Research
Research
IN PRESS
“The Relation Between Anti-Abstractionism and Idealism in Berkeley’s Metaphysics,” forthcoming in British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
“Hume’s Theory of Pity and Malice,” forthcoming in British Journal for the History of Philosophy.
“The Contrast-Insensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions,” forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
“Locke’s ‘Sensitive Knowledge’: Knowledge or Assurance?” forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, vol. 7.
“Will and Motivation,” forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century.
“Qualities,” forthcoming in The Routledge Companion to Seventeenth Century Philosophy.
“Should Philosophers Become Public Intellectuals?” forthcoming in Global Academe: The Location of Public Intellectual Discourse.
“Georges Dicker’s Berkeley’s Idealism: A Critical Examination, forthcoming in Berkeley Studies.
IN PROGRESS
Berkeley’s Argument for Idealism (monograph)
George Berkeley is famous for his embrace of four theses: (i) idealism, the view that physical objects are nothing but collections of ideas (first announced in A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)), (ii) immaterialism, the view that there is no such thing as material substance, (iii) anti-abstractionism, the view that abstract ideas are impossible, and (iv) the likeness principle, the thesis that an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Although the structure of Berkeley’s world view is fairly well understood, it remains a matter of controversy why he takes idealism to be true. While some hold that Berkeley’s argument rests on immaterialism, others hold that the argument rests on anti-abstractionism, and yet others hold that the argument rests on the likeness principle. In this book, I argue that Berkeley’s argument rests neither on immaterialism nor on the likeness principle. I also argue that Berkeley distinguishes between two kinds of abstraction, “singling” abstraction and “generalizing” abstraction, and that his argument for idealism depends on the impossibility of singling abstraction (but not on the impossibility of generalizing abstraction). The heart of the argument, which does not appear in full until the publication of Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713), rests on the distinction between mediate and immediate perception (a distinction that plays a crucial role in An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision (1709)), and in particular on the thesis that everything that is perceived by means of the senses is immediately perceived. After analyzing the argument, I conclude that it is valid and may well be sound. This is Berkeley’s most enduring philosophical legacy.
WORK IN PREPARATION
Locke (monograph, under contract with Blackwell, part of the Great Minds Series, edited by Steven Nadler)
Locke is one of the most important figures in the history of western philosophy. Along with Descartes, he is largely responsible for setting the terms of numerous debates that engaged his immediate philosophical successors and that remain live to this day. His metaphysics, ethics, political philosophy, and even his philosophy of language (though, interestingly, not his epistemology), continue to inspire contemporary scholars of these fields. It is impossible to consider the problem of personal identity over time, the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, the question of free will, the content of natural rights, the justification for the state, and the meaning of natural kind terms without turning first to Locke’s thoughts on these matters. It is also impossible to understand the development of western philosophy after Locke without understanding the theory of ideas that is central to every aspect of his work. The point of this book is to introduce and examine the most important of Locke’s philosophical contributions in these areas, with particular emphasis on his two great masterpieces, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and the Second Treatise on Government.
PUBLICATIONS
Access to some of the papers listed below requires a personal or university subscription to Blackwell Synergy, JSTOR, Lexis-Nexis, and other commercial databases. If access is blocked, please contact me and I will be glad to email you a copy of the relevant paper.
“Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition,” Theoria 78 (2012): 6-25.
Review of Jonathan Kramnick, Actions and Objects from Hobbes to Richardson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, April 17, 2011.
“The Moral Status of Enabling Harm,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2011): 66-86.
“Plato’s Definition(s) of Sophistry,” Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 289-298.
Review of Francis A. Grabowski III, Plato, Metaphysics and the Forms, Ancient Philosophy 30 (2010): 428-432.
Review Essay on Marc A. Hight’s Idea and Ontology: An Essay in Early Modern Metaphysics of Ideas, Berkeley Studies 20 (2009).
Review of John Russell Roberts, A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, Philosophical Review 118 (2009): 244-247.
“Is Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Inconsistent?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 83-104.
“The Right to Privacy Unveiled,” San Diego Law Review 44:1 (2007): 773-799.
“Plato’s Parmenides.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. August 2007.
Plato’s Forms in Transition: A Reading of the Parmenides
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, December 2006)
There is a mystery at the heart of Plato’s Parmenides. In the first part, Parmenides criticizes what is widely regarded as Plato’s mature theory of forms, and, in the second, he promises to explain how the forms can be saved from these criticisms. Ever since the dialogue was written, scholars have struggled to determine how the two parts of the work fit together. Did Plato mean us to abandon, keep, or modify the theory of forms, on the strength of Parmenides’ criticisms? In order to answer this question, I provide a careful reconstruction of every argument in the dialogue. I conclude that Plato’s main aim was to argue that the theory of forms should be modified by allowing that forms can have contrary properties. To grasp this is to solve the mystery of the Parmenides and understand its crucial role in Plato’s philosophical development.
“Locke’s Polemic Against Nativism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Lex Newman (Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 33-66.
“Binding Arguments and Hidden Variables,” (with Jonathan Cohen) Analysis 67 (2007): 65-71.
“Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage: A Response to Calhoun,” San Diego Law Review 42:3 (2005): 1043-1048.
“A Synthetic Approach to Legal Adjudication,” San Diego Law Review 42:2 (2005): 519-532.
“The Coherence of Orthodox Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence,” George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal 15 (2005): 261-296.
“The Cartesian Fallacy Fallacy,” Noûs 39 (2005): 309-336.
“From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2004): 554-577.
“Warfield’s New Argument for Incompatibilism” (with Dana K. Nelkin), Analysis 62 (2002): 104-107.
“Review Essay: Gideon Yaffe’s Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency,” Locke Studies (2001): 235-255.
“Religious Arguments and the Duty of Civility,” Public Affairs Quarterly 15 (2001): 133-154.
“How to Solve Blum’s Paradox” (with Dana K. Nelkin), Analysis 61 (2001): 91-94.
“Miranda, Dickerson, and the Problem of Actual Innocence,” Criminal Justice Ethics 19 (2000): 53-55.
“Locke on the Freedom to Will,” The Locke Newsletter 31 (2000): 43-67.
“How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms,” Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 501-554.
“The Semantic Function of Chained Pronouns,” Analysis 58 (1998): 297-304.
“Socrates’ Moral Intellectualism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1998): 355-367.
“The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing,” Philosophical Review 106 (1997): 555-575.
“Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (1997): 297-319.