative peculiarity of the state to rebut globalists (and thus settle the intramural debate between relationists once relationism has been accepted). Two proposed accounts of the normative peculiarity of the state are coercion-based statism (i.e., what distinguishes membership in a state is its coerciveness) and reciprocity-based statism (i.e., what distinguishes membership in a state is its intense form of cooperation).

These views, however, face the challenge that forms of coercion and cooperation also hold within the global order as such, which makes it problematic to argue that principles of justice govern only the relation among those who share a state. Statists can respond by arguing that the normative peculiarity of the state is based on its particular kind of coerciveness or cooperativeness. Risse (2006), for instance, accounts for the state's coerciveness in terms of legal and political immediacy. The legal aspect consists in the directness and perversiveness of law enforcement. The political aspect consists in the crucial importance of the environment provided by the state for the realization of basic moral rights, capturing the profundity of this relationship.

However, assuming that Risse's (2006) account succeeds in explaining what is morally special about shared membership in states, one must still wonder whether this account matters for justice, that is, whether it can explain why principles of justice apply only among those who share a state. That is the point that globalists push. Capturing globalist resistance to statism, Beitz argues that global interdependence involves a pattern of transactions that produce substantial benefits and costs; their increased volume and significance have led to the development of a global regulative structure... Taken together, these institutions and practices can be considered as the constitutional structure of the world economy: their activities have important distributional implications. (1999, 148)
It does not matter precisely what the nature of international economic interdependence is. The dispute between statists and globalists already arises for a loose sense of interconnectedness.

Beitz argues that in an interdependent world, limiting justice to domestic societies means taxing poor nations so that others may live in "just" regimes (1999, 149ff). Beitz's target is Rawls. He argues that if Rawls's case for his principles succeeds, their content should not change as a result of enlarging the scope of the original position to include the global order. Beitz considers two objections (1999, 154–61). The first insists that interdependence is necessary but insufficient for the applicability of justice. The global order lacks any effective decision-making mechanisms, as well as any real sense of community, and these, the objector says, are also necessary for an order's being subject to standards of justice. Beitz responds that these differences fail to show that principles of justice do not apply globally; instead, they show that it is harder to implement the principles.

According to the second objection, features of cooperation within states override requirements of global principles even if justice applies globally. Rich countries may deserve their advantages because of differences in organization or technology. Beitz responds that this entails basing entitlements on morally arbitrary factors such as those that, as Rawls insisted, ought not to affect one's share of social primary goods. Thus he rejects this move much as Rawls rejects principles of justice drawing on undeserved social or genetic characteristics.

7. Pluralist Internationalism

One way of making progress in light of the debate among statists and globalists discussed in the previous section is to deny that there is a single justice relationship in which any two individuals either do or do not stand. One may use principles of justice as a collective term for different principles with their respective ground and scope. Let us call nongraded or monist internationalism the view that principles of justice either do or do not apply, that they do apply within states, and thus that they apply among people who share membership in a state and only then. Nongraded or monist internationalism is the same as statism. Introducing this additional terminology allows us to connect statism to other views that endorse the normative peculiarity of the state. Coercion-based and reciprocity-based statism are versions of monist or nongraded internationalism.

Graded internationalism holds that different principles of justice apply depending on the associational (i.e., social, legal, political, or economical) arrangements. Graded internationalism allows for associations such as the WTO, the European Union, or the global order as such to be governed by principles of justice but endorses the normative peculiarity of the state. Among the principles that apply within other associations we find weakened versions of principles that apply within states;
for this reason I talk about graded internationalism. I lack the space to motivate the graded view in detail, but suffice it to say that all those who live, say, under the WTO are tied to each other much more loosely than individuals who respectively share a state. It is therefore plausible to think that the principles of justice that hold within the WTO are weakened versions of those that hold within a state.

However, now that we have introduced a nonmonist view, we also must take seriously the idea that some grounds could be relational, whereas others would not be. We must consider the possibility that there is no deep conflict between relationism and nonrelationalism. Perhaps advocates have respectively overemphasized facets of an overall plausible theory that recognizes both relationist and nonrelationalist grounds. Integrating relationist grounds into a theory of justice pays homage to the idea that individuals find themselves in, or join, associations that membership in some of them generates duties. Integrating nonrelationist grounds means taking seriously the idea that some duties of justice do not depend on the existence of associations. One obvious nonrelational ground is common humanity. One view that develops these ideas could be called pluralist internationalism or just internationalism. The use of the term internationalism for this position acknowledges the applicability of principles of justice outside of and among (“inter”) states. This view endorses the state’s normative peculiarity but recognizes multiple other grounds of justice, some relational (e.g., subjection to the global trade regime) and others not (e.g., common humanity). Respectively different principles are associated with these different grounds, all of which are binding, say, for states and international organizations. Internationalism transcends the distinction between relationism and nonrelationalism.

Internationalism offers one way of preserving the plausible aspects of nonrelationalism, globalism, and statism. Obviously making this view credible, and proving its fruitfulness, requires detailed discussions of its implications for a wide range of areas. The costs of making such a move are considerable, because one would give up on the uniqueness of the justice relationship. One would also have to meet the challenge that such a pluralist view does not, one way or another, collapse into one of the original views. Other ways of making progress in this debate are possible as well, including those that abandon the state’s normative peculiarity. We have now reached the research frontier in this field.9

8. DOES THE GLOBAL ORDER WRONGFULLY HARM THE POOR? PART 1

So far we have talked only about distributive justice. However, perhaps the main theme in an assessment of global justice should be whether the global order wrongfully harms some people—presumably the weakest—the global poor. If so, we should think of global justice primarily in terms of moral obligations to rectify
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harms (where the harms are not simply defined by a conception of distributive justice). There are different ways of articulating that thought. First, one may say the
global order wrongfully harms human beings because of the sheer existence of borders. Perhaps frontiers are inconsistent especially with the value of freedom and 
with liberal justice. Second, perhaps the global order wrongfully harms the poor 
(i.e., individuals who are unable to meet basic needs) by imposing an institutional 
framework that is not as advantageous to them as some alternatives. Finally, one 
may argue that the extents of poverty and inequality themselves reveal that the 
global order wrongfully harms the poor.

One way of making the point that national borders can function as unjustified 
restrictions of freedom draws on Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s approach to 
freedom in terms of “capabilities.” Nussbaum offers a list of capabilities central for 
a life with dignity. “Bodily integrity” is on her list, of which one instantiation is 
“being able to move freely from place to place” (2006, 76). The challenge is to explain 
why this capability can be limited by frontiers. However, appeals to the value of 
freedom to assess the legitimacy of borders cut both ways. It is true that frontiers 
limit choice, but so does any immigration policy. Permissive immigration policies 
in countries where many people wish to live are likely to constrain some who already 
live there.

Some have argued that immigration barriers are unjust owing to liberalism’s 
commitment to moral equality. Liberalism, Carens (2003) notes, condemns the use 
of morally arbitrary facts about persons to justify inequalities. Examples include 
race, sex, and ethnicity. Political communities that treat people differently on the 
basis of such features are illiberal and unjust. Yet citizenship seems as arbitrary as 
any of those. Maintaining borders, to him, is as offensive as other perhaps more 
obvious cases of injustice because it differentiates rights based on origin. Carens is 
correct that moral equality and the value of common humanity cannot stop at bor-
ders, but it has been argued that this does not mean shared citizenship is as morally 
irrelevant as race or ethnicity. The fact that shared citizenship arises in a manner for 
which individuals deserve neither credit nor blame does not make it morally irrele-
vant. On this view, there is no inference from moral equality to political equality 
regardless of what structures persons share.11

In a related vein, one may argue that a system of states cannot properly consider 
all affected interests, and so they automatically wrongfully harm persons. The ac-
tions of states affect many who have no say in the design of policies. For instance, 
Mexicans who wish to enter the United States never consented to the existence of an 
American people that can unilaterally constrain immigration. Yet interests can be 
properly considered in domain-specific ways. To the extent that trade policies affect 
interests, for instance, we should ensure that such policies are fair, but that does not 
mean one must enfranchise everyone connected to a country by trade arrangements. 
We also need morally acceptable immigration policies that spell out how many 
people from country A have a claim to immigration to country B. But once these 
claims are met, no additional demands, especially to enfranchisement, arise. Moral 
acceptability here does not require consent.
The next question is whether the global order harms the poor because there is a feasible alternative under which the situation of the global poor is improved, as presented by Pogge (2002). Pogge seems to think “feasibility” is primarily a matter of allocating money. It would just take 1.2 percent of the income of rich economies, $312 billion annually, to bridge the aggregate shortfall of those living on less than $1 per day to the $2 line (2002, 7). Pogge’s proposal for raising some of those funds is the Global Resource Dividend, which taxes extraction of resources. Yet while Pogge’s calculations show that abject poverty could be surmounted if closing such a gap is a matter of transferring money, it is doubtful whether financial transfers are enough to seriously mitigate poverty. Suppose in situation S1 we have the funds to cover the financial shortfall. We still need reliable ways of distributing funds to individuals who do not simply have bank accounts that they can securely access. We would also need an environment in which individuals can actually spend the money on available goods and services. Both of these scenarios involve institutional improvements, especially if one wants the changes to be lasting. Similar points apply if one wishes to support medical and educational advancements. One cannot simply start to “work on AIDS” but instead must build and maintain medical infrastructure. One cannot improve education by building a few schoolhouses but must also invest in teacher training and provision of books, supplies, family support, and much else.

That sustainable measures for enduring changes require good institutions has become a guiding insight for many at the intersection between the social sciences of development and its practice. Having funds to close the aggregate financial shortfall between S1 and S2 is at best necessary but not sufficient for S2 to be feasible. Pogge may respond that while it is true that money does not automatically educate or cure anyone, the money would be used precisely to take care of these issues in appropriate ways. Money is not enough by itself, but the other necessary conditions normally require money. This is fair enough, but the relevant points now are these: We have found a sense in which the poor are wrongfully harmed, namely, if not enough effort goes into exploring possibilities for implementing appropriate institutional change. But while this is presumably a valid charge, it makes it much harder than it appears in Pogge’s proposal to ascertain how to go about creating a feasible alternative and who is guilty of what failings in this regard.

9. Does the Global Order Wrongfully Harm the Poor? Part 2

Let us consider the import of poverty and inequality statistics. Statistics do not show in any obvious way that the global order harms (let alone wrongfully harms) the poor. For instance, while indeed 1.2 billion people in 1998 lived below the poverty line of $1.08 PPP 1993 per day (Pogge 2002, 98), there is now less misery than ever
before, as measured in terms of any standard development indicator. The progress made over the past 200 years is miraculous. In 1820, 75 percent of the world population lived on less than $1 a day (appropriately adjusted). Today, in Europe, almost no one does. In China, the figure is fewer than 20 percent; in South Asia, around 40 percent; and altogether slightly more than 20 percent. The share of people living on less than $1 a day fell from 42 percent in 1950 to 17 percent in 1992. Historically almost everyone was poor, but that is no longer true.

What conclusion such statistics warrant depends on (a) the period considered (“Sub-Saharan Africa has made progress over a 200-year horizon, but not for the last 20 years”); (b) whether one looks at absolute or relative quantities (“the number of abysmally poor has remained unchanged for 15 years, but their share of the world population decreased”); and (c) whether one looks at individuals or countries (“the median developing country has experienced zero growth over the last 20 years; still, inequality between two randomly chosen individuals has fallen”—because of growth in India and China). Still, what is remarkable is not that so many now live in poverty but that so many do not; not that so many die young but that so many do not; not that so many are illiterate but that so many are literate. If one looks at the past 200, 100, or even 50 years, things have improved dramatically for the poor. The 200-year and the 50-year horizon (roughly speaking) are especially significant. The former captures the period when the industrial revolution perfected the system of the division of labor, which led to technological advancements across the board, advancements originating largely in what are now industrialized countries but that have worked to everyone’s benefit. The 50-year horizon captures the period when the global order came into its own. Historically speaking, the global order at least seems to have benefited the poor dramatically.

Surely, one may say, developing countries are better off than 200 years ago, but should we not assess if wrongful harm has occurred by asking what things would be like had European supremacists never invaded the rest of the globe? The trouble is that it is impossible to say anything about this benchmark. What are we to make of the idea that the world would be a better place if states had never emerged, or if colonialism had never happened? Such questions defy sensible answers. It is hard (if not impossible) to assess when agents came close to deciding differently, or natural events may readily have occurred in other ways. It is equally hard to assess what alternate course would then have emerged. Had Europeans not colonized Africa, alternate political structures may have allowed indigenous peoples to exploit their continent’s wealth to build prosperous civilizations. It is also conceivable that war would have thwarted such efforts. According to Herbst (2000), physical geography in Africa impeded the emergence of powerful states.

There is yet another way of articulating the thought that developing countries are being harmed by the global order: a benchmark of fairness, the reference point being a state of nature where resources are distributed fairly. “Worldwide 34,000 children under age five die daily from hunger and preventable diseases. Try to conceive a state of nature that can match this amazing feat of our globalized civilization!” writes Pogge (2004, 274). Yet state-of-nature references cannot distinguish
between the view that the global order does harm and any other view explaining how such poverty could arise. Such references show only that the situation is not as we would have hoped. Whatever else is true, among the three benchmarks we have considered, the historical benchmark is the only one of which we can make sense. In terms of that benchmark, the global order has brought tremendous advances.

10. CONCLUDING REMARKS

There are many questions about global justice that I have been unable to discuss here. For example, the philosophical foundations of human rights have attracted much attention recently. (See the chapter by Alan Buchanan in this volume.) Topics that are in need of much more, and are accessible to, philosophical analysis include immigration and fairness in trade. In need of but less accessible to philosophical analysis is the question of how to distribute the burdens from climate change. Deserving of more attention are also political and economic structures other than states. We must explore, for instance, what demands of justice, but also what types of accountability, apply to entities such as the WTO or the European Union.

Political philosophy would also benefit tremendously from systematic resurrection of the topic of humanity’s collective ownership of the earth. (See the chapter by Peter Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism,” in this volume.) To illustrate, suppose the population of the United States shrinks to two people, but these two people control access through border-surveillance mechanisms. Nothing changes elsewhere. Surely these two should permit immigration since they are grossly under-using their area. We can best explain this view by the fact that all of humanity has claims to the earth. Immigration is but one topic that such theorizing could illuminate. Humanity’s ownership of the earth was the pivotal theme of seventeenth-century political philosophy. In an age in which global problems have become central, we have much to gain from reinvigorating that standpoint.

NOTES

1. Many thanks to Micha Glaeser, Gabriel Wollner, and David Estlund for helpful comments.
2. I disregard differences between citizenship and permanent residency and speak of shared membership.
3. Some of my terminology draws on Sangiovanni (2007), yet my usage deviates from his. For instance, globalism, on my account, is by definition a relationist view. To remember the relationist meaning of this term easily, the reader should connote it with *global order* rather than with *globe*.